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This thesis is made up of three papers in the areas of labor, environmental, and 
behavioral economics. The first paper examines the impact that trade liberalization has 
had on wage inequality in Mexico since the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) was enacted in the mid 1990s. The second and third papers examine the 
problem of how to boost support for land uses widely perceived to benefit society, but 
present net costs to their prospective host communities. Such land uses have been termed 
not-in-my-backyard or NIMBY projects. I use wind farms as the type of NIMBY project 
to test the ideas in the latter two papers.  
In the first paper, I attempt to isolate one piece of NAFTA’s effect on wage 
inequality. I match annual industry wage and employment data with data on the tariffs the 
U.S. and Canada impose on goods from Mexico. A difficulty in isolating NAFTA’s 
effects through changes in U.S. and Canadian tariffs on Mexican exports is that these 
tariffs are highly correlated with the tariffs that Mexico’s other major trading partners 
impose on imports from Mexico. Since exports to these countries impact Mexican wages, 
leaving these relationships out of a model for estimation will leave the estimates for the 
effect that U.S. and Canadian tariffs have on wages biased. Since tariff data for this 
period is available for one of Mexico’s other top importers, I include this data to help 
mitigate the bias. The result is that the estimates for the effect that U.S. and Canadian 
tariffs have increase several fold. However, because the U.S. and Canada had little room 
left to lower their tariffs on the manufactured goods evaluated here, the small changes in 
tariffs that occurred in the post-NAFTA period result in calculations that attribute a less 
than one percent change in inequality to changes in U.S. and Canadian tariffs on Mexican 
exports.  
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Additionally, it has been widely noted that while Mexico has a low-skill 
advantage compared to the U.S. and Canada, it may not be abundant in low-skilled labor 
in the global sense. Namely at the same time the U.S. and Canada lowered tariffs on 
Mexican exports, they also lowered tariffs on Chinese exports. With China arguably 
being the most abundant country in the world in low-skilled labor, Chinese exports to 
Mexico’s NAFTA partners could well be expected to cut into demand for Mexican 
products. I account for this effect by interacting the tariffs the U.S. and Canada charge on 
Mexican exports with the tariffs they respectively charge on Chinese exports. Since the 
tariffs the U.S. and Canada charge on Chinese exports are correlated with the tariffs they 
charge on goods from their other major exporters, I include tariffs from these partners as 
well to cut down on bias. The result is that this China effect is statistically significant. 
However, since the U.S. and Canada had already brought their tariffs on Chinese exports 
down to very low levels by 1995, the small changes each made in the post-NAFTA 
period appeared to have caused only miniscule changes in inequality in Mexico.  
The second paper analyzes how the more directly someone in a prospective host 
community sees compensation as addressing their concerns over a proposed land use, the 
less likely the person may be to see the offer of compensation as a bribe. Other studies 
note an often significant bribe effect, but cannot distinguish why one form of 
compensation might be seen as a bribe while another worth the same amount of money 
might not be. The NIMBY literature notes that compensation perceived as appropriate is 
more likely to be acceptable, but offers reasons that can primarily only be applied ex post 
in determining why a given offer of compensation might be seen as appropriate. The 
theory developed here can be applied ex ante in developing compensation and mitigation 
packages that are likely to be seen as appropriate and therefore acceptable.  
The theory developed here was tested in a survey on central Illinois residents 
regarding their responses to offers of different forms of compensation and mitigation for 
a hypothetical proposed wind farm. This population was chosen as it is made up of 
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residents who primarily live in areas that are likely to face future wind farm development. 
The results here can be interpreted as how individuals might initially react to a proposed 
wind farm with accompanying offers of compensation and mitigation. The results are 
consistent with the idea that the more (less) directly individuals see compensation or 
mitigation as addressing their concerns, the less (more) likely they are to see it as a bribe. 
The results are robust to different estimation methods and a number of specifications.  
 The NIMBY literature notes that offering compensation can cause support 
associated with civic duty to decline. No such decline is detected in the research here. 
However, since the wind farm proposed in the survey used here poses few or no 
perceived threats to public health, it differs dramatically from the nuclear waste sites 
associated with this crowding out of support associated with civic duty. That support 
associated with civic duty does not decline significantly is important since for all 
respondents and those with initially neutral or lower support, civic duty does appear to be 
a driving factor behind individuals’ support for the wind farm proposed. Further, while 
only a minority of respondents initially opposed the wind farm, most of them did not hold 
what are often referred to as NIMBY attitudes. Most of those who opposed the wind farm 
also opposed wind power in general. Indeed, respondents’ support or opposition towards 
wind power in general was one of the strongest predictors of how much respondents 
supported or opposed the wind farm proposed. The results here suggest that overcoming 
opposition to wind power in general may be especially helpful in overcoming opposition 
to wind farms in individuals’ back yards.  
The third paper primarily examines the effect of others’ support on individuals’ 
support for a wind farm hypothetically proposed one mile from their home. It also 
investigates how others’ support may affect individuals’ support for wind power in 
general and how directly individuals see compensation as addressing their concerns. 
Others’ support is only found to significantly affect support for the wind farm among 
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those who have neutral or lower support for wind power in general. It is especially 
noteworthy that others’ support significantly affects these groups since the finding is 
consistent with conformity as a driving force, but not reciprocity—two of the primary 
behaviors believed to motivate conditional cooperation. Others’ support will only move a 
reciprocator to engage in a kind act—one that s/he believes will confer some benefit to 
others or society. It is unlikely that those who have neutral or lower support for wind 
power believe hosting a wind farm constitutes a kind act. Alternatively, it could be that 
respondents in these groups saw high others’ support as signaling fewer impacts from the 
wind farm than they previously expected. For respondents in these groups, there was no 
significant difference in the impacts expected among those in the high treatment group 
versus those in the low group. However, the results for those with neutral or lower 
support for wind power may be sensitive to the small number of respondents who 
indicated these levels of support.  
 It also appears that others’ support for the wind farm proposed positively affects 
individuals’ support for wind power in general. Whether this effect is long-lasting or 
fleeting cannot be determined from the data gathered. It also appears that others’ support 
positively affected how directly the following groups saw compensation as addressing 
their concerns: those with initially neutral or lower support for the proposed wind farm 
and those with neutral or lower support for wind power in general. While the effect of 
how directly respondents saw compensation as addressing their concerns is positively 
significant for all respondents, those with initially neutral or lower support for the wind 
farm proposed, and those with high support for wind power in general, it is not for those 
with neutral or lower support for wind power in general.  Overall, the work here finds 
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that others’ support does appear to have significantly affected individuals’ behavior in a 
real world setting—providing further evidence to the literature that conditional 
cooperation may matter in how individuals make significant economic decisions in their 
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THE EFFECT OF LOWERED TARIFFS FROM THE U.S. AND 
CANADA ON MEXICAN INCOME INEQUALITY: AN 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DIRECT AND THIRD 
PARTY IMPACT OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION UNDER 
NAFTA 
1.1 Introduction 
The North American Free Trade Agreement’s (NAFTA) impact on income 
inequality in Mexico has been a puzzle. In the ten years following the agreement’s 
enactment in 1994, Mexico’s income inequality had increased even though such an 
outcome is at odds with neoclassical economic theory (Polaski 2004b). As a country 
relatively abundant in low-skilled labor compared to its cosigners the U.S. and Canada, 
trade liberalization should have led to an increase in demand for low-skill intense goods 
made in Mexico. On the export side, lower U.S. and Canadian tariffs Mexican goods 
should have increased demand for low-skilled labor more than high-skilled, causing low-
skilled wages to rise more than high-skilled—lowering income inequality. On the import 
side, Mexico could have been expected to ramp up its imports of the relatively high-skill 
intense products in which the U.S. and Canada have a comparative advantage. This 
change in imports should have decreased demand for high-skill labor proportionately 
more than for low-skilled, again causing inequality to decline. But inequality rose.  
Yet income inequality may have risen in the post-NAFTA era not because of 
trade liberalization, but in spite of it. The post-NAFTA period was characterized by a 
huge amount of change apart from the trade liberalization called for in the agreement. 
These events could well be expected to offset changes in income associated with 
NAFTA. For example, in 1994 there was the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas, the peso 
crisis and devaluation, a rise in crime and kidnappings, and reduced electoral fraud. In 
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1995, $29 billion of government debt service notes came due, but the government found 
itself unable to pay. Mexico’s government ultimately created an emergency economic 
plan to tighten fiscal and monetary policy as well as restrain wages. The plan ultimately 
led to a $20 billion contribution from the U.S. government, $10 billion from the Bank for 
International Settlements, and $17.8 billion from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
(Country Profile Mexico  2004). Further, the oil price collapse in 1998 hit Mexico 
especially hard as it ranks among the earth’s largest oil producers. Especially significant 
in 2000, Mexico’s central bank began maintaining the free and floating peso—previously 
limited to a banded exchange rate. NAFTA may have reduced wage inequality, but it 
would be difficult to tell at a glance when so much else occurred with the potential to 
affect wages in the same period.  
 In this paper, I attempt to isolate one piece of NAFTA’s effect on wage 
inequality. I match annual industry wage and employment data with data on the tariffs the 
U.S. and Canada impose on goods from Mexico. While this is just one piece of the story 
regarding NAFTA’s effect on wages, it is one that is not often told. It appears most work 
on how NAFTA affects wages in Mexico focuses on Mexico’s trade restrictions on its 
imports—neglecting the export side. A difficulty in isolating NAFTA’s effects through 
changes in U.S. and Canadian tariffs on Mexican exports is that these tariffs are highly 
correlated with the tariffs Mexico’s other major trading partners impose on imports from 
Mexico. Since exports to these countries impact Mexican wages, leaving these 
relationships out of a model for estimation will leave the estimates for the effect U.S. and 
Canadian tariffs have on wages biased. Since tariff data for this period is available for 
one of Mexico’s other top importers, I include this data to help mitigate the bias. The 
result is that the estimates for the effect U.S. and Canadian tariffs have increase several 
fold. However, because the U.S. and Canada had little room left to lower their tariffs on 
the manufactured goods evaluated here, the small changes in tariffs that occurred in the 
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post-NAFTA period result in calculations that attribute a less than one percent change in 
inequality to changes in U.S. and Canadian tariffs on Mexican exports.  
Lastly, it has been widely noted that while Mexico has a low-skill advantage 
compared to the U.S. and Canada, it may not be abundant in low-skilled labor in the 
global sense (Polaski 2004b, 2004a). Namely at the same time the U.S. and Canada 
lowered tariffs on Mexican exports, they also lowered tariffs on Chinese exports. With 
China arguably being the most abundant country in the world in low-skilled labor, 
Chinese exports to Mexico’s NAFTA partners could well be expected to cut into demand 
for Mexican products. I account for this effect by interacting the tariffs the U.S. and 
Canada charge on Mexican exports with the tariffs they respectively charge on Chinese 
exports. Since the tariffs the U.S. and Canada charge on Chinese exports are correlated 
with the tariffs they charge on goods from their other major exporters, I include tariffs 
from these partners as well to cut down on bias. The result is that this China effect is 
statistically significant. However, since the U.S. and Canada had already brought their 
tariffs on Chinese exports down to low, low levels by 1995, the small changes each made 
in the post-NAFTA period appeared to have caused only miniscule changes in inequality 
in Mexico.  
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it provides an 
analysis of how tariffs on Mexico’s exports affect wages in Mexico whereas most studies 
look at how Mexico’s tariffs on other countries’ exports affect Mexican wages. Second, 
the paper shows that when secondary relationships are not accounted for, estimates for 
the effect tariffs placed directly on Mexican exports have on wages may be downwardly 
biased in magnitude—underestimating the effect tariffs have on wages. Third, the paper 
provides what appear to be the first estimates for the impact changes in U.S. and 
Canada’s tariffs on goods from other countries—namely China—have on wages in 
Mexico.  
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This paper has five remaining sections. Section 1.2 surveys the relevant literature 
and provides a country background. Section 1.3 discusses the data used. Section 1.4 
presents the estimation methods and descriptive statistics relevant to selecting the 
methods chosen. Section 1.5 shows and analyzes the main econometric results. Section 
1.6 concludes. 
1.2 Literature Review and Country Background 
A two-by-two Heckscher-Ohlin model where the inputs are low- and high-skilled 
labor yields the prediction that when two countries trade, the one that is relatively 
abundant in low-skilled labor will export the good that is relatively production-intense in 
low-skilled labor and import the good that is relatively intense in high-skilled labor 
(Wood 1997). In the country that is relatively abundant in low-skilled labor, these 
changes in trade cause the demand to increase for the domestically produced low-skill 
intense product and decrease for the domestically produced high-skill intense product.  
The Stolper-Samuelson theorem links these changes in demand for outputs to the 
effect they have on wages for inputs with the net effect that low-skilled wages increase 
and high-skilled wages decrease (widely cited as a result from combining the Heckscher-
Ohlin model with the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem e.g. (Anderson 2005; Goldberg and 
Pavcnik 2007; Verhoogen 2008; Robertson 2004, 2007; Wood 1997)). Low-skilled 
wages are expected to rise because the increased demand for the low-skilled good is 
expected to offset the decrease in demand for the high-skilled good. High-skilled wages 
are expected to go down because the decreased demand for high-skilled good is expected 
not to be offset by the increase demand for the low-skilled good.  
However, there are a number of reasons a country abundant in low-skilled labor 
could expect wage inequality to increase when liberalizing trade with high-skill abundant 
countries. For instance, the assumptions in the two-by-two model are often violated and 
adapting it to incorporate these violations can radically change the model’s predictions 
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(Davis and Mishra 2007). As an example, many imported goods in developing countries 
are not substitutes for or are only weak substitutes for goods produced domestically. 
When this is the case and import restrictions are eased on these goods, the model predicts 
there will be no or only small changes in wages with potentially no changes in inequality. 
In addition, the supply of low-skilled workers is much more elastic than that for high-
skilled workers, so even if demand increases proportionately more for low- than high-
skilled workers, the end result can still be an increase in wage inequality (Cragg and 
Epelbaum 1996).1 Further still, exporting firms often produce goods that are more skill 
intense than non-exporting firms. In turn, as a low-skill abundant country increases its 
exports to a high-skill intense country, the demand for high-skill workers may grow faster 
than that for low-skill workers—increasing wage inequality (Verhoogen 2008). Lastly, 
even countries abundant in low-skilled labor can protect low-skill intense industries 
enough to allow for substantial rent sharing with low-skilled workers. When countries 
like this liberalize trade, these previously protected industries can face increased 
competition in output markets that leads them to lower the share of rents paid to low-skill 
workers (Revenga 1997).  
So while the standard model predicts that Mexico’s liberalizing trade with the 
U.S. and Canada should have resulted in less wage inequality, there are several reasons 
the opposite could occur. When Mexico joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) in 1986, it liberalized trade with countries that were both more and less 
proportionally abundant in low-skilled labor. Since Mexico was likely globally 
proportionally abundant in low-skilled labor but liberalized trade with countries that were 
both more and less proportionally abundant, it could be expected that this round of trade 
                                                
1 Changes in tariffs on inputs can further confound the predictions from a 2x2 model (Davis and Mishra 
2007; Leamer 1996). But since this paper is concerned with outputs (the data used in this paper make it 
impossible to plausibly link inputs to their respective outputs) and uses data on production and trade 
restrictions at the four-digit level, changes in trade restrictions at this level can reasonably be expected to be 
uncorrelated with changes in trade restrictions on inputs. This reduces the likelihood that estimates here 
suffer from omitted variable bias in this respect. In turn, the discussion here of the effect changes in trade 
restrictions can have on wages is limited to tariffs on outputs. 
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liberalization might increase wage inequality. In a Lerner diagram with cones of 
diversification, Davis (1996) shows that a country in Mexico’s situation joining the list of 
nations in the GATT may see an increase in wage inequality.  
But there is another reason that Mexico’s wage inequality could have been 
expected to rise when it signed the GATT. At the time, Mexico had much higher import 
restrictions on low-skill than high-skill intense products despite the country having a 
presumed comparative advantage in low-skill intense goods (Feliciano 2001; Hanson and 
Harrison 1999; Revenga 1997; Robertson 2000b). These protections may have kept these 
goods’ prices higher than in a more competitive economy. With competing imports 
restricted, unions representing low-skilled labor may have been able to negotiate rent 
sharing agreements better than in perfectly competitive markets—raising wages further 
above the level that a two-by-two model would predict. Using annual plant level data at 
the four-digit level, Revenga (1997) allows for these effects in her empirics and finds that 
the decline in demand for these outputs and associated inputs attributable to trade 
liberalization caused wages to go down by approximately three-to-four percent. She finds 
that trade liberalization lowered wages still more by reducing the proportion of rents 
shared with low-skilled workers. After Mexico joined the list of GATT members, Mexico 
eased trade restrictions on imports that competed with those produced in the low-skill 
intense sector much more than on imports that competed with goods produced with 
proportionately more high-skilled labor (Feliciano 2001; Hanson and Harrison 1999; 
Revenga 1997; Robertson 2000b). As a result, the trade liberalization in Mexico 
associated with its becoming a member of the GATT hit low-skilled labor hardest 
resulting in increased wage inequality.  
Like Revenga, Hanson and Harrison (1999) use plant level data at the four-digit 
level and find that reduced tariffs appear to have hit low-skilled industries hardest. They 
find that reduced tariffs significantly affect output prices but they find no correlation 
between prices and wages. However, Hanson and Harrison appear to use the change in 
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wages between 1984 and 1990 rather than annual wages as in Revenga, giving them a 
single observation per four-digit manufacturing industry. This brings their observations 
per regression down to 109-125 compared to Revenga’s which each had between 695 and 
812. Their metrics also do not allow them to account for time dynamics in wages—
increasing the likelihood of a type two error.  
Robertson (2004) finds that the relative price of skill-intense goods rose after 
Mexico joined the GATT and finds a strong, consistent link between output prices and 
wages using more detailed price data than Hanson and Harrison (1999). Robertson also 
allows for a lag between changes in prices and wages using a band pass filter. He finds 
there is a three-to-five year lag between changes in product prices and wages.  
In contrast to Revenga (1997), Feliciano (2001) estimates that decreases in import 
license coverage reduced wages in reformed industries by two percent but did not affect 
employment and had no effect on relative wages or employment. There is however a 
significant risk that Feliciano underestimates the impact that GATT had on wages and 
employment, both absolute and relative. The wage data she uses for her dependent 
variable comes from a data set that categorizes individuals’ employment at the one-or-
two-digit level. First, this guarantees for the three years of data she analyzes (1986, 1988, 
and 1990) there will be significantly less variation in tariffs than studies that use data at 
the four-digit level. Second, it guarantees that tariffs at this level will be matched to 
individuals in industries that in actuality face very different levels of trade protections. 
Third, the more aggregated the tariff data is on outputs, the more likely it is to be 
correlated with tariffs on inputs, which have the opposite effects on wages. This raises the 
likelihood that the tariff estimates are correlated with significant variables in the error 
term, potentially causing her estimates to be biased. That Feliciano also regresses wages 
against their associated tariff or import license coverage ratio in the same year rather than 
allowing for lags further increases the likelihood that her estimates may be incorrectly 
insignificant. 
7
In contrast to all of the above findings, Esquivel and Rodriguez-Lopez (2003) find 
that in the GATT period, trade liberalization reduced wage inequality while technological 
change increased it. The authors use a mandated wage approach developed by Leamer 
(1996) with no data on trade restrictions or trade in which a “globalization effect” is 
meant to capture the effect of trade liberalization. The authors point out that this estimate 
in fact captures anything that affects wages beyond changes in productivity. This makes 
for a less-than-desirable measure for the effect of trade liberalization. 
When Mexico enacted NAFTA with the U.S. and Canada in 1994, the country 
faced a decidedly different situation than when it joined the GATT. By this time, Mexico 
had significantly lowered trade restrictions across the board. In 1985, import licenses 
covered 92 percent of domestic products but in 1993 covered only 16.5 percent (Esquivel 
and Rodriguez-Lopez 2003). The national average weighted tariff also fell from 25.4 
percent in 1985 to 11.8 percent in 1987 with the largest tariff at 20 percent. More so, in 
this round of liberalization Mexico opened itself up to trade with only countries that were 
more proportionally abundant in high-skilled labor. So at least in a two-by-two model, it 
could be expected that increased liberalization would lessen wage inequality. Even 
though Mexico had already dropped its tariffs substantially, the liberalization called for in 
NAFTA could be expected to have a significant effect since trade with Canada and 
especially the U.S. accounts for the overwhelming majority of Mexico’s trade. According 
to data from the World Bank’s World Integrated Trade Solution, between 1994 and 2003, 
the U.S. imported more than 40 times as much from Mexico (in U.S. dollars) than the 
next largest importer, Canada. The U.S. also increased its imports from Mexico more 
than any other country. Canada imported more than twice the value of the next largest 
importer. In the same period, Mexico was the third largest exporter to the U.S. and fourth 
largest to Canada.2 So in addition to affecting inequality through the channels allowed in 
                                                
2 See Tables 1.1-1.6 for calculations referenced in this paragraph. 
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perfect competition, there again existed the potential for trade liberalization to reduce rent 
sharing.  
Robertson (2004) finds that tariffs had a much smaller effect on product prices in 
Mexico for the NAFTA period compared to the GATT period.3 Consistent with a 2x2 
model where a country liberalizes trade with other countries that are relatively more skill 
abundant, he finds that the relative price of skill-intense goods and wage inequality began 
to fall after NAFTA was enacted. Hanson (2003) estimates the impact NAFTA has had 
on wages by estimating modified Mincer equations for 1990 and 2000—comparing 
which coefficients are significantly different in the regressions for each year. Hanson 
uses no data for trade or trade restrictions, essentially treating Mexico’s trade 
liberalization as an experiment with NAFTA as the treatment. He finds that trade reforms 
appear to have raised the demand for highly skilled labor, reducing the rents to low-
skilled industries. He finds little evidence that Mexico’s wages have converged to those 
in the United States. Esquivel and Rodriguez-Lopez (2003) use the mandated wage 
approach to analyze NAFTA’s effect on wages, finding that NAFTA lowered real wages 
in roughly equal proportions for both low and high-skilled workers. As in their analysis 
of GATT’s effect on wages, they use no data for trade or trade policy. Verhoogen (2008) 
argues that trade liberalization can cause changes both within and between industries 
whereas Robertson (2000a) argues that changes in trade policy affect wages between 
industries while changes in technology affect wages within them. Robertson argues that 
changes in trade policy for a particular industry cause shifts in the industry’s demand for 
labor which causes the industry to hire labor away from or shed labor to other industries. 
Changes in technology on the other hand, he proposes, constitute changes within 
industries. Verhoogen, however, argues that trade policy can affect wages within 
industries since the more productive plants export while the lesser do not—with 
exporting firms paying higher wages. As barriers to trade are lowered, more firms enter 
                                                
3 The GATT period refers to 1985-1993 and the NAFTA period refers to 1993-1999. 
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the export market raising both the quality of goods and wages paid within the industry. 
Instead of using data on trade or trade liberalization, Verhoogen treats the peso 
devaluation of 1994-1995 as a treatment in a natural experiment. He uses a triple-
difference approach comparing the peso crisis period of 1993-1997 to 1989-1993 and 
1997-2001 where there were no devaluations. He finds results that support his hypothesis 
that the peso crisis induced within-industry wage inequality. 
As the authors above find, when Mexico and its partners change their trade 
policies with each other, this can be expected to affect wages and employment within 
Mexico. But at the same time these changes occurred, Mexico’s partners also changed 
trade policies with other countries. When these other countries’ exports to Mexico’s 
partners are substitutable with those from Mexico, changes in trade policy with these 
secondary parties can affect the demand for goods from Mexico, subsequently affecting 
wages and employment within Mexico. Sargent and Matthews (2008), for example, note 
that goods from firms in China’s export processing zones may compete with goods from 
Mexico’s Maquiladoras. Additionally, as India and China—with their abundance of low-
skilled labor—ramp up their exports, countries that once may have had a comparative 
advantage with their partners in low-skilled labor may see their advantage decline 
(Hanson 2003; Wood 1997). This change can contribute to an increase in wage inequality 
in countries like Mexico. Among exporters to the U.S. from 1994-2003, China increased 
its exports to the U.S. by approximately $80 billion (USD adjusted to year 2000), almost 
twice as much as the next biggest increase of approximately $41 billion by Mexico.4 
China was also the number four exporter to the U.S. in this period, just behind Mexico.5  
China was the number three exporter to Canada, ahead of Mexico by just under $3 
billion.6 China also increased it exports to Canada in that period by an estimated $8.7 
                                                
4 See Table 1.3. 
5 See Table 1.4. 
6 See Table 1.5. 
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billion, more than twice the country with the next largest increase—Mexico.7 This 
situation makes for a very real possibility that Chinese exports to the U.S. and Canada 
may have affected wages in Mexico in the post-NAFTA period.  
It appears there has been little published research on the effect Chinese exports to 
the U.S. and Canada have had on wages or employment in Mexico. Sargent and 
Matthews (2008) appear to be the only ones to have published in this area. The authors 
gather data on a sample of Mexico’s Maquiladoras through plant tours and interviews 
with industry managers. They find that the firms surveyed had adopted business 
strategies centered around their proximity to the U.S. rather than strategies aimed at 
competing in output prices with companies in China’s export processing zones. 
1.3 Data 
The wage data used in this paper are drawn from the Annual Industrial Survey 
(EIA) conducted by Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics, Geography, and Informatics 
(INEGI). The data used in this paper are from the Banco de Información Económica 
(BIE) website: http://dgcnesyp.inegi.gob.mx/. The EIA data posted are averaged at the 
national level by industry-year. The EIA is an annual survey of more than 5,000 
manufacturing firms in Mexico that covers an estimated 65 percent of all people 
employed and 85 percent of total gross output. The breadth and scope of the survey make 
it fairly representative of Mexico’s manufacturing sector, excluding the Maquiladoras 
which are not included in the survey (Encuesta Industrial Anual 205 Clases de Actividad  
2011). The trade and tariff data are drawn from the World Bank’s World Integrated Trade 
Solution (WITS). WITS is perhaps the most comprehensive source of annual bilateral 
trade and trade protection data available. While there is sufficient data on the tariffs 
Mexico’s major partners impose on its exports, the data on tariffs Mexico charges on 
imports is only available for a few unevenly spaced years for the period analyzed in this 
                                                
7 See Table 1.6. 
11
paper. In turn, I have restricted the analysis here to only look at the effect that tariffs on 
Mexico’s exports have on wages. I only look at tariff barriers since a WITS 
representative advised against using the organization’s data on non-tariff barriers because 
of quality concerns. The tariff data used here is at the four-digit level using the Standard 
Industry Classification (SIC) system. 
1.4 Estimation 
I estimate the effect of changes in trade policy on wage inequality using a model 
where the dependent variable is the high-skilled share of total wages and is a function of 
a vector of right-hand side variables. This approach to estimating the effect of different 
variables on wage inequality is commonly used in the literature. e.g. (Airola 2008; 
Aubert, Caroli, and Roger 2006; Feenstra and Hanson 1996, 1997; Haskel and Slaughter 
2002; Robertson 2007). Feenstra and Hanson (1997) note that this approach incorporates 
the effects of both relative wages and relative employment, causing changes in either 
wages or employment of skilled or unskilled labor to affect the ratio. Since the EIA data 
available here does not separate wages or employment according to skill, education, or 
worker status, an alternative method needs to be used to estimate the high-skilled wage 
bill share. I use a method developed by Leamer (1996) and used by Esquivel and 
Rodriguez-Lopez (2003) in a paper published in the Journal of Development Economics. 
The method assumes there are two types of workers, high and low skilled, and that each 
respectively earns the same amount regardless of the industry each is employed in. The 
low skilled wage is found by assuming that the industry with the lowest wages is made up 
entirely of low-skilled workers and that the industry with the highest wages is made up 
entirely of high-skilled employees. Then within each year, the amount spent in each 
industry on low- and high-skilled labor can be found by solving a system of two 
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equations for each industry.8  While this method is clearly imperfect, there is no data set 
that allows a perfect measure of directly observed skill within Mexico that also has 
industry data disaggregated enough to allow accurate matching with and sufficient 
variation in tariff data.9, The most common distinction in other data sets is that between 
obreros and empleados. The distinction separates workers according to whether they are 
considered blue- or white-collar workers. However, there is a sizable chunk of blue- and 
white-collar workers that have overlapping wages—casting doubt on how accurately this 
categorization separates highly-skilled workers from the lowly-skilled (Esquivel and 
Rodriguez-Lopez 2003).  
I estimate both first-differenced and non-differenced models. The first differenced 
model is one of the most commonly used approaches in the literature. While first 
differencing the data purges the estimates of time-invariant effects, it also is equivalent to 
fixed effects estimation (the other most commonly used approach) which provides 
within-industry estimates—purging between industry effects. A difficulty with using this 
approach here is that Robertson (2000a) proposes the bulk of changes in wages due to 
changes in trade policy occur between industries. If this accounts for a large enough 
portion of the change in wages due to changes in trade policy, within estimates will find 
that changes in trade policy have had little effect on wages not because these changes 
have had little effect, but because this is not how trade policy affects wages. However, 
trade policy may have affected wage inequality within industries through the skill-
upgrading mechanism described earlier from Verhoogen (2008). It is because of this 
latter hypothesis and that most research in the literature reports within estimates that they 
are included here.  
                                                
8 One equation is a budget constraint for the total amount spent on wages (
). The second equation is the constraint that the low- and high-skilled labor make-up total employment 
(L+H=E). 
9 The National Survey of Employment and Occupation (ENOE) and the National Income and Expenditure 
Survey (ENIGH), for example, have data on skill or education, but are both entered at the one or two-digit 
industry level. 
wLL + wHH = Total Wage Bill
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I use tariff data to account for changes in trade policy as in Revenga (1997). I do 
not use non-tariff barriers because of the quality concerns mentioned earlier. I exclude 
import penetration ratios since they account for shifts in domestic demand and other 
factors beyond trade policy. Regarding whether to use simple or weighted average tariffs, 
the problems with both measures are well known (Cipollina and Salvatici 2008). Simple 
average tariffs give the same weight to industries that account for a negligible portion of 
a sector’s imports as industries that make up the bulk of the sector’s imports. Meanwhile, 
with weighted average tariffs, as the tariff in an industry goes up, imports can be 
expected to go down, causing the most restricted industries to have the smallest weights. 
In practice though, the difference between simple average and weighted tariffs is often 
small (Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga 2008). For the relationships under analysis in the 
period studied in this paper, the mean simple and weighted tariffs by year are generally 
within one percentage point of each other.10 I report both here since several of the models 
have problems with multicollinearity and it may be helpful to see if the results change 
drastically between the simple and weighted regressions or if the models do not appear to 
be excessively sensitive to small changes in the data. I run separate regressions for 
present tariffs, tariffs lagged three years, four years, and five years. I run regressions for 
tariffs with these lags since Robertson (2004) finds that changes in prices in Mexico may 
take three-to-five years before they affect wages. I run separate regressions for present 
tariffs and each lag since tariffs from year-to-year are highly correlated causing 
significant multicollinearity when all are included. The changes in tariffs’ significance 
from one regression to the next should give an indication of how long it took to affect 
wage inequality. 
From 1994-2003, the U.S. and Canada changed the tariffs they changed on 
imports from a number of countries—not just Mexico. These changes may also have 
affected wages in Mexico. If significant and correlated with the tariffs that the U.S. and 
                                                
10 See Tables 1.7-1.10. 
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Canada charge on imports from Mexico, excluding them from analysis would cause the 
estimates for the effect that the two countries’ tariffs on goods from Mexico have on 
wage inequality to be biased. However, because the tariffs are so highly correlated,11 
accounting for all the relationships causes extreme multicollinearity, with variance 
inflation factors in pre-regression analysis at times exceeding 100. The symptoms of 
multicollinearity are that the coefficients estimated may be sensitive to small changes in 
the data, the coefficients will have high standard errors that may incorrectly cause the 
parameter estimates to be insignificant, and that coefficients may carry the wrong sign 
(Greene 2003). A standard approach to solve the problem of multicollinearity is to 
remove the variables causing the problem. When the dropped variables do not belong in 
the model, this approach comes without significant costs. But removing the problem 
variables here could leave the remaining coefficients significantly biased. Other 
approaches include using a ridge estimator, which would also produced biased estimates, 
or combining several variables at a time into one—constructing principal components. 
Combining several tariffs at a time would eliminate multicollinearity but produce noisy 
measures due to aggregating tariffs that should not be aggregated.  
I take several steps to account for the effect NAFTA has had on wage inequality 
in Mexico via changes in the tariffs the U.S. and Canada charge on Mexico’s exports. 
First, I include the tariffs the U.S. and Canada impose on goods from Mexico. To account 
for the effect that changes in the trade relations the U.S. and Canada maintain with China 
may have, I include interaction terms of the tariffs each country places on goods from 
Mexico and the tariffs they respectively place on goods from China. These estimates may 
however be biased for at least two reasons. First, the tariffs the U.S. and Canada impose 
on Mexico’s exports are significantly correlated with the tariffs that Japan—the fourth 
largest importer of goods from Mexico between 1994 and 200312—charges on Mexican 
                                                
11 See Tables 1.11-1.16. 
12 See Table 1.1. 
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exports.13 It would be ideal include tariffs from all of Mexico’s top five importers, but 
data on the tariffs Spain and Germany—respectively Mexico’s number three and five 
importers—charge on Mexico’s exports are not available.  Second, the tariffs the U.S. 
and Canada impose on Chinese exports are correlated with the tariffs each country 
charges on goods from its other major trading partners.14 Since goods from these other 
partners may be substitutable with goods from Mexico, imports from these countries 
could affect wage inequality in the same way imports from China might. If this is the 
case, excluding these relationships will leave the remaining coefficients biased. The 
models that only account for Mexico’s relationship with the U.S. and Canada, and the 
secondary relationship with China, do not suffer from multicollinearity, but may be 
biased. The models that account for Mexico’s relationship with Japan and more 
secondary relationships suffer from multicollinearity but should be less biased. 
The method used here developed by Leamer (1996) to estimate high and low 
wages is determined entirely by the highest and lowest paying industries each year. This 
may make the results sensitive to changes in these industries that are not related to trade. 
To check for robustness, I rerun all the regressions here but with the high and low salaries 
determined by the top and bottom five percent of industries according to salary each 
year.15 Since this change inherently reduces inequality, it is expected that previously 
significant coefficients may become insignificant.  
I include several control variables to help keep the tariff estimates from being 
correlated with significant components of the error term. I base the set of controls on 
variables previously used in the literature. Although perfect matches are not available in 
the EIA data used here, I use the closest substitutes possible. Robertson (2007) and 
Feenstra and Hanson (1997) define the high-skilled wage share as a function of capital 
and real-value added. Revenga (1997) includes the price of raw materials as a right hand 
                                                
13 See Tables 1.11-1.12 for correlations. 
14 See Tables 1.13-1.16. 
15 These results are available upon request. 
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side variable. To proxy for these variables, I use total gross investment and the natural 
log of total raw and auxiliary materials. I do not take the natural log of total gross 
investment since the variable at times takes on negative values. Since the cost of raw 
materials by industry is available but not prices or quantity data to convert the cost of raw 
materials into prices, I include the cost of raw materials. Following Airola (2008), I 
include year dummies to purge the estimates from bias that could result from correlations 
with other year-to-year changes. This is especially important here since the post-NAFTA 
period has been one of tremendous change for Mexico beyond the country’s changes in 
trade policy with the U.S. and Canada. 
Lastly, I only include industries in the regressions that have positive values for 
exports.16 I do this to focus attention on the industries most directly affected by changes 
in trade policy. This does however limit analysis in this paper to the traded sector.  
1.5 Results 
1.5.1 U.S., Canada, and Interactions with China 
According to the standard two-by-two model, the coefficients for the tariffs the 
U.S. and Canada place on Mexican exports should be positive since as tariffs go down, 
demand for Mexican exports goes up—where the increase is presumably greatest for low-
skill intense products—causing demand to increase more for low- than high-skilled labor. 
In sum, as tariffs go down, inequality should decrease. If the alternative hypotheses 
discussed earlier are significant, the coefficients may be insignificant or negative. 
Particularly, in the first-differenced regressions where Robertson’s work indicates trade 
may have the smallest effect, the coefficients may be negative if Verhoogen’s skill-
upgrading hypothesis dominates. In the first two series of first-differenced regressions 
(Tables 1.17 and 1.18) the tariffs the U.S. charges on Mexican exports carry insignificant 
coefficients for the present and all lagged terms. However, when interacted with the 
                                                
16 Verhoogen (2008) uses this criteria to define exporting firms. 
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tariffs the U.S. charges on Chinese exports, the interacted coefficients are negative and 
significant at the one percent level for the present period for both simple and weighted 
average tariffs. The interacted tariff term lagged three years in the simple average 
regressions is also negative and significant at the five percent level. The coefficients’ 
magnitudes are on par with the estimates for the effect changes in tariffs have on 
Mexican wage inequality in other work (Feliciano 2001; Hanson and Harrison 1995). As 
for the effect Canadian tariffs have had on inequality, the coefficient for the three-year 
lag in the simple average regressions is negatively significant, and the present estimate is 
positively significant. Both are however only significant at the ten percent level. In the 
weighted average regressions, the interacted tariffs are negatively significant for the 
present and four-year lag terms, respectively at the five and ten percent levels. However, 
the estimates for both are zero at the fourth decimal place. In sum, these estimates 
suggest that changes in tariffs on Mexican exports to its NAFTA trading partners have 
had only a small affect on inequality within industries in Mexico.  
The signs of the estimates for the effect tariffs have had between industries are 
similar to their within counterparts—except the magnitude of the estimates is much larger 
and the estimates are significant more often. The coefficient for U.S. tariffs is positive 
and significant at the one percent level in all specifications in simple average regressions 
and positive however insignificant in the weighted regressions (Tables 1.19 and 1.20). 
The coefficients for the U.S. tariffs on Mexican exports interacted with U.S. tariffs on 
Chinese exports are negatively significant in all specifications for the simple average 
regressions. In the weighted regressions, the coefficient is negatively significant in the 
specifications with tariffs in the present period, lagged three years, and lagged four years. 
The estimates for these interacted terms in the simple average regressions are between 3.5 
and 3.8 times as large as their counterparts in the weighted regressions.  
While the results for the between industry regressions are consistent with the 
standard two-by-two model for the U.S. and Mexico, the same is not true for the results 
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for Canada. In the simple average regressions, the coefficient for the tariffs Canada 
charges on Mexican exports is negatively significant in all specifications. In the weighted 
regressions it is negatively significant for all but the fifth year lag. In both sets of 
regressions, the coefficient becomes smaller with each subsequent lag indicating the 
strongest effect is in the present and then diminishes over time. The result unexpectedly 
indicates that Canada’s easing of tariffs on goods from Mexico has increased inequality. 
It may be that Canada eased tariffs more on Mexico’s high-skill intense industries than it 
did on the low-skill industries, causing inequality to increase. Unlike the interacted terms 
with the U.S tariffs on Mexico and China, the Canadian interacted terms are only 
significant twice in the simple average regressions and never in the weighted regressions. 
The Canadian results here are again inconsistent with the standard two-by-two model, 
with the two significant coefficients getting positive signs although both are very small—
the present period coefficient is positive but zero at the fourth decimal place and the 
coefficient lagged five years is 0.0008.  
When the regressions in this section were re-run where the high and low wages 
are determined by the top and bottom five percent of industries each year by salary, the 
results were largely the same. Sixty-four coefficients were estimated in the results 
reported above. Of these, only three coefficients that were previously insignificant gained 
significance when the regressions were re-run. Four coefficients lost their significance.  
And four coefficients switched signs. No coefficient changed both significance and signs.  
1.5.2 U.S., Canada, Japan and Major Partner Interactions 
Adding Japan’s tariffs on Mexican exports and the more complete set of 
interactions has resulted in such small samples in the first-differenced specifications that 
the estimates have become highly susceptible to small changes in the data. This can be 
seen in both the simple average and weighted results (Tables 21 and 22). In the simple 
average results, the coefficient for U.S. tariffs is positive with similar magnitudes for the 
specifications with tariffs in the present and lagged three years but then turns negative 
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with approximately the same magnitude with the four-year lag. The coefficient for the 
three-year lag is significant at the five percent level. The coefficient for the interaction 
between tariffs the U.S. charges on Mexican and Chinese exports is negative with 
inconsistent magnitudes, but always insignificant. In the weighted regressions, the 
coefficient for U.S. tariffs changes magnitudes depending on the specification and is 
always insignificant. Regarding the interaction with Chinese exports, the coefficient is 
negatively significant in the first specification, positively significant in the second, and 
positively insignificant in the third.  
The story for the Canadian estimates is roughly the same. In the simple average 
regressions the coefficient for Canadian tariffs is never significant and switches signs 
from the first to second to third specifications. The coefficient for the Canadian 
interactions with China is positive in the present but negative for the three- and four-year 
lags, and is never significant. In the weighted regressions, the Canadian coefficient is 
always insignificant and while positive in the first and second specifications, turns 
negative in the third. The interaction with China is also always insignificant, but starts out 
negative in the first specification, turning positive but zero at the fourth decimal place in 
the latter specifications. While a number of other coefficients in Tables 1.21 and 1.22 are 
significant, their signs often change, reinforcing the idea that the small sample size in 
these specifications has made for spurious results.  
One of the most interesting things about the estimates between industries in 
Tables 1.23 and 1.24 with the extended trading relationships accounted for is that the 
results do not appear to suffer as much as expected from the significant multicollinearity 
present. Unlike the first-differenced regressions, coefficients generally do not switch 
signs and the magnitudes from one regression to the next are stable as well. Most 
surprisingly, many of the coefficients are often highly significant despite the inflated 
standard errors. It appears the tradeoff between making the coefficients less biased by 
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including a more complete set of tariffs has at least somewhat offset the negative effects 
of multicollinearity.  
There are several striking differences between the results with the fuller set of 
relationships and the estimates with only the tariffs the U.S. and Canada charge on goods 
from Mexico and China. Perhaps most striking is how much larger in magnitude the 
coefficients are in the specifications with the fuller set of relationships. In the fuller 
simple average regressions, the coefficients for the U.S. tariffs are approximately three 
times as large as their counterparts in the more restricted specifications. The estimates 
come in at 0.1048, 0.1253, and 0.1298 in the present, three-year lagged, and four-year 
lagged regressions with each significant at the one percent level. The results are 
consistent with Robertson’s finding that the most significant effects from changes in 
tariffs may take a few years to set in since the coefficient increases in magnitude from the 
present to the four-year lag before falling in magnitude to 0.0339 and fading to 
insignificance for the five-year lag. In the weighted regressions, the coefficient follows 
the same patterns regarding size and significance, but peaks at the three-year lag. The 
weighted estimates come in at 0.1064, 0.1109, and 0.1016 respectively in the present, 
three-year lagged, and four-year lagged regressions. While the present estimate is slightly 
larger than the simple average present estimate, the other two are smaller—fitting with a 
pattern of the weighted regressions providing slightly more conservative estimates. As 
with the simple average regressions, the coefficient’s positive sign is consistent with the 
standard two-by-two model. 
The results for Canada follow a similar pattern to those for the U.S. in comparing 
the restricted regressions to those that account for more trade relationships. First, the 
significant coefficients on the tariffs that Canada charges on Mexican exports are 
approximately five to seven times as large in the simple average regressions, comparing 
the unrestricted to the restricted regressions. In the weighted regressions, the coefficients 
are approximately six to ten times as large. The coefficients again indicate a lag in the 
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time it takes tariffs to most affect inequality, with the coefficient taking the largest value 
for the four-year lag in the simple average regressions compared to the three-year lag in 
the weighted regressions. The Canada-Mexico-China interactions are insignificant in the 
simple average regressions but significant up until the four-year lag in the weighted 
regressions. The significant coefficients are small, but much larger than their counterparts 
in the restricted regressions.  
When the regressions in this section were re-run where the high and low wages 
are determined by the top and bottom five percent of industries each year by salary, few 
coefficients gained significance but a number lost it. Even more switched signs but only 
once did a coefficient switch both signs and significance. One-hundred sixty-eight 
coefficients were estimated in the results reported above. Of these, ten coefficients that 
were previously insignificant gained significance, 25 coefficients lost it, and 30 
coefficients switched signs. In the regression with 3 year lags of unweighted tariffs, the 
coefficient for the interaction between tariffs the U.S. charges on goods from Mexico and 
Germany changed from -0.0129 (significant at the ten percent level) to 0.0110 
(insignificant).   
1.6 Conclusions 
This paper has shown that omitting trade relationships beyond the one or two of 
interest can cause these estimates to be significantly biased downwards in magnitude—
greatly underestimating the effect trade liberalization has on wage inequality. In the case 
of Mexico under NAFTA, when looking at the effect of Mexico’s partners reducing 
tariffs on the country’s exports, the bias is likely so large for a combination of two 
reasons. First, the tariffs the U.S. and Canada charge on Mexico’s exports are highly 
correlated with the tariffs they charge on exports from their other largest trading partners. 
Second, the goods from these partners may substitute for the goods imported from 
Mexico. When looking at a bilateral relationship, if the tariffs of interest are not 
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correlated with those charged on other major third parties or third party exports do not 
affect demand for goods from the country of interest, this bias is likely insignificant. 
However, in the case of Mexico in the post-NAFTA era, both problems appear 
significant.  
This paper’s results support the idea that when countries liberalize trade with 
others that have a global low-skill labor surplus like China, doing so can affect wage 
inequality in the countries’ other partners. However, since the U.S. had already cut tariffs 
on Mexican exports for the goods considered here to less than one percent by 1995 and 
its tariffs on goods from China were less than five percent, this left little room to further 
lower tariffs. In Canada, by 1995 tariffs on Mexican exports had already dropped to less 
than four percent and on Chinese exports to less than six percent. From 1995 to 2003, the 
U.S. lowered the weighted average tariff on Mexican exports by 0.81 percentage points 
and on Chinese exports by 1.48 percentage points. Canada lowered the corresponding 
average tariffs by 3.66 percentage points and 3.73 percentage points. Consequently 
neither the U.S.’ nor Canada’s changes in tariffs on Mexican exports in the industries 
considered here appear to have affected wage inequality in Mexico by anywhere close to 
even one percent. This is not to say that NAFTA had a small impact on wage inequality 
in Mexico—just that this one aspect of NAFTA appears to have had little effect.  
While these coefficients estimated here translate into small changes in wage 
inequality for Mexico, this is only because there was little room left to drop tariffs. If 
parameter estimates of this size were found for countries considering trade agreements 
that called for much larger reductions in tariffs on its exports, the effects on wage 
inequality could be substantial. For example, the smallest significant estimate from the 
less restricted regressions with weighted average tariffs for the effect changes in U.S. 
tariffs have directly on wage inequality in Mexico suggest that every 10 percentage point 
decline in tariffs is associated with a 1 percent decline in inequality. For countries 
considering large changes in trade policy these are no small numbers. 
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Table 1.1 Importers from Mexico (Years 1994-2003) 
Rank Importer 
Imports 
($ millions USD, year 2000) 
1 United States 1,421,805 
2 Canada 34,037 
3 Spain 14,971 
4 Japan 14,639 
5 Germany 14,248 
 
Table 1.2 Countries With Largest Increase in Imports from Mexico (Years 1994-
2003) 
Rank Importer 
Increase in Imports 
($ millions USD, year 2000) 
1 United States 6,296 
2 Aruba 768 
3 China 706 
4 Germany 632 
5 Netherlands Antilles 498 
 
 
Table 1.3 Exporters to United States (Years 1994-2003) 
Rank Exporter 
Average Annual Exports  
($ millions USD, year 2000) 
1 Canada 2,198,901 
2 Japan 1,609,996 
3 Mexico 1,192,574 
4 China 1,041,168 
5 Germany 608,457 
 
Table 1.4 Countries With Largest Increase in Exports to United States (Years 1994-
2003) 
Rank Exporter 
Increase in Exports  
($ millions USD, year 2000) 
1 China 80,701 
2 Mexico 41,610 
3 Ireland 19,948 
4 Germany 7,084 
5 Venezuela 4,996 
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Table 1.5 Exporters to Canada (Years 1994-2003) 
Rank Exporter 
Average Annual Exports  
($ millions USD, year 2000) 
1 United States 1,618,688 
2 Japan 118,354 
3 China 76,615 
4 Mexico 73,905 
5 United Kingdom 66,582 
 
 
Table 1.6 Countries With Largest Increase in Exports to Canada (Years 1994-2003) 
Rank Exporter 
Increase in Exports  
($ millions USD, year 2000) 
1 China 8,718 
2 Mexico 3,234 
3 Algeria 1,476 
4 Norway 1,094 
5 Ireland 806 
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1995 0.82 4.46 0.96 4.28 4.23 
1996 0.57 4.13 0.80 3.96 6.97 
1997 1.02 4.06 0.67 3.89 4.41 
1998 0.68 3.40 . 3.16 6.24 
1999 0.03 5.98 0.41 2.91 6.01 
2000 0.04 2.83 0.36 5.70 5.81 
2001 . 2.85 . 2.80 5.74 
2002 0.03 5.77 0.25 2.71 5.65 
2003 0.03 2.76 0.15 2.64 5.62 
Tariffs are at the four digit level using the SIC revision 3 classification system. Canada and Mexico 
received preferential tariff treatment under NAFTA. Japan and Germany received most favored nation 
treatment as members of the WTO. China also received MFN treatment in this period. 
 













1995 0.85 4.20 0.96 4.21 4.12 
1996 0.62 4.00 0.86 3.85 6.75 
1997 1.16 3.92 0.69 3.89 3.96 
1998 0.88 3.37 . 3.12 6.16 
1999 0.09 6.04 0.46 2.91 5.82 
2000 0.08 2.86 0.38 5.77 5.69 
2001 . 2.82 . 2.79 5.61 
2002 0.06 5.71 0.24 2.76 5.56 
2003 0.05 2.70 0.15 2.73 5.54 
Tariffs are at the four digit level using the SIC revision 3 classification system. 
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1995 . 9.10 5.53 3.28 9.77 
1996 . 7.74 3.60 4.92 8.15 
1997 0.49 6.05 2.56 1.60 6.01 
1998 1.39 5.09 4.31 2.86 6.06 
1999 0.00 4.95 4.28 1.73 5.65 
2000 0.00 3.90 2.20 0.45 3.69 
2001 0.04 3.88 . 0.19 3.58 
2002 0.01 3.63 1.78 0.07 3.47 
2003 0.02 3.42 1.66 0.01 3.43 
Tariffs are at the four digit level using the SIC revision 3 classification system. The U.S. and Mexico 
received PRF treatment under NAFTA. China received PRF treatment under the Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP). Japan and the United Kingdom received MFN treatment as members of the WTO. 
 













1995 . 9.06 5.73 3.67 10.81 
1996 . 8.23 3.89 5.24 9.49 
1997 0.50 5.84 2.85 1.55 5.62 
1998 1.84 5.37 4.51 3.24 6.80 
1999 0.00 5.17 4.43 2.33 6.71 
2000 0.00 3.73 2.29 0.49 3.53 
2001 0.05 3.53 . 0.24 3.37 
2002 0.03 3.53 2.10 0.11 3.22 
2003 0.02 3.26 2.00 0.01 3.24 
Tariffs are at the four digit level using the SIC revision 3 classification system. 
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Table 1.11 Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Simple Average Tariffs United 
States Charges on Goods from Top Five Exporters to United States 
 Canada Japan Mexico China Germany 
Canada 1.0000         
      
Japan 0.0732 1.0000    
 (0.0364)**     
Mexico 0.3529 0.0946 1.0000   
 (0.0000)*** (0.0089)***    
China 0.1014 0.9246 0.1284 1.0000  
 (0.0037)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0004)***   
Germany 0.0463 0.9942 0.0344 0.9870 1.0000 
 (0.1844) (0.0000)*** (0.3408) (0.0000)***   
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Tariffs are at the four digit level using the SIC revision 3 classification system. 
 
Table 1.12 Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Weighted Average Tariffs United 
States Charges on Goods from Top Five Exporters to United States 
 Canada Japan Mexico China Germany 
Canada 1.0000         
      
Japan 0.0639 1.0000    
 (0.0679)*     
Mexico 0.2585 0.0998 1.0000   
 (0.0000)*** (0.0058)***    
China 0.0921 0.8477 0.1230 1.0000  
 (0.0083)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0007)***   
Germany 0.0281 0.9952 0.0326 0.9837 1.0000 
 (0.4200) (0.0000)*** (0.3667) (0.0000)***   
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Tariffs are at the four digit level using the SIC revision 3 classification system.  
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Table 1.13 Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Simple Average Tariffs Canada 
Charges on Goods from Top Five Exporters to Canada 
 
United 
States Japan China Mexico 
United 
Kingdom 
United States 1.0000         
      
Japan 0.4388 1.0000    
 (0.0000)***     
China 0.6612 0.7558 1.0000   
 (0.0000)*** (0.0000)***    
Mexico 0.1696 0.5374 0.5005 1.0000  
 (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)***   
United Kingdom 0.6497 0.8145 0.9185 0.5793 1.0000 
  (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)***   
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
Tariffs are at the four digit level using the SIC revision 3 classification system.  
 
Table 1.14 Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Weighted Average Tariffs Canada 
Charges on Goods from Top Five Exporters to Canada 
 
United 
States Japan China Mexico 
United 
Kingdom 
United States 1.0000         
      
Japan 0.5264 1.0000    
 (0.0000)***     
China 0.5886 0.8509 1.0000   
 (0.0000)*** (0.0000)***    
Mexico 0.3464 0.5941 0.4408 1.0000  
 (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)***   
United Kingdom 0.5956 0.8305 0.8458 0.5343 1.0000 
  (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)***   
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  




Table 1.15 Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Simple Average Tariffs the United 
States, Canada, and Japan Charge on Goods from Mexico (Countries in the top five 
Mexico exports to for which data is available for a sufficient number of years) 
 USA Canada Japan 
USA 1.0000     
    
Canada 0.4025 1.0000  
 (0.0000)***   
Japan 0.2939 0.2219 1.0000 
  (0.0000)*** (0.0000)***   
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Tariffs are at the four digit level using the SIC revision 3 classification system. 
No data was available from WITS on the tariffs Spain and Germany charge on imports from 
Mexico. Other countries that are among the largest 10 importers of goods from Mexico had tariff 
data available for intermittent years from 1994-2003. E.g. Chile had MFN data for 1994-1995 and 
1997-2002 and PRF data only for 1995. Venezuela had MFN data for 1995, 1997-2000, and 2002 
as well as PRF data for only 1995. 
 
Table 1.16 Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Weighted Average Tariffs the 
United States, Canada, and Japan Charge on Goods from Mexico (Countries in the 
top five Mexico exports to for which data is available for a sufficient number of 
years) 
 USA Canada Japan 
USA 1.0000     
    
Canada 0.2413 1.0000  
 (0.0000)***   
Japan 0.2142 0.2286 1.0000 
  (0.0000)*** (0.0000)***   
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Tariffs are at the four digit level using the SIC revision 3 classification system. 
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Table 1.17 OLS estimates for change in high-skilled wage share within industries
 
 
First Differences - Simple Average 
Tariffs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
COEFFICIENT Present 
Tariffs
Tariffs Lagged 3 
Years
Tariffs Lagged 4 
Years
Tariffs Lagged 5 
Years
Constant -0.0060*** 0.0030 -0.0132*** -0.0125***
(0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0028)
Total gross investment (Thousands 
of pesos at current prices)
0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
ln(Total raw and auxiliary materials 
(Thousands of pesos at current 
prices))
-0.0121 0.0076 0.0007 0.0080
(0.0186) (0.0159) (0.0170) (0.0181)
Tariffs - USA on Mexico 0.0049 0.0006 -0.0064 -0.0012
(0.0033) (0.0046) (0.0040) (0.0040)
Tariffs - Canada on Mexico 0.0007 -0.0010* 0.0004 -0.0010
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0008)
Tariffs - USA on Mexico*USA on 
China
-0.0009*** -0.0001 -0.0006** -0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Tariffs - Canada on Mexico*Canada 
on China
-0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Observations 408 307 307 212
Adjusted R-squared 0.5861 0.1771 0.6518 0.5269
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Time dummies suppressed
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Table 1.18 OLS estimates for change in high-skilled wage share within industries 
 
 
First Differences - Weighted Average 
Tariffs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
COEFFICIENT Present 
Tariffs
Tariffs Lagged 3 
Years
Tariffs Lagged 4 
Years
Tariffs Lagged 5 
Years
Constant -0.0054*** 0.0036* -0.0137*** -0.0147***
(0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0025)
Total gross investment (Thousands of 
pesos at current prices)
0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
ln(Total raw and auxiliary materials 
(Thousands of pesos at current 
prices))
-0.0105 0.0077 0.0011 0.0032
(0.0185) (0.0159) (0.0170) (0.0177)
Tariffs - USA on Mexico 0.0011 0.0010 -0.0009 0.0005
(0.0019) (0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0022)
Tariffs - Canada on Mexico 0.0004* -0.0004 -0.0002 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Tariffs - USA on Mexico*USA on China -0.0004*** -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Tariffs - Canada on Mexico*Canada on 
China
-0.0000** -0.0000 -0.0000* 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Observations 408 307 307 212
Adjusted R-squared 0.5849 0.1752 0.6512 0.5247
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Time dummies suppressed
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Table 1.19 OLS estimates for high-skilled wage share by industries 
 
 
OLS - Simple Average Tariffs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
COEFFICIENT Present 
Tariffs
Tariffs Lagged 3 
Years
Tariffs Lagged 4 
Years
Tariffs Lagged 5 
Years
Constant -0.0324 -0.0304 -0.0965 0.0003
(0.0877) (0.1018) (0.1197) (0.1164)
Total gross investment (Thousands of 
pesos at year 2000 prices)
-0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
ln(Total raw and auxiliary materials 
(Thousands of pesos at year 2000 prices))
0.0516*** 0.0539*** 0.0537*** 0.0518***
(0.0058) (0.0069) (0.0079) (0.0078)
Tariffs - USA on Mexico 0.0391*** 0.0417*** 0.0374*** 0.0381***
(0.0089) (0.0101) (0.0109) (0.0107)
Tariffs - Canada on Mexico -0.0096*** -0.0095*** -0.0088*** -0.0205***
(0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0046)
Tariffs - USA on Mexico*USA on China -0.0052*** -0.0050*** -0.0046*** -0.0043***
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0008)
Tariffs - Canada on Mexico*Canada on 
China
0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000 0.0008***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002)
Observations 728 522 424 352
Adjusted R-squared 0.2604 0.2818 0.2857 0.3168
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Time dummies suppressed
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Table 1.20 OLS estimates for high-skilled wage share by industries 
 
 
OLS - Weighted Average Tariffs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
COEFFICIENT Present Tariffs Tariffs Lagged 3 
Years
Tariffs Lagged 4 
Years
Tariffs Lagged 5 
Years
Constant -0.0191 -0.0265 -0.0785 -0.0031
(0.0894) (0.1039) (0.1216) (0.1219)
Total gross investment 
(Thousands of pesos at year 
2000 prices) -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
ln(Total raw and auxiliary 
materials (Thousands of pesos at 
year 2000 prices)) 0.0508*** 0.0526*** 0.0526*** 0.0511***
(0.0059) (0.0071) (0.0081) (0.0083)
Tariffs - USA on Mexico 0.0080 0.0104 0.0066 0.0007
(0.0079) (0.0087) (0.0084) (0.0077)
Tariffs - Canada on Mexico -0.0053** -0.0048** -0.0045** -0.0038
(0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0027)
Tariffs - USA on Mexico*USA on 
China -0.0015** -0.0015** -0.0012* -0.0007
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Tariffs - Canada on 
Mexico*Canada on China 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Observations 728 522 424 352
Adjusted R-squared 0.2130 0.2284 0.2287 0.2261
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Time dummies suppressed
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Table 1.21 OLS estimates for change in high-skilled wage share within industries 
 
First Differences - Simple 
Average Tariffs
(1) (2) (3)
COEFFICIENT Present Tariffs Tariffs Lagged 3 
Years
Tariffs Lagged 4 
Years
Constant -0.0497*** -0.0164*** -0.0410***
(0.0047) (0.0027) (0.0070)
Total gross investment 
(Thousands of pesos at 
current prices) -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
ln(Total raw and auxiliary 
materials (Thousands of 
pesos at current prices)) -0.0452 0.0674 0.0531
(0.0438) (0.0442) (0.1062)
Tariffs - USA on Mexico 0.0635 0.0776** -0.0780
(0.0489) (0.0336) (0.0862)
Tariffs - Canada on Mexico 0.0047 0.0025 -0.0059
(0.0079) (0.0050) (0.0143)
Tariffs - Japan on Mexico -0.0038 0.0048 -0.0123**
(0.0032) (0.0036) (0.0059)
Tariffs - USA on Mexico*USA 
on China -0.0038 -0.0331 -0.0352
(0.0026) (0.0231) (0.0655)
Tariffs - USA on Mexico*USA 
on Canada -0.0700 0.4907* 0.3572
(0.0482) (0.2683) (0.8360)
Tariffs - USA on Mexico*USA 
on Japan -0.0012 0.0167** 0.0088
(0.0020) (0.0075) (0.0241)
Tariffs - USA on Mexico*USA 
on Germany -0.0003 0.0240* 0.0219
(0.0010) (0.0140) (0.0438)
Tariffs - Canada on 
Mexico*Canada on China -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0005)
Tariffs - Canada on 
Mexico*Canada on Japan 0.0008 0.0002 -0.0014
(0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0009)
Tariffs - Canada on 
Mexico*Canada on United 
Kingdom -0.0012 -0.0002 0.0014
(0.0010) (0.0006) (0.0014)
Observations 100 51 51
Adjusted R-squared 0.6909 0.2842 0.0186
Robust standard errors in parenthe
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Time dummies suppressed
No regression reported for first differenced regression with five year lags since data not 
available for all variables at this level.
First differenced tariff for interacted between the tariff Canada puts on goods from Mexico 
and goods from the US was dropped due to collinearity.
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Table 1.22 OLS estimates for change in high-skilled wage share within industries 
 
  
First Differences - Weighted 
Average Tariffs
(1) (2) (3)
COEFFICIENT Present Tariffs Tariffs Lagged 3 
Years
Tariffs Lagged 4 
Years
Constant -0.0487*** -0.0125*** -0.0492***
(0.0045) (0.0020) (0.0061)
Total gross investment (Thousands 
of pesos at current prices) -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
ln(Total raw and auxiliary materials 
(Thousands of pesos at current 
prices)) -0.0381 0.0948*** 0.0409
(0.0453) (0.0313) (0.0849)
Tariffs - USA on Mexico 0.0359 0.0057 0.0563
(0.0334) (0.0125) (0.0583)
Tariffs - Canada on Mexico 0.0059 -0.0023 0.0022
(0.0047) (0.0036) (0.0091)
Tariffs - Japan on Mexico 0.0002 -0.0010 0.0020
(0.0030) (0.0007) (0.0026)
Tariffs - USA on Mexico*USA on 
China -0.0059** 0.0040*** 0.0027
(0.0024) (0.0007) (0.0029)
Tariffs - USA on Mexico*USA on 
Canada -0.0338** 0.0199*** -0.0359***
(0.0143) (0.0025) (0.0070)
Tariffs - USA on Mexico*USA on 
Japan 0.0096** -0.0170*** 0.0238***
(0.0043) (0.0017) (0.0074)
Tariffs - USA on Mexico*USA on 
Germany -0.0069** 0.0101*** -0.0122***
(0.0029) (0.0008) (0.0034)
Tariffs - Canada on Mexico*Canada 
on China -0.0003 0.0000 0.0003
(0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0004)
Tariffs - Canada on Mexico*Canada 
on Japan 0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0005
(0.0009) (0.0003) (0.0009)
Tariffs - Canada on Mexico*Canada 
on United Kingdom -0.0001 -0.0000 0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Observations 100 51 51
Adjusted R-squared 0.6980 0.4543 0.1137
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Time dummies suppressed
No regression reported for first differenced regression with five year lags since data not 
available for all variables at this level.
First differenced tariff for interacted between the tariff Canada puts on goods from Mexico
and goods from the US was dropped due to collinearity.
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Table 1.23 OLS estimates for high-skilled wage share by industries 
 
 
OLS - Simple Average Tariffs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
COEFFICIENT Present Tariffs Tariffs Lagged 3 
Years
Tariffs Lagged 4 
Years
Tariffs Lagged 5 
Years
Constant -0.2575 -0.4147* -0.4670 -0.2367
(0.1702) (0.2264) (0.3071) (0.3340)
Total gross investment 
(Thousands of pesos at year 
2000 prices) 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
ln(Total raw and auxiliary 
materials (Thousands of 
pesos at year 2000 prices)) 0.0686*** 0.0741*** 0.0780*** 0.0680***
(0.0114) (0.0148) (0.0203) (0.0220)
Tariffs - USA on Mexico 0.1048*** 0.1253*** 0.1298*** 0.0339
(0.0194) (0.0242) (0.0294) (0.0398)
Tariffs - Canada on Mexico -0.0474*** -0.0559*** -0.0589*** -0.0215
(0.0123) (0.0131) (0.0151) (0.0237)
Tariffs - Japan on Mexico -0.0087*** -0.0085*** -0.0111*** -0.0079*
(0.0023) (0.0029) (0.0039) (0.0043)
Tariffs - USA on Mexico*USA 
on China -0.0165** -0.0179*** -0.0146** -0.0353***
(0.0067) (0.0063) (0.0060) (0.0120)
Tariffs - USA on Mexico*USA 
on Canada 0.0046 0.0015 0.0015 -0.0042
(0.0051) (0.0054) (0.0059) (0.0064)
Tariffs - USA on Mexico*USA 
on Japan 0.0117** 0.0204*** 0.0212*** 0.0388**
(0.0059) (0.0062) (0.0075) (0.0149)
Tariffs - USA on Mexico*USA 
on Germany -0.0043 -0.0129* -0.0171*** -0.0025
(0.0065) (0.0070) (0.0062) (0.0063)
Tariffs - Canada on 
Mexico*Canada on China 0.0004 0.0005 0.0006 0.0005
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0017)
Tariffs - Canada on 
Mexico*Canada on USA 0.0018 0.0023 0.0005 0.0010
(0.0033) (0.0037) (0.0046) (0.0012)
Tariffs - Canada on 
Mexico*Canada on Japan 0.0047*** 0.0047*** 0.0048*** -0.0068
(0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0074)
Tariffs - Canada on 
Mexico*Canada on United 
Kingdom -0.0038** -0.0035* -0.0034 0.0059
(0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0022) (0.0067)
Observations 274 169 114 82
Adjusted R-squared 0.3764 0.4224 0.4326 0.3365
Robust standard errors in parenth
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Time dummies suppressed
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OLS - Weighted Average 
Tariffs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
COEFFICIENT Present Tariffs Tariffs Lagged 3 
Years
Tariffs Lagged 4 
Years
Tariffs Lagged 5 
Years
Constant -0.3108* -0.3671* -0.5174* -0.3067
(0.1611) (0.2082) (0.2845) (0.3267)
Total gross investment 
(Thousands of pesos at year 
2000 prices) -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
ln(Total raw and auxiliary 
materials (Thousands of 
pesos at year 2000 prices)) 0.0711*** 0.0772*** 0.0809*** 0.0726***
(0.0110) (0.0142) (0.0190) (0.0221)
Tariffs - USA on Mexico 0.1064*** 0.1109*** 0.1016*** 0.0367
(0.0198) (0.0241) (0.0299) (0.0285)
Tariffs - Canada on Mexico -0.0317*** -0.0395*** -0.0459*** -0.0177
(0.0107) (0.0119) (0.0153) (0.0218)
Tariffs - Japan on Mexico -0.0106*** -0.0093*** -0.0096** -0.0046
(0.0020) (0.0027) (0.0038) (0.0042)
Tariffs - USA on Mexico*USA 
on China -0.0051*** -0.0054*** -0.0045** -0.0060**
(0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0029)
Tariffs - USA on Mexico*USA 
on Canada 0.0074** 0.0063* 0.0064* -0.0018
(0.0031) (0.0033) (0.0038) (0.0041)
Tariffs - USA on Mexico*USA 
on Japan -0.0038 -0.0028 -0.0023 0.0021
(0.0031) (0.0035) (0.0039) (0.0038)
Tariffs - USA on Mexico*USA 
on Germany 0.0011 0.0000 -0.0006 0.0019
(0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0031) (0.0024)
Tariffs - Canada on 
Mexico*Canada on China 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0012** 0.0011
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0009)
Tariffs - Canada on 
Mexico*Canada on USA -0.0014 -0.0004 -0.0025 0.0006
(0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0034) (0.0012)
Tariffs - Canada on 
Mexico*Canada on Japan -0.0013 -0.0010 -0.0005 0.0000
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0023)
Tariffs - Canada on 
Mexico*Canada on United 
Kingdom 0.0008*** 0.0009*** 0.0009*** -0.0012
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0020)
Observations 274 169 114 82
Adjusted R-squared 0.3895 0.4291 0.4252 0.3251
Robust standard errors in parenth
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Time dummies suppressed
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CHAPTER 2: BRIBERY AND NIMBY PROJECTS: HOW THE 
DEGREE OF SUBSTITUTION BETWEEN GOODS AT RISK AND 
COMPENSATION CAN AFFECT PEOPLE’S SUPPORT FOR LAND 
USE PROJECTS 
2.1 Introduction  
Despite there being a great deal of literature on ways to boost support for not-in-my-
backyard (NIMBY) projects1, even some of the least noxious proposed energy projects like wind 
farms still encounter enough opposition to be shut down.2 This lack of success in siting efforts 
may be partly due to the incomplete understanding in the literature of why some forms of 
compensation are seen as bribes while others are seen as perfectly legitimate. The former can 
cause support to decline sharply while the latter can cause it to increase significantly. This gap in 
understanding produces the outcome that even if a developer actually wants to make a host 
community better off, attempting to do so by offering compensation can decrease support for his 
project in the very community he wants to help. One result is that developers facing this 
constraint on offering benefits are limited in their ability to put together packages capable of 
getting a community’s approval. A second result is that if developers are hesitant to offer 
mitigation and compensation partly out of the fear that doing so could decrease support, 
communities may be seeing proposals that make them less well off than proposals that include 
these measures. Subsequently, this gap in knowledge increases the chance that both individual 
                                                
1 NIMBY projects are defined here as they are in Frey, Oberholzer-Gee, and Eichenberger (1996) as land uses that 
themselves benefit society overall but present net costs to prospective host communities. 
2 The Cape Wind project proposed off the coast of Nantucket has encountered significant opposition. Plans to build 
a 10 turbine, $250 million wind farm in Woodford County, IL were cancelled after community protest. A number of 
papers in the wind farm literature note that local opposition is a significant impediment to achieving clean energy 
goals through wind farm development (Devine-Wright 2011, 2005; Cass and Walker 2009; Wolsink 2007; 
Wüstenhagen, Wolsink, and Bürer 2007; Walker 1995). 
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communities and society at large miss out on land use projects that could make all parties 
concerned better off.   
A standard economic model of human behavior predicts that compensation can only 
make someone better off, yet the decreasing rates of support often associated with compensation 
imply this may not be the case. For individuals who see compensation as a bribe, simply 
accepting the offer can make them worse off if the belief that they have accepted a bribe 
decreases their utility more than they could increase it with the compensation they have accepted 
(Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997). People may also see an offer of compensation as signaling that 
a project is riskier than they previously thought (Kunreuther and Easterling 1996). In this case, 
the increase in expected losses from the project outweighs the increase in utility they expect to 
obtain from the compensation—causing expected net utility to decrease. Alternatively, an offer 
of compensation can cause support to decrease even if individuals do not expect it to make them 
worse off. When some people are offered compensation, they may see the offer as a chance to 
bargain where no such chance had previously occurred to them (Kunreuther and Easterling 
1992). In turn, their support may decrease initially but should recover after enough bargaining 
has taken place.  
At least one study is able to rule out the alternative hypotheses that people may associate 
compensation with increased risk or an opportunity to bargain (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997). 
The authors observed how people living in a town where a nuclear waste facility was proposed 
for construction responded to a few hypothetical large offers of compensation. The study finds 
that the overwhelming majority of people who decreased their support said they saw the offers as 
bribes. Frey and Oberholzer-Gee ultimately find that when a sense of civic duty drives support 
for a public works project, offering people money may dominate people’s decision-making and 
cause the once positive effect of civic duty to dissipate. It may be that offering compensation is 
more likely to have a negative effect in the case of nuclear power where the act of offering 
compensation attempts to monetize a transaction in which the most significant expected costs are 
not monetary in nature. Additionally, it may be that when money is offered to individuals in a 
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community it is likely to be seen as a bribe, but when the same amount is offered to the 
community as a whole to mitigate risks it is less likely to be seen as a bribe. Indeed, a number of 
other forms of compensation may be less likely to be seen as bribes.  
Other papers have found results consistent with the hypothesis that the more directly 
compensation or mitigation addresses residents’ concerns, they less likely they are to see 
compensation as a bribe.3 However it appears no paper has explicitly tested the hypothesis. The 
theory developed in this paper is that the more directly compensation addresses individuals’ 
concerns, the more likely residents are to see it as being able to substitute for their losses or 
allow them to acquire substitutes for their losses. In this respect, the more individuals see 
compensation as addressing their concerns, the less likely they are to see it as a bribe. In this 
chapter, an explanation and theoretical model are offered to help answer the research question of 
whether the more directly compensation addresses individuals’ concerns, they more 
compensation should increase support for the project proposed.  
The hypotheses here are tested using a survey to see how factors relating to bribery affect 
people’s support for wind farms. Wind farms were chosen for several reasons.  First, there is less 
of a risk with wind farms than other NIMBY projects like nuclear waste sites or garbage dumps 
that people may see an offer of compensation as signaling increased risk. Second, at the time the 
survey was conducted, developers were trying to site a number of wind farms in Illinois—
making a local survey both appropriate and feasible. Third, despite their being one of the least 
harmful and least odious ways to generate energy, some wind farm proposals have encountered 
protest strong enough to put the projects in jeopardy, and in some cases protest has shut projects 
down entirely. 
This paper contributes to the literature in at least two ways. First, it provides a new theory 
of how compensation can induce or reduce bribe effects depending on how substitutable it is 
perceived to be with expected losses. Second, the paper tests this theory on a land use (wind 
farms) that has not previously been studied with respect to bribery in the NIMBY literature. 
                                                
3 See literature review for a discussion of these papers. 
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Ultimately, it is found that the more directly respondents see compensation as addressing their 
concerns (referred to going forward as “directness”), the more likely they are to report higher 
levels of support. Further, this effect of directness appears to be largest for those initially neutral 
about or opposed to the wind farm presented. The results are robust to using both ordered logit 
and ordered probit estimators as well as to a number of different specifications. The findings in 
this chapter may be helpful to developers for public works projects in crafting development 
proposals that stand a greater chance at boosting host community approval.  
This paper has seven remaining sections. Section 2.2 surveys the relevant literature. 
Section 2.3 provides a model developed to account for how a compensation or mitigation 
measure’s substitutability with the goods at risk can induce or reduce a bribery effect. Section 
2.4 describes the survey used to test the ideas put forth in this paper. Section 2.5 discusses 
summary statistics from the survey. Section 2.6 discusses estimation methods. Section 2.7 
discusses the results and section 2.8 summarizes and concludes the paper. 
2.2 Literature Review 
When a new land use is proposed, it is usually the case that at least some residents nearby 
expect to be worse off. When these expected net costs translate into opposition, these residents 
are often able to mount enough protest to bring the project’s development to a halt (e.g. Gregory 
et al. 1991; Hamilton 1993; Lober 1995a). According to standard economic reasoning, there 
should be at least two simple ways to turn these residents’ opposition into support. Either reduce 
residents’ expected costs or raise their expected benefits until expected benefits exceed expected 
costs. Lowering negative impacts consistently raises support (Carnes et al. 1983; Jenkins-Smith 
and Kunreuther 2001; Opaluch et al. 1993; Swallow, Opaluch, and Weaver 1992). But with 
offering benefits, the results are less clear. Sometimes offering benefits raises support (Carnes et 
al. 1983; Frey, Oberholzer-Gee, and Eichenberger 1996; Jenkins-Smith and Kunreuther 2001), 
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sometimes it lowers support (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997; Jenkins-Smith and Kunreuther 
2001), and other times, it leaves support unchanged (Jenkins-Smith and Kunreuther 2001).  
There are a number of reasons an offer of benefits can lower support. People may see an 
initial offer as a chance to bargain where they saw no such opportunity before. If this is the case, 
they may engage in strategic behavior that causes support to go down initially but later rebounds 
once people feel they have bargained for a good enough deal (Kunreuther and Easterling 1992). 
People may see an offer as a signal that the facility is riskier than they previously thought 
(Kunreuther and Easterling 1996). People may also think compensation is inappropriate given 
the particular losses at stake and increase their opposition out of protest (Kunreuther and 
Easterling 1992). Lastly, people may perceive an offer as a bribe, where the bribery effect offsets 
how much better off the benefits themselves would have made the person (Frey and Oberholzer-
Gee 1997).  
 The literature has long noted that the more directly compensation can prevent or offset 
expected losses the more respondents see it as appropriate4 and therefore acceptable (O'Hare, 
Bacow, and Sanderson 1983). But absent from the literature is an explicit empirical test for the 
effect of directness and an explanation for why this directness matters. These lapses have left 
researchers with a significantly incomplete understanding of how compensation affects support 
for a project. In turn, the recommendations made in the literature for how to design 
compensation packages run a significant risk of offering advice made in error. Such advice may 
ultimately lead to compensation packages expected to boost support that in fact are more likely 
to do the opposite.  
From previous empirical work, it is hard to glean the factors that make people more likely 
to see an offer as a chance to bargain or as signaling higher risk, but a much clearer picture 
                                                
4 Compensation perceived as acceptable or appropriate precludes its being seen as a bribe. 
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emerges for when people are more likely to see an offer as a bribe. Jenkins-Smith and 
Kunreuther (2001) have found results consistent with the hypothesis that the less (more) 
effectively a compensation package can be used to prevent or offset losses, the more (less) likely 
a respondent is to see it as a bribe. The authors find that when “economic benefits” to a 
community were offered before mitigation measures in a survey, they boosted support for a 
prison, a landfill, an incinerator, and for a nuclear waste repository.5 But when offered after 
mitigation, the offer of “economic benefits” raised support for the prison, but lowered support for 
the landfill, the incinerator, and the nuclear waste repository.6 Before mitigation is offered, 
communities may be able to use “economic benefits” to mitigate potential losses and offset them 
should they occur. But after mitigation is on the table, there is both less of a need to use the 
benefits to finance mitigation measures since they are already provided and to offset potential 
losses since the mitigation measures make them less likely to occur. So when offered before 
(after) mitigation, an offer of compensation is more (less) likely to be interpreted as an effort to 
prevent and offset losses—diminishing (strengthening) its signal as a bribe. 
Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) note an instance when compensation offered in a survey 
lowered support for a proposed nuclear waste facility in Wolfenschiessen, Switzerland—a town 
actually being considered to host a nuclear waste facility. When civic duty drives support for a 
facility, but when money is offered the effect of civic duty disappears, it is said that the support 
associated with civic duty has been crowded out. This behavior has long been documented in the 
literatures in psychology, law, and social policy (Deci and Ryan 1985; Gneezy and Rustichini 
2000; Titmuss 1970). Frey and Oberholzer-Gee test whether respondents saw the offer of a 
                                                
5 The effect was statistically significant for the prison, landfill, and incinerator, but not for the nuclear waste 
repository. 
6 The effect was statistically significant for the incinerator, but not for the prison, landfill, or nuclear waste 
repository. 
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substantial amount of money as a chance to bargain, as signaling increased risk, or as a bribe. 
After the initial offer cut support in half, the authors substantially increased the amount offered 
to each respondent. This failed to boost support, helping to rule out the possibility that 
respondents saw the offer as a chance to bargain. Additionally, only five percent of those who 
refused the first offer said the amount was too small. When asked if they thought compensation 
signaled increased risk, just six percent said yes. But when asked if they saw the offer as a bribe, 
83 percent said yes. The authors hypothesize that when civic duty drives support for a facility, 
offering compensation can cause wipe out the effect of civic duty on support.  
One implication of their research is that when civic mindedness does not initially drive 
support, there is less civic support to crowd out so the effects of the benefits themselves are more 
likely to dominate and consequently raise support. Frey, Oberholzer-Gee, and Eichenberger 
(1996) note an instance in which this may have occurred. In the same town in which the 
researchers conducted their survey, one year later, the residents voted with a three-fifths majority 
in a town meeting to host the nuclear waste site with a substantial compensation package. The 
authors argue that when given time, people may go through a “compensation cycle” (p. 1307-
1310). This “compensation cycle” is the process of people raising their lifetime expected 
incomes to include the compensation and performing a “substitution of moral principles” (p. 
1308) that allows them to accept the compensation as an ordinary market transaction—not a 
bribe. So where once a sense of civic duty drove support, the “compensation cycle” allows it to 
diminish and makes room for money to drive support. But another factor may have helped 
increase support in the referendum. While the compensation the developer offered the 
community fell in the same range offered in the survey, there was a key difference. In the survey, 
the money was to be paid to individuals. But in the compensation package ultimately approved, 
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it appears the money was to be paid to the community’s local government (Frey, Oberholzer-
Gee, and Eichenberger 1996).  
The difference between whether individuals or a public body receives compensation can 
be crucial in determining how effectively the money can be used to mitigate against losses or 
acquire substitutes should they occur. When the most effective mitigation methods to prevent 
losses and/or the most direct substitutes for losses are public in nature, giving individuals money 
makes them little or no more able to prevent or offset their expected losses than before they 
received the money. Meanwhile, giving money to a public body can greatly increase its ability to 
mitigate and/or acquire substitutes for potential losses. In these instances, the same amount of 
money on a per capita basis is likely to have a much stronger bribe effect when given to 
individuals than a public body. It may be for this reason that several studies have found that 
when compensation is offered to communities—not directly to individuals within them—the 
offer can increase support. Carnes et al. (1983) found that offering “substantial payments to your 
community” increased support from 22% with no incentives to 26%. Kunreuther et al. (1990) 
found that tax rebates—at $1,000, $3,000 and $5,000/year—had no significant effect on support 
for a nuclear waste repository but grants to the community at large increased support by 
approximately 24-34%. Due to the public nature of mitigating risk from nuclear waste sites, it is 
more likely that communities may be able to use grants to mitigate risk than individuals can use 
money from tax rebates to achieve the same end. In turn, grants can arguably be used to more 
directly address the risks posed by a nuclear waste site than individual tax rebates. 
The literature that addresses problems in siting wind farms often focuses on why people 
are opposed to wind farm proposals and on why some efforts to boost support may not work 
rather than on how to overcome opposition (Casey 2007; Cass and Walker 2009; Cowell, 
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Bristow, and Munday 2011; Devine-Wright 2005). The literature notes that two of the most 
common reasons people are opposed are because of concerns about changes to the view and 
increased noise (Devine-Wright 2005; Wolsink 2000). However with regard to the view, Devine-
Wright (2005) notes several studies that have found the distance between residents and a given 
wind farm can have positive, negative, or uncertain effects regarding how they see the wind farm 
as affecting the landscape. The literature notes that significant support for wind power in general 
often coexists with opposition among individuals where wind farms are proposed (Cass and 
Walker 2009; Devine-Wright 2005; Walker 1995; Wüstenhagen, Wolsink, and Bürer 2007).  
This support for wind power in general existing simultaneously with opposition for 
particular wind farms would seem to fit the definition of NIMBY behavior—support for a type 
of project that individuals see as good for society, but opposition to it in their backyard. But the 
picture is often not that simple. Sometimes developers make mistakes in the planning process 
that can turn residents against them who might have otherwise approved of a local wind power 
project (Beddoe and Chamberlin 2003; Evans, Parks, and Theobald 2011). Alternatively, it may 
not be that residents are opposed to wind power in their backyard, but believe that some of the 
electricity should go to residents in the host community (Evans, Parks, and Theobald 2011).  
One area that does not appear to have been explored significantly in the literature is the 
extent to which those who oppose wind farms locally support wind power in general (Devine-
Wright 2005).7 For example, if 75% of a population supports wind power in general and 25% 
opposes it, it may only take that 25% to cause a developer to cancel a project. For wind farms 
that are built, some research finds that support for a given wind farm among nearby residents can 
rebound after an initial decline during construction (Krohn and Damborg 1999). Similarly, 
                                                
7 This divergence between support for particular facilities and a type of power generation in general has been studied 
in other industries (e.g. Easterling and Kunreuther 1995; Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997). 
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research in the U.S. has found that property values are unaffected (Hoen et al. 2009) or may 
decline before wind farm construction begins (referred to as wind farm anticipation stigma 
theory), but rebound and actually exceed their pre-wind farm value over time (Hinman 2010).  
This resurgence cannot be entirely attributed to changes in attitudes regarding the wind 
farm. Wind farms often bring with them a significant increase in tax revenues and permitting 
fees to the locales in which they are sited—providing money for schools and other public works 
projects that can have a positive effect on property values. Krohn and Damborg (1999) note a 
Danish study of at least one factor that boosted community support for wind farms. The study 
was carried out in the municipality of Sydthy where wind power provides more than 98 percent 
of the area’s electricity. Those who held shares in a cooperatively owned wind turbine were more 
willing to accept a neighbor building a turbine. However, people who own shares in wind 
turbines may have higher levels of support than those who do not own shares in turbines for 
wind power harnessed in their communities.  
2.3 Model Development 
A necessary step for a model to predict when a bribe effect is likely to occur is to let 
benefits have a negative impact on utility. However, many of the land use siting papers model 
utility as a function of income, benefits, and costs defined generally even though this 
specification produces the result that benefits can only increase support (Easterling and 
Kunreuther 1995; Jenkins-Smith and Kunreuther 2001; Kunreuther et al. 1987; Kunreuther and 
Easterling 1990, 1992, 1996; Kunreuther and Kleindorfer 1986; Minehart and Neeman 2002; 
Nicolas and Daniel 2003; Opaluch et al. 1993; O'Sullivan 1993; Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein 
2002; Swallow, Opaluch, and Weaver 1992). One model that does allow a benefits package to 
lower approval does so by letting a bribe effect offset the increase in utility that a benefits 
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package itself provides (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997). Frey and Oberholzer-Gee model the 
decision of a resident in a prospective community as choosing the level of support that 
maximizes the individual’s expected net benefits of a facility being sited.  If the facility is sited, 
the individual receives the inherent benefits associated with it, incurs some personal costs, and 
receives some amount of compensation. But in addition to the effect an individual’s support may 
have on the likelihood the facility is sited, the person may receive benefits associated with the act 
itself of supporting the facility. These intrinsic benefits are a function of the compensation the 
developer offers and the level of support the person chooses. The individual also bears the costs 
of supporting the project (time, effort, etc.). 
I adapt the model from Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997) to 
incorporate the following two points. First, the more (less) substitutable an offer of compensation 
is with the goods at risk to a land use project, the more (less) likely respondents are to see the 
offer as appropriate, and therefore the less (more) likely they are to see it as a bribe. Second, 
even when no bribe effect is present, the more substitutable a given type of compensation is with 
a person’s expected losses, the less is the person’s willingness to accept (WTA).  
The latter point is noted in the willingness to accept/willingness to pay (WTA/WTP) 
literature in the theoretic finding that the more substitutable a particular form of compensation is 
with the goods someone is asked to sell, the less a person's minimum WTA will exceed his/her 
WTP (Amiran and Hagen 2003; Hanemann 1991; Shogren et al. 1994). Since a person’s WTA to 
relinquish a good is almost always more than his/her WTP to acquire it, this means that the more 
substitutable the form of compensation is with the expected losses, the less compensation needs 
to be spent to get the person to accept the policy change. As shown in the WTA/WTP literature, 
because of diminishing marginal returns to utility, when a person cannot make up the utility lost 
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from losses in non-market goods by increasing his/her consumption of market goods, the 
difference between one’s WTA and WTP can become infinite. This finding is of particular 
relevance to NIMBY projects since many of the goods at risk to these land uses provide a 
substantial amount of utility and are weakly or non-substitutable with those available to 
individuals in the marketplace—rendering them privately irreplaceable. In these cases, the 
WTA/WTP literature suggests that as the degree of substitution decreases between compensation 
and the goods at risk to him/her, the less effective compensation will be in allowing individuals 
to acquire substitutes that can restore them to their prior level of utility. In this respect, when 
individuals face projects that carry some probability of causing losses that cannot be replaced by 
goods in the marketplace (mainly losses to human health) attempting to monetize the transaction 
by offering monetary compensation should not lower approval. But compensation cannot be 
expected to raise support very much since individuals cannot use the compensation to offset the 
losses they expect from the project. 
It is important to account for both factors in the model for land use support here since 
omitting either would result in biased estimates. One bias would be that as the degree of 
substitution between compensation and the goods at risk decreases, a person’s support can be 
expected to go down both because of a potential bribe effect and because the compensation is 
less effective at restoring the person to his/her prior level of utility.  
Frey and Oberholzer-Gee’s (1997) expected utility model for a representative agent 
living in an area facing a prospective NIMBY project is given below. 
       (1)8 
 Probability a facility is sited 
                                                
8 As in Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997), I assume decreasing returns to support (pS>0, pSS<0), that intrinsic utility is 
concave in support (DS>0, DSS<0), that external compensation tends to cause intrinsic support to decrease 
(DE<0),and that the cost of support is convex (KS>0, KSS>0). 
max{p(S)[B ! C + E]+ D(E,S) ! K(S)}
p =
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 An individual’s level of support for a facility 
 Benefits to an individual of a facility being sited 
 Costs to an individual of a facility being sited. Vector including that costs may increase 
(decrease) the less (more) distance there is between a person’s residence and the proposed 
facility. 
 External compensation offered 
 = Intrinsic benefits of supporting a facility 
 Costs of supporting a facility (time, money, and other tangible costs) 
The variables above that are specified as endogenous are defined as in Frey and 
Oberholzer-Gee (1997). The probability a facility is sited (!) is a function of an individual’s 
level of support for a facility (!) since the more (less) an individual supports a project, the 
greater (smaller) its chance is of being put into operation. Support is intended to include all 
forms of support from simply voting yes or no in a referendum to actively campaigning for or 
against the project. The intrinsic benefits of supporting a facility are a function of external 
compensation (!) to allow compensation to have a bribery effect on support by allowing it to 
lower the intrinsic benefits of supporting a supporting a facility. Intrinsic benefits are also 
defined to be increasing with support. The costs of supporting a facility (!) are increasing in 
support since it is assumed that the more someone supports a facility the more costly it is to the 
individual (i.e. the more time and resources someone devotes to supporting a project, the more 
costly it is to the individual).  
The model predicts that compensation can lower support for public works projects when 
civic duty drives support for a project. But there are cases in the land use literature where it can 








(Carnes et al. 1983; Jenkins-Smith and Kunreuther 2001). Frey and Oberholzer-Gee’s model 
cannot explain why when civic duty drives support for a project, sometimes compensation is 
seen as a bribe and other times it is not. This is where the research here makes one contribution. 
Take for example, that someone expects a land use to lower his home’s property value. One of 
the most directly substitutable forms of compensation is an insurance policy to insure against any 
losses in property value attributable to the land use. But giving someone money without tying it 
to changes in their property’s value is less directly related to the loss. One way to incorporate this 
idea into Frey and Oberholzer-Gee’s model is to make the intrinsic benefits someone receives 
from supporting a facility partly a function of the probability the person sees the compensation as 
a bribe. I interact this probability with the external compensation someone receives to allow the 
utility someone receives from civic duty to increase (decrease) the less (more) the person sees 
the offer as a bribe.  
       (2) 
probability someone sees an offer as a bribe 
measure of substitution between external compensation and costs facility poses  
Let  where 0 denotes the compensation is not substitutable with the goods at risk and 
1 denotes the compensation is perfectly substitutable.  
Vector of other factors that affect the likelihood someone sees an offer of compensation as a 
bribe. For example, the way a developer presents the same offer of compensation to a 
community member can affect the likelihood s/he sees the offer as a bribe. i.e. A developer could 
say, “We want to make sure this project doesn’t make anyone in the community worse off. To 
make sure this facility won’t cause you to lose any money from changes in value to your home 
max{p(S)[B ! C + E]+ D("(#CE ,V )E,S) ! K(S)}





because of this wind farm, can we get you property value insurance?” Alternatively, a developer 
could say “If we get you property value insurance, then will you support the project?” 
 To account for how the degree of substitution between the compensation offered and the 
goods at risk can affect someone’s expected utility apart from any bribe effect, I interact the 
measure for degree of substitution with the positive utility the person gets from external 
compensation alone.  
      (3) 
 Following the steps in Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, the representative community member 
chooses the level of support that maximizes his/her utility (the derivative of (3) is taken with 
respect to S yielding the first order conditions). After observing the level of support in the 
community, the developer then offers compensation to achieve the level of support necessary to 
site the project. This compensation in turn can affect the representative community member’s 
support (using the implicit function theorem, support is specified as a function of the exogenous 
variables in the first order conditions). When the developer offers the compensation, it can affect 
the member’s support (mathematically, this is equivalent to taking a derivative with respect to 
E). These steps yield: 
      
(4)
 
The result in equation 4 shows the effect that compensation can have on support. As in Frey and 
Oberholzer-Gee, the denominator is positive making the derivative’s sign determined by the 
numerator. Also the same is the relative price effect shown by  that the effect compensation 
has on support increases the more someone’s support improves the odds that the facility is sited. 
However, that the measure for the degree of substitution interacts with the price effect indicates 
max{p(S)[B ! C + "CEE]+ D(#("CE ,V )E,S) ! K(S)}
!S
!E =
pS"CE + DSE # "CE( )( )# "CE( )
$ pSS B $ C +"CEE[ ] + DSS # "CE( )( ) $ KSS%& '(
pS
55
that the more substitutable the compensation is with the goods at risk, the more this increases the 
already positive relative price effect. Additionally, the expression  shows 
that there are two ways the degree of substitution affects how much the bribery effect can 
diminish the impact of compensation. As the degree of substitution increases, the likelihood that 
the offer is seen as a bribe decreases—diminishing the bribe effect. Further, the less someone 
sees an offer as a bribe, the less negative an impact compensation has on the marginal utility of 
support—making the overall sign of the derivative more positive. 
2.4 Central Illinois Wind Farm Survey 
2.4.1 Prior Survey Research in the NIMBY Literature 
The gold standard for conducting a survey on the effects that compensation and/or 
mitigation can have on support for a land use is to conduct an in-person survey of a 
representative random sample of residents in an area actually considering the project about how 
different forms of mitigation and compensation would affect their support in a referendum. This 
approach comes from combining the survey methods recommended in the Report of the NOAA 
Panel on Contingent Valuation (1993) with the general preference in the NIMBY literature for 
surveys in areas where the land use of interest is proposed. While this is the gold standard, a 
number of factors including time and budget limitations have resulted in the standard approach to 
contingent valuation being a mail survey, often on hypothetical land uses (Portney 1994). The 
literature that addresses the problem of how to boost support for NIMBY projects includes 
research using surveys administered in-person at people’s homes (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 
1997); in-person outside polling places during an election (Lober and Green 1994); by booklet 
survey at public spaces including shopping malls, motor vehicle offices, town halls, and public 
libraries (Opaluch et al. 1993); by telephone (Jenkins-Smith and Kunreuther 2001; Kunreuther 
and Easterling 1990) and; by mail (Lober 1993).  
DSE ! "CE( )( )! "CE( )
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This research surveys people in areas where land uses are actually being proposed (Frey 
and Oberholzer-Gee 1997; Kunreuther and Easterling 1990; Lober 1995b), in areas on a list of 
places that might one day be proposed for the land use (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997), and in 
areas where the land uses in question are hypothetical (Jenkins-Smith and Kunreuther 2001; 
Lober 1993; Lober and Green 1994; Opaluch et al. 1993). These studies find that compensation 
and mitigation efforts have similar effects on people considering actual and hypothetical land 
uses.  
2.4.2 Population Sampled 
The survey used here was carefully crafted to be consistent with others in the contingent 
valuation literature and with the standards in Dillman, Smyth, and Christian (2009) and Couper 
(2008). The limiting factor in the survey was that the best population available for a sample was 
employees at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The University’s Division of 
Management Information builds and contacts random samples of staff for academic research 
using online surveys.  
The staff at the University of Illinois is a good population to draw from since it consists 
of people in communities where wind power projects will likely be cited in the near future.9 The 
survey location makes this sampling makes this sampling population similar to the six 
communities surveyed in Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) that were on a short-list to host a 
nuclear waste site in the future and to the Rhode Island residents surveyed in Opaluch et al. 
(1993) where the state was interested in new landfill construction. Lober and Green (1994) and 
Lober (1993) surveyed Connecticut residents about their support for one of several land uses 
including recycling centers, landfills, and garbage burning plants. However, it is not clear if any 
of the facilities in question were expected to be proposed for siting in the near future in the areas 
                                                
9 One small wind power project proposed for construction in Urbana was recently cancelled because of community 
opposition and cost concerns (Wade 2011). In 2009, the Champaign County Board approved an ordinance to 
regulate wind farm development with the expectation that there would be future wind farm development in the 
county. The cities of Champaign and Urbana have also both passed wind farm ordinances. According to the 
American Wind Energy Association, by September 2010 there were 22 wind power projects in operation in Illinois 
capable of generating approximately 1,848 megawatts of electricity with another three projects under construction 
capable of generating an estimated 587 megawatts (U.S. Wind Energy Projects - Illinois  2010). 
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surveyed. While respondents may have read about wind farm projects nearby in the local press, 
this may be the first time many have considered what their support would be for one in their 
community. The results here can be considered how people in a mid-western town might first 
react to hearing about a wind farm and mitigation/compensation packages proposed for their 
community (Jenkins-Smith and Kunreuther 2001).  
2.4.3 Survey Design 
To test for bribery effects as well as the effect directness may have on support, a number 
of survey variations were developed. To test if the effect of civic duty dissipates when 
compensation is offered, respondents were first exposed to a scenario with no compensation and 
then two subsequent scenarios in which they were offered different forms of compensation 
and/or mitigation. This is similar to Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) who ask respondents for 
their support for a nuclear waste facility before and after compensation has been offered. Here, 
four forms of compensation were offered. The first form of compensation was an annual cash 
payment as in Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997). This offer is most likely to cause a bribe effect 
since it is unlikely to address community concerns10 and consequently is likely to be seen as a 
payment offered in return for support. The amount offered was $1,000/year, which is on par with 
what developers have paid residents in Illinois who live within one mile of a wind farm but do 
not have any wind turbines on their property.  The amount was determined in an interview with 
Prof. David Loomis, Director of the Center for Renewable Energy at Illinois State University. 
The remaining three offers were meant to address several of the most commonly voiced concerns 
in potential host communities—shadow flicker (alternating shadows cast by moving wind 
turbine blades), noise, and potential losses in property values. The second offer was to locate the 
wind turbines in such a manner as to minimize shadow flicker. The third offer was to install 
turbines designed to minimize noise. The final offer was to provide free insurance to make up 
                                                
10 Of all the news articles published in the local press on wind farm proposals in central Illinois, it appears 
community members have not once expressed a desire for personal compensation if the wind farm proposed was 
built.  
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any losses in property value that might be caused by the wind farm.11 The final offer is the only 
form of compensation/mitigation that is unrealistic since it generally not offered by developers 
since it is not possible to calculate the exact change in value to a particular property due to a 
nearby wind farm. The offer was made since property values are often mentioned among 
residents’ biggest concerns. As noted earlier, property value insurance has been offered in 
previous surveys regarding NIMBY projects.  
In case there might be ordering effects specific to which form of compensation preceded 
another, the forms of compensation offered were put into five pairs. The pairs are shown in Table 
A.1 of the appendix. Bundles 1-5 represent the first five survey variations. Bundles 3-5 were 
offered to test for inequality aversion in another paper. In bundles 6-10, the order of 
compensation was reversed. To test for conditional cooperation in the third paper in this 
dissertation, one batch of the survey variations included information in each scenario that in an 
earlier survey, 83% of Central Illinois residents surveyed said they would vote yes for the wind 
farm proposed here in a referendum. This comprised the first ten survey variations. The latter ten 
survey variations included information that 22% of residents said they would vote yes.  
The survey was designed to avoid the ordering effects that have been significant in the 
literature when respondents are asked to consider one form of compensation followed by another 
(Jenkins-Smith and Kunreuther 2001). An earlier draft of the survey was pretested using students 
in an introductory economics course. As part of pre-testing, several student respondents were 
interviewed in a group during which ordering effects were discussed. All members of the group 
agreed that when each form of compensation/mitigation was introduced in the third scenario with 
the following language, they considered each form of compensation/mitigation separately in the 
scenario intended: “In this scenario, instead of offering [compensation/mitigation offered in 
scenario two], the developer has offered [compensation/mitigation offered in scenario three].” 
                                                
11 The wording for the third offer is adapted from Kunreuther and Easterling (1996). 
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The group also said they did not think the survey was biased for or against wind farm 
development. In the final survey, it appears that ordering effects are absent. The mean levels of 
support and directness when exposed to each form of compensation do not differ significantly 
depending on the order in which respondents were offered each measure (see Tables 2.1 and 
2.2). 
Since each respondent was randomly assigned to each compensation or mitigation 
package, this guarantees that any differences in responses between these groups are due to the 
differences in the packages offered (Jenkins-Smith and Kunreuther 2001). To test the 
substitutability hypothesis in this paper, all respondents were asked to select how directly they 
believed the compensation/mitigation measure offered addressed the impacts they expected. This 
is similar to questions in the NIMBY literature that have asked respondents to indicate how 
appropriate they see a particular measure (Jenkins-Smith and Kunreuther 2001). The added value 
of the question here is to get at why an offer of compensation or mitigation is appropriate.  
As recommended by the NOAA panel, respondents were asked to state their support or 
opposition for the given wind farm proposed using the referendum format. The two variants of 
the referendum format used in the NIMBY literature ask respondents either to indicate if they 
would vote yes or no if the land use were put to a vote (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997; 
Kunreuther and Easterling 1990) or to indicate their level of support or opposition to the facility 
on a Likert scale (Jenkins-Smith and Kunreuther 2001; Lober 1993, 1995b; Lober and Green 
1994). The voting format carries a significant risk of not picking up changes in support when 
there are actual changes since voting does not capture the strength of someone’s support or 
opposition. For example, if a given form of compensation moves someone from supporting a 
project to strongly supporting, or from opposing a project to being indifferent, the voting 
mechanism may not pick up these changes.  
In Frey and Oberholzer-Gee’s study, respondents were offered compensation that was 
likely to produce dramatic bribe effects since it was offered as a very large cash payment directly 
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to the respondents after they had already indicated how they would vote. In Kunreuther and 
Easterling’s survey, respondents were also offered each compensation/mitigation measure after 
they had already indicated their level of support. In this study, compensation is also offered after 
respondents have indicated their level of support for the project.  However, several of the 
compensation and mitigation measures are meant to minimize potential bribery effects. In turn, 
changes due to compensation may be less pronounced than in other work. Additionally, since 
many residents near proposed wind farms are likely concerned about more than one impact, 
simply addressing one impact alone is unlikely to move many people from disapproving to 
approving of a proposed wind farm. A more minor concern relates to the fact that wind farms in 
Illinois are built on privately held land where no referendums are actually held to determine their 
fate. Instead, community members’ can only express support or dissent through other means 
such as protests, writing letters, and speaking at community meetings. Since they have no 
opportunity to vote on these measures, a hypothetical vote may seem unrealistic to respondents. 
It is for these reasons that a five-point Likert scale is used to measure respondents’ support.  
All respondents were presented with the same hypothetical wind farm project as is 
standard in the literature to keep the land use project constant for all respondents.12 The distance 
from each respondent’s home to the wind farm was also kept constant at one mile since changes 
in distance may affect people’s support for wind farms (Devine-Wright 2005; Thayer and 
Freemand 1987). The description of the wind farm was kept brief to be consistent with how other 
land uses in the literature have been described. The wind farm described in the survey is the 
average size of wind farms in Illinois and uses the average size wind turbine (1.5 megawatts, 400 
feet tall from the base to the tip of the wind turbine blade at its highest point).  
Several visual aids were used to help respondents better understand the scope of the 
project proposed. One graphic was provided to help respondents grasp how large the type of 
wind turbine proposed is compared to others on the market. Another graphic was provided in the 
form of a picture taken of a wind farm in central Illinois at a distance of one mile. A number of 
                                                
12 Visual elements are included in the Internet survey printout provided in the appendix. 
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pictures were taken at the Twin Groves Wind Farm in Bloomington, IL and at the Pioneer Trail 
Wind Farm near Paxton, IL. The picture selected is of the Pioneer Wind Farm and was selected 
to show both the clearest view of a wind farm from one mile away while showing the greatest 
number of turbines possible. The picture selected was also chosen so as not to glamorize the 
wind turbines. The Pioneer Trail Wind Farm is approximately 30 miles from the University of 
Illinois so should be similar in landscape and ultimately in the view of a wind farm that 
respondents may face if a wind farm was proposed in their community.  
The survey concludes with a page for respondents to answer basic demographic questions 
normally asked in the NIMBY literature. The only demographic variable not asked about that is 
sometimes asked in the NIMBY literature is personal politics (conservative to liberal). 
Respondents were not asked to state where they place themselves on the political spectrum since, 
for many respondents, the question would likely seem too invasive and cause the response rate to 
drop significantly. That said, in the NIMBY literature where a variable is included to account for 
respondents’ support for the type of power that is associated with the facility proposed, the 
variable for political affiliation is insignificant (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997). Next, 
respondents were given the opportunity to provide any extra comments in writing.  
Respondents were offered several incentives to complete the survey. Respondents were 
given the chance to enter a drawing for one of the three awards below and to choose which 
award they would like to receive. One award was given out for every 25 respondents and 
respondents were informed of this.  The first award was for a $25 Amazon gift certificate or 
direct payment through PayPal. The second was for scratch off parking tags for three days of free 
parking on campus. The final award was for a $25 donation to be made on behalf of the 
respondent to the Eastern Illinois Food Bank, which serves Champaign County. The Division of 
Management information suggested that the option to have respondents be able to make a 
donation to a local non-controversial charity as their award might be especially effective given 
the population sampled. Offering a chance for respondents to enter a lottery as an incentive to 
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complete the survey is standard practice in online surveys (Couper 2008; Frippiat and Marquis 
2010).  
While it is not clear if research has been done on the effect that letting respondents 
choose their method of payment may have on response rates, it seems that doing so could boost 
the number of responses. Giving respondents a choice is nearly costless for respondents while it 
shows respect for each person’s preferences. Respondents were also given the chance to sign up 
to receive copies of any research that results from the survey as is generally recommended in the 
literature on online surveys (Couper 2008; Dillman, Smyth, and Christian 2009). I attempt to 
maximize the response rate through other means by following the guidelines laid out in Dillman, 
Smyth, and Christian (2009) and Couper (2008)—i.e. it was kept as brief as possible, the tone of 
the survey was written to treat respondents like adults, many elements were included to establish 
the survey’s importance and legitimacy, it was thoroughly proofread for typos, it was easy to 
navigate, etc. 
2.4.4 Method of Collection 
Although none of the NIMBY research cited here uses online surveys to collect their 
data, the possibility for online survey research was largely non-existent at the time the surveys 
were done. Since then, a number of respected journals including Land Economics (Little et al. 
2006), Agricultural Economics (Hartl and Herrmann 2009), the Journal of Environmental 
Planning and Management (Meyerhoff, Dehnhardt, and Hartje 2010; Nielsen and Kjaer 2011), 
and the Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Berrens 2004) have published 
contingent valuation research based on original online surveys.13 While there is scant research in 
economics on how to best adapt contingent valuation and related surveys to an online format, the 
research that has been done finds that so long as the surveys are kept short (in choice 
                                                
13 A number of other economic journals have published research based on original online surveys in fields other than 
contingent valuation. These include the following: the Economics Bulletin (Lii 2009), Resource and Energy 
Economics (Axsen, Mountain, and Jaccard 2009), the International Journal of Production Economics (Cao and 
Zhang 2010), AgBioForum (Harrington 2009), the American Journal of Economics and Sociology (Klein and 
Tabarrok 2008), the International Food and Agribusiness Management Review (Novotorova and Mazzocco 2008), 
and Research in Transportation Economics (Reilly, Williams, and Haider 2010). 
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experiments there should be four sets of choices or less) the responses are of the same quality as 
those gathered by other means (Li et al. 2004; Marta-Pedroso, Freitas, and Domingos 2007; 
Savage and Waldman 2008). In keeping with these findings, respondents in the survey here faced 
only three screens where they were asked to mark their level of support for the wind farm 
proposed.  
The survey was administered using SurveyMonkey. The survey templates available on 
this program have been designed to be user friendly on a number of Internet browsers and meet 
disability guidelines. Each potential respondent was sent an e-mail asking them to participate in 
the survey using the guidelines laid out in Dillman, Smyth, and Christian (2009) and Couper 
(2008). The e-mail informed the recipients of the nature of the survey, guaranteed their 
confidentiality, provided information about the incentives offered to complete the survey, and 
provided a hyperlink to the survey.14 All respondents were given the same hyperlink to a 
“welcome” webpage hosted on the author’s account with the University of Illinois.15 
Respondents who chose to move on with the survey then clicked a “next” button and were 
randomly sent to one of the survey’s variations hosted on SurveyMonkey.com. The webpage 
hosted at the University of Illinois was designed to be identical in appearance to the rest of the 
survey hosted on SurveyMonkey.com.  
The invitation and follow up e-mails were sent by the Division of Management 
Information respectively on Wednesday, March 14, and Friday, March 16, 2012 between 9:00 
am and 10:00 am to a random sample of 5,000 university employees.16 Respondents who lived 
outside of Champaign, Urbana, and Savoy were oversampled to result in a sample with 
                                                
14 The text of the invitation and follow up e-mail are included in the appendix. 
15 Respondents were not each sent a unique link that would have helped guarantee that only those who were e-
mailed about the survey could complete it. The Division of Management Information cautioned that some 
respondents were likely to think they could be personally identified by a unique link, putting the likelihood of 
getting a decent response rate in jeopardy. It may be the case that some people who responded to the survey may not 
have been on the e-mail list. While the survey was active, several individuals who were not on the initial contacted 
the author to ask whether they should take the survey. Additionally, several respondents on the email list contacted 
the author to inquire about whether they should forward the link to others who might be interested. All were advised 
not to. 
16 See appendix Tables A.2 and A.3 for a comparison by gender and ethnicity of the population from which the 
sample was drawn and those who received e-mails to take the survey. 
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respondents who were more likely to live in rural areas where wind farms are more likely to be 
sited. The survey was closed the following Wednesday evening once a sample of 1,000 
responses was obtained.17 The 20% response rate for this survey is approximately double the 
average response rate for online surveys administered to employees at the University of Illinois. 
The short window for responses may bias the results because of the early responder nature of the 
sample obtained. However, extending the time for respondents to complete the survey would 
have likely had little effect on the total number of responses received. The overwhelming 
majority of the responses came in on the days the invitation and follow up e-mails were sent. On 
the Wednesday the invitation was sent, 569 respondents completed the survey. On the Friday the 
reminder was sent, another 269 respondents completed the survey. On the following Monday and 
Tuesday, only 22 and 12 respondents respectively completed the survey.  
Regarding the incentives offered, 38% asked to receive copies of reports with findings 
from the survey by e-mail. Six percent entered the drawing for free parking, 43% entered the 
drawing for a $25 Amazon gift certificate or direct payment using PayPal, and 29% entered the 
drawing for a donation to be made in their name to the Eastern Illinois Food Bank. Of those 
selected to receive the Amazon gift certificate or PayPal payment, 80% chose to receive the 
Amazon gift certificate. Of those who asked to receive copies of reports and findings, 95% also 
entered the drawing for one of the awards.  
2.5 Summary Statistics18 
Eighty-nine percent of those who started the survey completed it. On average, 
respondents took 9.88 minutes to complete the survey with a median time of 6 minutes.  
Among those who completed the survey, mean support for the wind farm proposed before 
compensation was offered was very high at 4.10 out of 5 being the highest level of support (See 
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 for demographic statistics comparing those who did and did not complete the 
                                                
17 The number of responses was limited to 1,000 because of budget limitations.  
18 All results reported are for respondents who completed the survey.  
65
survey). Mean support for wind power in general was even higher at 4.36. These high levels of 
support stand in contrast to support for the nuclear waste site in Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997). 
It may be the case that monetizing a transaction in which there are slight or no risks to one’s 
health does not have nearly as deleterious an effect on support as attempting to do so when 
respondents expect significant health risks. With wind farms, critics rarely if ever cite risks to 
human health as a concern but these risks are often at the top of critics’ lists regarding nuclear 
power.  
This very high level of average support for a wind farm one mile from one’s home may 
have been larger than would exist in reality due to potential bias since the situation considered 
was hypothetical (Diamond and Hausman 1994; Johnston 2006). That average support for wind 
power in general was higher than mean support for the proposed wind farm before compensation 
was offered may be an indicator of a NIMBY attitude in some respondents. Two hundred and 
twelve respondents rated their support for wind power as higher than their support for the 
proposed wind farm one mile from their home before compensation was offered. Only 27 
respondents strongly supported or supported wind power in general while opposing or strongly 
opposing the wind farm proposed before compensation was offered. This indicates that only a 
very small proportion of respondents displayed what is often considered a true NIMBY 
attitude—supporting a type of project in general but opposing it in one’s backyard. 
One hundred-nine respondents started but did not complete the survey. These respondents 
had lower levels of both support for the wind farm proposed and for wind power in general. Both 
differences are significant at the one percent level. The other main difference (significant at the 
one percent level) between those who did and did not complete the survey is that those who did 
not complete the survey were on average slightly older than those who did. In turn, it may be the 
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case that respondents who completed the survey were not representative of the population 
sampled. Consequently, the results may not perfectly forecast support for wind farms for the 
population sampled. Still, the high response and completion rates suggest that the sample 
collected should accurately reflect how many individuals react to the incentives offered. 
Of those who completed the survey, nine percent either lived near a wind farm at the time 
of the survey or had at some point lived near a wind farm. Approximately 60% of the 
respondents were female even though the survey was sent to roughly equal proportions of men 
and women. This gender response differs from another wind farm survey carried out in Illinois. 
In 2009, the Center for Renewable Energy at Illinois State University conducted a mail survey on 
wind farm attitudes which yielded a response rate of 35.3% of which 63% were from men 
(Loomis et al. 2010). This indicates that women are not necessarily more likely to respond to 
surveys about wind farms. Rather it may be that women in the particular population sampled 
were more likely to respond to online surveys, that the incentives offered somehow appealed 
more to women, and/or some other factor may have been at play.  
 The average level of education was fairly high with the mean respondent being between a 
college graduate and having completed some post-graduate work. This outcome is to be expected 
since the sample was drawn from University employees. The average pre-tax income reported 
was in the area of $50,000 to $74,999. Of those who did not complete the survey, the fewest 
number of respondents answered the income question of any of the demographic questions. 
Lastly, 84% of respondents were homeowners. Of those who did not complete the survey but did 
respond to the homeownership question, 92% said they owned a home, which is different from 
those who completed the survey at the ten percent level.  
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 Those who did not complete the survey appear to have been more likely to expect more 
of the negative impacts listed (e.g. shadow flicker, losses in property values, noise, and damage 
to the view of the landscape) than those who did complete the survey (See Tables 2.5 and 2.6 for 
a breakdown of respondents’ expected impacts). Of those who did not complete the survey, 30% 
expected the wind farm proposed to tarnish the view, 19% expected shadow flicker to be 
significant, 29% expected losses in property value, and 31% expected noise to be a problem. Of 
those who did complete the survey, 21% expected the view to be tarnished, 11% expected 
shadow flicker, 24% expected losses in property value, and 23% expected noise to be a problem. 
The differences between the incomplete and complete surveys for the view and shadow flicker 
are significant at the five percent level and for noise at the ten percent level. However, 
approximately half of both those who did and did not complete the survey expected no impacts 
whatsoever.  
 Fairly small numbers of respondents wrote in expected impacts beyond those provided in 
the checklist. The most common write-in expected impact was over concern that the wind 
turbines might harm birds and/or bats. The next most common write-in response mentioned 
subsidies and/or government in a negative context. Both of these concerns were present in 
another wind farm survey conducted in Illinois (Loomis et al. 2010). Other write in responses 
included concerns over blinking lights at night on the wind turbines, that the turbines could harm 
wildlife, and that new wind farm developments would not lower respondents’ power bills.   
 While the respondents in general are of interest in terms of their expected impacts, it is 
also useful to compare the expected impacts of homeowners and non-homeowners. For 
developers, homeowners are a distinct group of interest since they are the ones developers 
negotiate with concerning neighbor payments. It also stands to reason that homeowners might 
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have been more concerned with impacts like property values and may have provided more 
accurate answers in the survey if they took it more seriously than renters. The only impact that 
homeowners expected more frequently than non-homeowners was losses in property values 
(Table 2.7). Twenty-five percent of homeowners expected losses in property values compared to 
14% of non-homeowners. The difference was significant at the one percent level. It is reasonable 
that more homeowners would expect losses in property values than non-homeowners. It bodes 
well for the quality of responses from non-homeowners that their level of expected impacts did 
not differ significantly from those of homeowners for any of the other expected impacts. While 
there is concern that renters may not see all a wind farm’s costs, the result does not appear to 
bear out since homeowners and non-homeowners expect largely the same costs. This lack of 
significance further helps address concerns that responses from non-homeowners in the survey 
may be less valid than those from homeowners.  
It may be the case that those who think it is possible for a wind farm to be sited in their 
area provide a more realistic picture of the impacts residents would expect from a proposed wind 
farm. The wind farm proposed in the survey may seem much more real to those who think it is 
possible a wind farm could be proposed, potentially providing data more representative of people 
who live in areas where developers might propose a wind farm. Respondents who thought it was 
possible that a wind farm could be built where they live were less likely to expect each negative 
impact from the wind farm than those who thought it was not possible (Table 2.8). For three out 
of four impacts the difference was significant at either the one (noise) or five (shadow flicker or 
losses in property value) percent level. Additionally, proportionally more respondents who 
thought a wind farm was possible in their area expected not to be affected (56%) than those who 
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did not think a wind farm was possible (48%). The difference was significant at the five percent 
level.  
It is hard to say why those who thought a wind farm was possible would expect fewer 
impacts. It may partly be that 10% of those who thought a wind farm was possible had 
experience living near a wind farm compared to five percent of those who did not think it was 
possible (this difference was significant at the ten percent level). It may also be that respondents 
who thought it was possible did so because they saw themselves as living someplace where wind 
farms posed few risks—i.e. they may have thought that living someplace where wind farms 
posed few risks increased the likelihood of a wind farm being proposed. Alternatively, there may 
be other unobserved factors that drove this difference.  
The potential risks presented, although hypothetical, in the survey appear to have been 
just as salient to renters as they were to homeowners; and to those who did not expect a wind 
farm as to those who did. Were the risks less salient to renters, for example, a smaller proportion 
of them should have expected the costs presented in the survey than homeowners. Yet, except for 
property values, similar proportions of each group expected each impact. Similarly, were the 
costs less salient to those who did not expect a wind farm, smaller proportions of them should 
have expected each impact. Yet larger proportions of those who did not think a wind farm could 
be built one mile from their home expected the impacts presented than did those who did think a 
wind farm could be built one mile from their home. These results support the notion that the 
estimates for the respondents in general—without breaking them up into home-owners and non-
homeowners or those who did or did not think a wind farm could be built one mile from their 
home—should be interpreted as valid.  
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2.6  Estimation Methods 
2.6.1  Estimation Procedures 
 The models estimated here have a dependent variable for “support” as a linear function of 
the independent variables of interest and a vector of demographic control variables as has been 
done before in the NIMBY literature (e.g. Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997; Kunreuther and 
Easterling 1990; Lober 1993). Since the variable for support is ordinal and bounded, the model is 
best estimated as an ordered probit or ordered logit. In preliminary regressions, the model 
variations run as ordered logits all had higher pseudo R-squared values and more positive log 
likelihoods indicating that an ordered logit fits the data better than an ordered probit. Aside from 
their sign and significance, ordered logit coefficients cannot be easily interpreted or compared 
across groups because of differences in the error structure (Hoetker 2004). However, since 
predicted probabilities can be compared across groups (Long 2009), the average predicted 
probabilities of support are provided for the effect of directness and support for wind power in 
general.  
2.6.2  Identification Strategy 
Hypothesis 1: The more substitutable compensation is with the losses expected from a 
wind farm, the less likely respondents are to see it as a bribe. To test for this, I include the 
measure for directness in the regressions. The survey asked respondents to rate how directly they 
saw compensation as addressing their concerns since asking them to rate how substitutable they 
saw it as being with their expected losses would have introduced potentially confusing economic 
jargon. If the measure for directness is positively significant, then the results are consistent with 
this hypothesis.  
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Hypothesis 2: When civic duty initially drives support for a wind farm, introducing 
compensation may cause support associated with civic duty to decrease. To test this hypothesis 
and keep the empirical model consistent with the theoretic model developed earlier, 
compensation and mitigation need to be allowed to directly affect support through the price 
effect and by allowing the effect of civic duty to dissipate. To estimate the price effect, variables 
for each form of compensation and mitigation are included on their own.19 Similar to Frey and 
Oberholzer-Gee (1997), the effect of support for wind power in general is allowed to differ 
before and after compensation was offered. This is done to allow the effect of civic duty on 
support to potentially dissipate after compensation has been offered. If the coefficient on support 
for wind power in general decreases or becomes negative after compensation has been offered, 
then the results would be consistent with a bribe effect since where civic duty once drove support 
for the wind farm proposed, compensation would appear to negate this effect.  
The demographic variables are constrained to be the same before and after compensation 
was offered since there is no a priori reason to believe their effect would change once 
compensation or mitigation was introduced. Additionally, in preliminary regressions, all 
demographic variables failed to differ at statistically significant levels when allowed to differ 
based on their effect before and after compensation was offered.  
All regressions were run for three groups—all respondents, respondents who were 
opposed or strongly opposed to the wind farm before compensation was offered (referred to 
going forward as having low initial support), and respondents who were neutral in their support 
for the wind farm before compensation was offered (referred to going forward as having neutral 
                                                
19 The variable for being offered $1,000/ year includes those who were only offered $1,000/year as well as those 
offered that amount and given information about how much respondents in an earlier survey accepted. In 
preliminary regressions those offered $1,000 and those offered the same amount and given other information were 
included separately. Their coefficients failed to differ at significant levels for any groups.  
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initial support). While the general population in areas facing prospective wind farm 
developments is of interest, the population in these areas who oppose wind farm developments 
are likely of most interest to developers. If the main purpose of compensation is to boost 
approval, then it is inefficient to offer compensation to those who already support a wind farm. 
However, there were only 97 respondents in the low initial support group. In turn, results for this 
group may be sensitive to the sample size. An additional regression is reported for those in the 
neutral initial support group since preliminary data analysis indicated that this sub-group may 
have been the most responsive to compensation. However, since only 66 respondents who 
completed the survey fell into this group, the results for this group may also be sensitive to the 
sample size.  
A number of additional regressions were run where the variables for directness and each 
offer of compensation were interacted with measures for several respondent groupings. One 
specification includes interactions for whether or not respondents had experience living near a 
wind farm (Table 2.10). This specification is designed to help rule out the possibility that instead 
of seeing compensation as a bribe, respondents instead may have seen the offers as a signal that 
the wind farm was riskier than previously expected. Respondents with experience living near a 
wind farm were likely to be familiar with the costs of living near a wind farm. In turn, offering 
compensation to this group should not affect their perceived costs. Therefore if the effect of 
compensation on those who have lived near a wind farm is the same as for those who have not, 
then it is reasonable to rule out that respondents saw compensation as signaling higher risk.  
A number of robustness checks were run to test if the results were sensitive to different 
specifications or estimation methods. Several series of regressions were run where the variables 
for directness and forms of compensation were interacted with variables to identify distinct 
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groups of interest among the respondents. The original specifications in Table 2.9 were also run 
as ordered probits and with the demographic variables dropped.  
The first group of interest tested is homeowners (Table 2.11). This group may provide 
more realistic responses to compensation as any money paid in these transactions goes to 
landowners—not renters.  
The second group tested is those who exhibited NIMBY characteristics (Table 2.12). 
While only a relative handful of respondents supported wind power in general while opposing 
the wind farm proposed, 212 respondents supported wind power in general more than they 
supported the proposed wind farm before compensation was offered. This is termed a weak 
NIMBY attitude since it may be that the wind farm proposed represented a “bad” wind farm to 
these respondents. Their weak NIMBY attitude may have disappeared completely when faced 
with a “good” wind farm. However, if these respondents had a weak NIMBY attitude before 
compensation was offered, they may have reacted more sensitively to compensation than 
respondents as a whole. Whether or not they were more likely to consider the compensation as a 
bribe is hard to say, but compensation may have made them angrier about a project they believe 
had no place in their backyard.  
Table 2.13 reports results for interactions with respondents in the highest income group. 
Since the compensation and mitigation measures may have been too small to matter for 
respondents in this group, compensation should have a less positive effect for this group—
yielding negatively significant coefficients. Additionally, if the amount of compensation is too 
small, then it also may not matter how directly each measure addresses respondents’ concerns.  
The final two groups of interactions are for respondents who respectively believed it was 
possible that a wind farm could be sited one mile from their home and for respondents who 
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believed a developer would actually offer the compensation described in the survey. Because of 
the population sampled, a number of respondents may have lived in areas where it was unlikely 
that a wind farm could be sited one mile from their home as described in the survey. Responses 
from residents who believed it was possible that a wind farm could be built one mile from their 
home may be more accurate than those who did not think it was possible they could face the 
situation described in the survey. Similarly, responses should be more accurate for respondents 
who believed developers would offer the forms of compensation described.   
2.7 Results   
2.7.1 Directness and Support (Testing Hypothesis 1) 
In this sub-section, I ask whether the more (less) directly compensation substitutes for 
respondents’ losses, the less (more) of a bribery effect there will be. In the comparative static 
result (4), directness may positively affect support through both by increasing the relative price 
effect and by decreasing the bribery effect. As discussed earlier, the relative price effect should 
however be very small for most respondents because most people’s support for or opposition to a 
wind farm has only a small effect on the probability that a wind farm is sited. So on average, if 
directness has a positive effect on support, it is likely that its primary effect is on the moral 
component of a person’s decision to support a wind farm. It would have been preferable to ask 
respondents whether they saw each offer of compensation as signaling higher risk, a chance to 
bargain, or a bribe. However, the online nature of the survey, as opposed to the personal 
interviews conducted in Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997), may have yielded poor quality data for 
questions of this nature.  
I test the substitutability hypothesis by including the Likert scale variable for directness 
in each regression. If the coefficient is positive (negative), then it appears that the more (less) 
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directly respondents saw a given offer of compensation as addressing their concerns the more 
(less) effective the offer was in boosting their support for the wind farm proposed. It would have 
been ideal to interact the measure for directness with those for each form of compensation and 
respondents’ support for wind power in general (a proxy for civic duty) to separate the relative 
price effect from the bribe effect. However, performing either of these interactions causes 
significant collinearity.  
Ultimately, the results support the idea that the more directly compensation addressed 
respondent concerns the more support for the wind farm proposed was likely to increase. The 
coefficient on directness is positively significant at the one percent level for all three groups, 
meaning that the more directly respondents saw compensation as addressing their concerns, the 
more likely they were to decrease their opposition to the wind farm (see Table 2.9). For the 
group “all respondents,” once the effects of all other variables are accounted for, directness 
appears to have most influenced whether respondents would support or strongly support the wind 
farm. Even at the lowest level of perceived directness, there was a 79 percent chance that 
respondents would support or strongly support the proposed wind farm (see Figure 2.1). At the 
highest level of directness, there was a 93 percent chance that respondents would strongly 
support or support the wind farm. All of the average predicted probability estimates in Figure 2.1 
are significant at the one percent level.  
In terms of the probability that a respondent would strongly support the proposed wind 
farm, directness had an almost perfectly linear positive effect. Seeing compensation as very 
directly versus very indirectly addressing their concerns increased the chance that a respondent 
would strongly support the wind farm by 24 percentage points. For all other levels of support, the 
effect of directness was negative. Seeing compensation as very directly versus very indirectly 
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addressing their concerns lowered the probability that respondents would support the wind farm 
by ten percentage points. The same change in directness lowered the probability that respondents 
would be neutral about the wind farm by 11 percentage points, that they would oppose the wind 
farm by three percentage points, and that they would strongly oppose the wind farm by 0.3 
percentage points.  
The positive effect of directness among those initially opposed to the wind farm appears 
to have been in weakening their opposition rather than converting them to supporters (see Figure 
2.2). Respondents who saw compensation as very directly addressing their concerns were 50.4 
percent less likely to strongly oppose the wind farm than those who saw compensation as only 
very indirectly addressing their concerns. However, this decreasing likelihood to strongly oppose 
the wind farm translated into respondents in this group being more likely to simply oppose rather 
than strongly oppose the wind farm. Respondents who saw the compensation as very directly 
addressing their concerns were 37.5 percent more likely to oppose the wind farm than 
respondents who saw the compensation as very indirectly addressing their concerns. The results 
for those initially opposed to the wind farm should actually give more confidence in the overall 
results in this paper than had these respondents reacted to single offers of compensation by 
drastically increasing their support. It is not realistic to expect that a single offer of compensation 
could turn someone opposed to a wind farm into a vocal supporter. But it is possible that one 
offer could lower someone’s opposition—and that is precisely what is found here. These results 
are especially strong since every point estimate but one in Figure 2.2 is significant at the one 
percent level. 
Those with initially neutral support for the proposed wind farm appear to have been the 
most affected by how directly they saw compensation as addressing their concerns. For 
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respondents in this group who saw the compensation offered as very directly addressing their 
concerns, there was a 50% chance that they would support the wind farm (see Figure 2.3). 
Comparatively, respondents in this group who saw the compensation offered as only very 
indirectly addressing their concerns had essentially zero chance of increasing their support above 
their initial level. As strong as the effect of directness appears to have been, no matter how 
directly these respondents saw compensation as addressing their concerns, they were extremely 
unlikely to be moved to strongly support the wind farm.  
According to Figure 2.3, the main effect of directness in this group appears to have been 
in whether respondents chose to remain neutral in their support of the wind farm or switched to 
supporting the wind farm. The point estimate(s) for the effect of directness on the probability of 
staying neutral about the wind farm is significant at the 10% level for the middle level of 
directness but are significant at the one percent level for the higher levels of directness. All point 
estimates for the probability of supporting the project are significant at the one percent level. 
Essentially, once respondents in this group saw the compensation offered as hitting the middle 
level of directness, from this point, as directness increased respondents generally became more 
and more likely to go from being neutral about the wind farm to supporting the wind farm (the 
probability of being neutral in this range declined as directness increased, while the probability 
of supporting the facility increased as directness increased). There is one other point estimate 
that is significant at the 10% level (the probability of being opposed to the wind farm given that 
respondents saw compensation as only indirectly addressing their concerns), but the magnitude 
of the point estimate itself barely differed from zero.  
Further, as seen in Table 2.18, of those who were initially neutral in their support for the 
wind farm, only those who saw the compensation as very indirectly addressing their concerns 
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had lower mean support than before compensation was offered. That the decline is statistically 
insignificant suggests that it may be a safe bet that developers offering compensation to those 
initially neutral about a proposed wind farm are likely to do no harm to mean support among this 
group.   
2.7.2 The Effect of Support for Wind Power in General on Support for the 
Proposed Wind Farm with Room for Crowding Out  (Testing Hypothesis 2)   
In this sub-section I ask whether compensation can crowd out the otherwise positive 
effect civic duty has on people’s support for the wind farm proposed. In their study on support 
for a nuclear waste repository, Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) note that before compensation 
was offered in a survey, individuals’ support for nuclear power in general was significantly 
positively related to the support for the nuclear waste site proposed. But after compensation was 
offered, the relationship turned negative and lost all significance. The compensation was said to 
have dominated people’s decision, causing the effect of civic duty on support to fade to 
insignificance. If civic duty drives support here, support for wind power in general can be 
expected to translate into higher support for the wind farm proposed. In turn, I include a Likert 
scale variable for support for wind power in general where the coefficient is allowed to differ 
before and after compensation was offered. If civic duty drove support before compensation was 
offered, then there should be a positively significant relationship between individuals’ support 
for wind power in general and their support for the wind farm proposed. If offering 
compensation came to dominate their decision—such that their support for wind power in 
general no longer factored in to their decision on how much to support the wind farm—then the 
coefficient for support for wind power in general should lose its significance after compensation 
was offered as the similar coefficient did in Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997). 
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Unlike in the research above on support for a nuclear waste site, offering compensation 
here appears to have not the support associated with civic duty to fade. Among no group did 
offering compensation cause the coefficient on support for wind power in general to decline 
significantly (see Table 2.9). Where the coefficient does change at a statistically significant 
level—for those with low initial support—it actually increases. The coefficient declines only for 
all respondents and the difference is statistically insignificant. This is noteworthy since with such 
high initial levels of support for the wind farm, for most respondents, support barely had any 
room left to improve but had a great deal of room to go down. However, for those with low 
initial support, the coefficient increases at a statistically significant level.  
There is at least one other instance in the literature in which compensation did not cause 
support for a NIMBY project to decrease. As discussed earlier, Jenkins-Smith and Kunreuther 
(2001) asked respondents to rate their level of support for a prison, a landfill, an incinerator and a 
nuclear waste repository hypothetically proposed at various distances from their home. The 
authors offered several measures to boost support (inspection by an independent agency 
approved by the local government, project subject to approval by locally elected officials, locally 
elected officials would have the authority to shut down the facility, and “economic benefits” 
would be “provided to residents living within 50 miles of the facility”).  When “economic 
benefits” were offered last, they failed to significantly boost support for any project and actually 
caused support to decline significantly for the incinerator. However, when offered first, 
“economic benefits” caused support to increase for all projects—the increase was significant for 
all facilities except the repository. The findings by Jenkins-Smith and Kunreuther have several 
things in common with the study here on support for a wind farm. The most glaring is that like a 
prison, a landfill, or an incinerator, a wind farm does not tend to carry the extreme perceived 
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risks to human health (a highly non-substitutable good when expected losses are significant) that 
people often associate with a nuclear waste site. Additionally, the authors offered one group of 
respondents “economic benefits” first, but the first offer to the other group was that inspections 
would be carried out by an independent agency approved by the local government. When offered 
first, inspections boosted support for every facility more than “economic benefits.” This result 
too is arguably consistent with the substitutability hypothesis put forward in this paper—i.e. 
inspections are more likely to directly address respondent concerns than offers of “economic 
benefits.” 
Among those initially opposed or strongly opposed to the wind farm, compensation 
boosted the effect of civic duty most for those who strongly supported wind power in general 
(see Figure 2.6). Compensation increased the probability that respondents who supported wind 
power in general would be neutral about the wind farm by 32.7 percentage points (significant at 
the one percent level) and decreased the probability that they would oppose the wind farm by 
22.9 percentage points (significant at the five percent level). Additionally, for respondents who 
were neutral about, supported, or strongly supported wind power in general, offering 
compensation reduced the likelihood that they would strongly oppose the proposed wind farm by 
more than 10 percentage points at each level of respective support for wind power (respectively 
significant at the five, one and five percent levels). It may be the case for those with initially low 
support that once their concerns were addressed, they could then be motivated by a sense of civic 
duty. Lastly, for those with initially neutral support, the effect of wind power in general is 
however insignificant both before and after compensation was offered. This indicates that for 
these individuals civic duty did not have a significant effect on support in either circumstance.  
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For the group “all respondents,” support for wind power in general was an extremely 
strong predictor of initial support for the wind farm proposed—all point estimates for the effect 
of support for wind power in general were significant at the one percent level (see Figure 2.4). If 
respondents strongly supported wind power in general, there was a 98% chance that they would 
strongly support or support the wind farm. For those who supported wind power in general, there 
was an 80% chance that they would strongly support or support the wind farm. To illustrate how 
effectively changing respondents’ support for wind power in general was in improving their 
support for the wind farm proposed, moving respondents from supporting to strongly supporting 
wind power in general made them 51 percentage points more likely to strongly support the wind 
farm. The same change in support for wind power in general, made respondents in general 34 
percentage points less likely to support the wind farm, 13 percentage points less likely to be 
neutral, three percentage points less likely to oppose the wind farm and less than one percentage 
point likely to strongly oppose the wind farm.  
Improving respondents’ support for wind power in general—even starting from those 
most severely opposed—was equally effective at lessening opposition. For the group “all 
respondents,” moving individuals from strongly opposing to opposing wind power in general 
made them 52 percentage points less likely to strongly oppose the wind farm and 36 percentage 
points more likely to simply oppose it (see Figure 2.4). Moving respondents from being opposed 
to neutral about wind power reduced the odds that they would strongly oppose the wind farm by 
26 percentage points and that they opposed the wind farm by 25 percentage points. The same 
change in support for wind power also raised the probability they would be neutral about the 
wind farm. This change in support for wind power was associated with a 24 percentage point 
increase in the probability of being neutral about the wind farm.  
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 As with the groups “all respondents,” increasing individuals’ support for wind power in 
the group with initially low support significantly decreased opposition to the wind farm before 
compensation was offered (see Figure 2.5). Going from strongly opposing to strongly supporting 
wind power was associated with a 53.8 percentage point decrease in the probability of strongly 
opposing the wind farm. Additionally, those strongly opposed to wind power had a 70% chance 
of also strongly opposing the wind farm. Similarly, changing respondents from being opposed to 
strongly opposed to wind power increased their probability of strongly opposing the wind farm 
by 15.5 percentage points. 
2.7.3 Compensation and Mitigation Estimates 
The compensation and mitigation measures generally carry negatively significant 
coefficients. There are several ways to interpret this. One is that once directness was stripped 
from the effect of compensation, all that was left was the price and bribery effects. Since there 
are likely more variables than one’s support for wind power in general that capture the effect of 
civic duty on support, some of this decline in the effect of civic duty may be captured in the 
coefficients on each form of compensation and mitigation. Regarding the relative price effect, 
unless someone puts a significant amount of effort into supporting or opposing a wind farm, the 
probability that their actions would affect whether a wind farm is sited or not is very small. For 
most, this makes the relative price effect very small. In the end, this leaves each form of 
compensation dominated by potential bribe effects. Alternatively it may be that being offered 
compensation signaled more risk than respondents previously expected. It is unlikely that 
respondents saw one offer as a chance to bargain since the survey did not allow for bargaining.  
2.7.4 Expected Impacts 
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 The coefficients that are significant for expected impacts show a potential divergence 
between perceived costs and those that residents would be likely to incur. The scenario described 
in the survey asked respondents how they would respond to a wind farm proposed one mile from 
their home. It is likely that only one of the negative impacts listed for respondents to choose from 
would have been imposed on residents one mile from the wind farm in the primarily flat, 
agricultural landscape of central Illinois. Alternatively there may have been a disconnect 
between perceived costs and those that were actually likely. The view may be the most realistic 
negative expected impact. The two wind farms closest to the University of Illinois are clearly 
visible from the nearest freeways, which are more than one mile away. It may partly be for this 
reason that the view being impacted is negatively significant for all respondents and those with 
initially low support. However, regarding shadow flicker, the shadows that wind turbines cast are 
much shorter than one mile in length, making shadow flicker at that distance highly unlikely. It 
may be for this reason that the effect of shadow flicker is insignificant for all respondents and 
those with initially neutral support. The coefficient is negatively significant at the ten percent 
level for those with initially low support. The studies that have been done in the U.S. on the 
effect that wind farms can have on property values have found no long-term impact on housing 
prices (Carter 2011; Hinman 2010; Hoen et al. 2009). Yet the coefficient for concerns regarding 
losses in property value is negatively significant at the one percent level for all respondents. The 
coefficient is however insignificant for respondents with neutral and low initial support. 
Regarding the noise that wind turbines produce, it is difficult to hear wind turbines operating in 
central Illinois from 0.25 miles away. From one mile away, they cannot be heard. However, the 
coefficient for concerns over noise is negatively significant for all respondents and those with 
initially low support, although only at the ten percent level for each group.  
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While it is likely that most respondents are not intimately aware of the actual costs 
associated with wind farms from one mile away, the lack of likely impacts may partly explain 
why the coefficient on “Do not expect to be affected” is positively significant for all respondents 
and those with initially low support.  
2.7.5 Demographics 
As has been found before in the NIMBY literature, the demographic variables are 
primarily insignificant (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997; Hamilton 1993; Lober 1993). For the 
group “all respondents,” none of the coefficients on the demographic variables are significantly 
different from zero. For those with initially low support, age is positively significant at the five 
percent level indicating higher support among older respondents. The coefficient for education is 
negatively significant at the five percent level, indicating that among those with initially low 
levels of support, support was especially low the more education respondents had. Additionally, 
income is also negatively correlated with support at the ten percent level. Among those who were 
initially neutral about the wind farm, education is negatively correlated with support at the five 
percent level and gender is positively correlated with support at the one percent level—indicating 
that men in this group were more likely to have higher levels of support. 
2.7.6 Robustness Checks 
A number of robustness checks were run to check the stability of the estimates for 
directness and the compensation measures. The regressions were rerun as ordered logits with 
directness and the compensation measures interacted with the following variables: whether a 
respondent had lived near a wind farm, was a homeowner, had lower initial support for the wind 
farm proposed than for wind power in general, was in the highest income group, believed it was 
possible that a wind farm could be built one mile from their home, or believed a developer would 
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offer the mitigation proposed in the survey (see pages 71-73 of the identification strategy section 
for a discussion of why each robustness test was carried out). In all specifications, only once 
does the measure for directness lose its significance and even then the coefficient remains 
positive.20 The coefficients for the compensation variables are also largely unchanged. The 
several instances in which the interactions are significant are discussed below. The main 
regressions were also rerun as ordered probits and, with the demographic variables dropped, 
again as ordered logits. 
2.7.6.1 Respondents with Experience Living Near a Wind Farm 
Respondents with experience living near a wind farm may have provided a more accurate 
reflection of how much directness mattered. If the interactions for this group are positively or 
negatively significant, it implies that directness in actuality had a smaller or greater effect than 
predicted by results from respondents here in general. That the interactions for wind experience 
and directness are all insignificant implies that directness mattered equally for both those with 
and without experience living near a wind farm (see Table 2.10). 
 Respondents who had experience living near a wind farm may have been more likely 
than the population in general to have seen an offer of compensation as a chance to bargain since 
wind farm developers sometimes negotiate compensation and mitigation with neighbors. Having 
lived near wind farms, respondents in this group may have been aware of this practice and 
factored this knowledge into their decision regarding how much to support the wind farm in the 
survey. If this thought process took place, this should have caused the interactions between the 
compensation measures and wind farm experience to take on a more negative sign than they 
would otherwise have. 
                                                
20 In the robustness check for homeowners, the coefficient is insignificant for those with neutral initial support.  
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Respondents with experience living near a wind farm may have also been less likely to 
have seen the offer as a bribe or as signaling increased risk. Respondents with experience living 
near wind farms may have become accustomed to the notion that developers sometimes offer 
neighbors compensation. Subsequently, these respondents may have already undergone the 
substitution of moral principles described in in Frey, Oberholzer-Gee and Eichenberger (1996) 
that allows people to accept an offer that could have previously triggered a bribe effect. 
However, because of their experience with wind farms and the possible negative impacts 
associated with them, they were less likely to have seen offers of compensation as signaling 
increased risk. If respondents in general saw an offer of compensation as less of a bribe or as less 
of a signal of increased risk, then interactions between each form of compensation and 
respondents’ wind farm experience should have yielded positively significant coefficients—
decreasing the negative effect of bribery or a signal of increased risk. If the interacted 
coefficients were positive (negative), it may have been that these decreased bribery and 
decreased risk-signaling effects were greater (less) than the negative effect of having seen an 
offer of compensation as a chance to bargain. Alternatively, if the interactions are insignificant it 
may have been that these effects cancelled each other out or were all insignificant to begin with. 
As reported in Table 2.10, all the interactions with each form of compensation in each regression 
are insignificant. 
2.7.6.2 Homeowners 
When the measures for directness and each form of compensation are interacted with 
homeownership, only the interaction with directness among those with low initial support for the 
wind farm is significant (see Table 2.11). That the coefficient is negative indicates that 
homeowners in this group cared less about how directly compensation addressed their concerns. 
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However, summing the interacted coefficient with the estimate for directness alone still yields a 
positive estimate for the effect of directness on support.  
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2.7.6.3 Respondents with NIMBY Attitudes 
Results were again largely similar to those in the original regressions for interactions with 
whether or not respondents fit a weak definition of exhibiting NIMBY behavior (see Table 2.12). 
Respondents were classified as exhibiting weak NIMBY behavior if their support for the wind 
farm before compensation was offered was less than their support for wind power in general. The 
only significant interaction is in the regression for all respondents where the effect of directness 
is positively significant. This indicates that among respondents with weak NIMBY tendencies, 
designing compensation packages that directly address respondent concerns may be especially 
helpful in boosting support. This supports the notion that it is easy to support a type of project 
that is good for society when it is costless to do so, but that when costs are involved, it is 
especially important to design compensation packages that address the concerns for those who 
exhibit weak-NIMBY attitudes. The result can also be interpreted to mean that those who 
support wind power more than the project in their backyard actually want to support the wind 
farm—they just need to have their concerns addressed in order to do so. 
2.7.6.4 Respondents with High Incomes 
If the relative price effect is substantial, and compensation offered has a weaker effect for 
those in the highest income group as might be expected if individuals in this group could better 
afford to offset negative impacts, then these interactions should be negatively significant. Yet 
none of the interactions between whether or not respondents were in the highest income group 
are significant (see Table 2.13).21 It may have been that for high-income respondents, their 
financial ability to offset negative impacts did not factor into their decision-making. 
Alternatively, it may have been that due to the non-monetary nature of several of the impacts, 
                                                
21 A dummy variable for whether or not respondents were in the high income group was substituted for the income 
variable used in other regressions to allow for a non-linear effect of income outside the interactions. 
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wealth was not seen as providing a way to directly offset or provide substitutes for the impacts 
expected.  
2.7.6.5 Respondents Who Believe a Wind Farm Could be Built One Mile 
From Their Home 
For residents who stated they believed it was possible that a wind farm could be built one 
mile from their home—the distance from the wind farm described in the survey—the results (see 
Table 2.14) were again largely the same as those in the original specification. Among those with 
neutral initial support for the wind farm, three interactions were significant at the ten percent 
level. The interacted effect of directness is negative, but when added to the stand-alone effect of 
directness still yields a positive overall estimate. This indicates that for those with initially 
neutral support for the wind farm who also believed a wind farm could be built in their area, the 
effect of directness is still positive—just less so than for respondents with initially neutral 
support in general. The interacted effect of property value insurance is positive, but when 
summed with the stand-alone effect if property value insurance is still negative. The interacted 
effect of $1,000/year in compensation is positive, but when summed with the stand-alone effect 
of $1,000/year still yields a negative estimate overall. Overall, these latter two significant 
interactions suggest the relative price effect had a stronger impact for this sub-group than for the 
groups “all respondents” and those with low initial support.  
2.7.6.6 Respondents Who Believe Developers Would Offer Compensation 
Packages Proposed 
The results are again largely the same for respondents who stated that they believe 
developers would offer the specific compensation packages they were presented with in the 
survey. The only interacted coefficients that are significant are for directness (significant at the 
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10% level) and property value insurance (significant at the five percent level) among all 
respondents and shadow flicker mitigation (significant at the five percent level) for those with 
low initial support (see Table 2.15). When the interaction for directness is summed with the 
stand-alone coefficient, the overall effect is still positive. This net positive effect indicates that 
for this sub-group, directness still helped boost support albeit with a smaller effect on support for 
the wind farm proposed. For those with initially low support, the interaction with shadow flicker 
mitigation is negatively significant at the ten percent level. This may mean that believing a 
developer would offer shadow flicker mitigation and being offered shadow flicker mitigation 
triggers one of the reactions that can cause support to decline (bribery, signal of increased risk, 
signal of chance to bargain). Alternatively, since the coefficient is only significant at the ten 
percent level and only five respondents fit the criteria of having low initial support, being offered 
shadow flicker mitigation, and believing a developer would offer shadow flicker mitigation, it 
may be best not to assign too much meaning to this result.  
2.7.6.7 Ordered Probit 
The ordered probit results (see Table 2.16) largely support the original ordered logit 
results reported in Table 2.9. The estimates for directness are still all positively significant at the 
one percent level. For all respondents, the coefficient for property value insurance is still 
negative but no longer significant at the ten percent level. For those with low initial support, all 
the estimates for compensation are still negatively significant at the one percent level. For those 
with neutral initial support, the compensation variables all have the same sign and significance as 
in the ordered logit results.  
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2.7.6.8 Ordered Logit With Demographic Variables Dropped 
When the demographic variables are dropped using an ordered logit estimator (see Table 
2.17), the results are largely the same as in the original regressions. All the coefficients for 
directness maintain their sign and significance. Similarly, all of the significant compensation 
measures maintain their sign and significance. The estimate for property value insurance for 
those with neutral initial support gains significance at the ten percent level.   
2.8  Conclusions  
This paper develops a theory of how the more directly individuals perceive compensation 
as addressing their concerns with a land use proposed nearby, the more likely residents are to see 
it as being able to substitute for their losses or allow them to acquire substitutes for their losses. 
In this respect, the more individuals see compensation as addressing their concerns, the less 
likely they are to see the compensation offered as a bribe. Previously, the NIMBY literature 
noted that compensation perceived as appropriate was more likely to be acceptable, but offered 
reasons that could primarily only be applied ex post in determining why a given offer of 
compensation might have been seen as appropriate. The theory developed here can be applied ex 
ante in developing compensation and mitigation packages that are likely to be seen as 
appropriate and therefore acceptable.  
The theory was tested in a survey on central Illinois residents regarding their responses to 
offers of different forms of compensation and mitigation for a hypothetical wind farm. This 
population was chosen since it was made up of residents who primarily lived in areas that were 
likely to face future wind farm development. The results here can be interpreted as how 
individuals might initially react to a proposed wind farm with accompanying offers of 
compensation and mitigation. The theory put forth is tested with ordered logit regressions that 
measure the effect of the variables of interest and control variables on support for the proposed 
wind farm. Results are reported for three groups of respondents. The first group consists of all 
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respondents who completed the survey to test the effect of compensation on the equivalent of all 
residents in an area where a wind farm might be proposed. The second group is made up of those 
who were initially opposed or strongly opposed to the proposed wind farm. This group is likely 
of most interest to developers since—in terms of overcoming opposition—it is most efficient to 
target those opposed to a proposed wind farm. The third group is made up of those who were 
neutral about the proposed wind farm before compensation was introduced. The third group was 
chosen since it appeared especially sensitive to compensation in preliminary analysis. The results 
for all groups are consistent with the idea that the more directly individuals see compensation or 
mitigation as addressing their concerns, the less likely they are to see the offer as a bribe. The 
results are robust to different estimation methods and a number of specifications.  
 Previous work in the NIMBY literature has noted that offering compensation can cause 
support associated with civic duty to decline. No such decline is detected at any significant level 
for the groups tested here. However, since the wind farm proposed here posed few or no 
perceived threats to public health, it differed dramatically from the nuclear waste sites where 
offering money appears to have caused the effect of duty to diminish. That support associated 
with civic duty did not decline significantly is important since for all respondents and those 
initially opposed or strongly opposed to the wind farm, civic duty does appear to have been a 
driving factor behind individuals’ support for the wind farm. Further, while only a minority of 
respondents initially opposed the wind farm, most of them did not hold what is often referred to 
as a NIMBY attitude. Most of those who opposed the wind farm also opposed wind power in 
general. Indeed, respondents’ support or opposition towards wind power in general was one of 
the strongest predictors of how much respondents supported or opposes the wind farm proposed. 
The results here suggest that overcoming opposition to wind power in general may be especially 
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Table 2.1. Ordering Effects - Mitigation and Compensation on Mean Support for Wind 
Farm Proposed  
(Number of observations in parentheses) 
 
 
Table 2.2. Ordering Effects - Mitigaiton and Compensation on Mean Directness  
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Table 2.3. Summary Statistics - Mean Responses  
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Table 2.5. Percent of respondents who expected the impacts below 
(Number of respondents who selected impact in parentheses) 
 
 
Table 2.6. Write in responses for impacts expected  
(T-tests not conducted due to small number of write-in responses)  
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Table 2.7. Percent of respondents who expected the impacts below 
Home Owners vs. Non-Home Owners 
(Number of respondents who selected impact in parentheses) 
 
 
Table 2.8. Percent of respondents who expected the impacts below 
Respondents who thought it was possible or not possible that a wind farm could be built 1 
mile from their home  
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Table 2.9. Factors Affecting Support for Wind Farm Proposed 
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Table 2.10. Factors Affecting Support for Wind Farm Proposed Robustness Check - 
Ordered Logit - Interactions 
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Table 2.11. Factors Affecting Support for Wind Farm Proposed Robustness Check - 
Ordered Logit - Interactions 
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Table 2.12. Factors Affecting Support for Wind Farm Proposed 
Robustness Check - Ordered Logit – Interactions 
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Table 2.13. Factors Affecting Support for Wind Farm Proposed  
Robustness Check - Ordered Logit – Interactions 
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Table 2.14. Factors Affecting Support for Wind Farm Proposed  
Robustness Check - Ordered Logit - Interactions  
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Table 2.15. Factors Affecting Support for Wind Farm Proposed  
Robustness Check - Ordered Logit - Interactions  
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Table 2.16. Factors Affecting Support for Wind Farm Proposed 
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Table 2.17. Factors Affecting Support for Wind Farm Proposed  
Robustness Check - Ordered Logit 
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Table 2.18. Impact of Directness on Mean Support by Initial Level of Support  
(Number of observations in parentheses) 
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2.11     Figures 
 
Figure 2.1. All Respondents - Probability of Each Level of Support for Proposed Wind 
Farm Given How Directly Compensation Perceived as Addressing Impacts 
 
*All estimates significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
Figure 2.2. Respondents with Low Initial Support - Probability of Each Level of Support 
for Proposed Wind Farm Given How Directly Compensation Perceived as Addressing 
Impacts 
 
*Neutral support for proposed wind farm where directness = 1 is significant at the five percent level. All remaining 
point estimates are significant at the 1 percent level. Note: No estimates are provided in Figure 2 for the effect of 
directness on respondents supporting or strongly supporting the wind farm since no respondents in this group 
supported the wind farm after compensation was offered and there were only 2 observations in which individuals 
strongly supported the wind farm. However, there were 79 observations for strongly oppose, 93 for oppose, and 20 







































































Figure 2.3. Respondents with Neutral Initial Support- Probability of Each Level of Support 
for Proposed Wind Farm Given How Directly Compensation Perceived as Addressing 
Impacts 
 
* For “Support,” estimate for directness = 3 is significant at the 10% level and for directness = 4 and 5 at the 1% 
level. For “Neutral,” all estimates are significant at the 1% level. For “Oppose,” estimate for directness = 2 is 
significant at the 10% level. All remaining point estimates are insignificant. 
 
Figure 2.4. All Respondents - Before Compensation - Probability of Each Level of Support 
for Proposed Wind Farm Given Support for Wind Power in General 
 








































































Figure 2.5. Respondents with Low Initial Support- Before Compensation - Probability of 
Each Level of Support for Proposed Wind Farm Given Support for Wind Power in 
General 
 
* For “Strongly Oppose,” estimate for wind support in general = 5 is significant at the 5% level. All remaining point 
estimates are significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
Figure 2.6. Respondents with Low Initial Support- Change in Probability of Each Level of 
Support for Proposed Wind Farm Given Support for Wind Power in General (Estimates 
After Compensation – Estimates Before Compensation) 
 
*For “Neutral,” estimates for support for wind power in general = 5 and 4 are significant at the 1% level; support for 
wind power in general = 3 is significant at the 5% level; remaining estimates are insignificant. For “Oppose,” 
estimates for support for wind power in general = 3 and 5 are significant at the 5% level; remaining estimates are 
insignificant. For “Strongly Oppose,” estimate for support for wind power in general = 4 is significant at the 1% 
level; support for wind power in general = 3 is significant at the 5% level; and support for wind power in general = 5 
is significant at the 10% level; all remaining point estimates for “Strongly Oppose” are insignificant. Note: For the 
same reasons as in Figure 2, no estimates are provided in Figure 6 for the effect of support for wind power in general 







































































CHAPTER 3: CONDITIONAL COOPERATION AND NIMBY 
PROJECTS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF HOW THE 
TENDENCY TO ENGAGE IN CONDITIONAL COOPERATION 
CAN AFFECT SUPPORT FOR WIND FARMS 
3.1 Introduction 
One type of behavior outside the standard economic model that may affect individuals’ 
support for not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) projects1 is pro-social behavior—particularly 
conditional cooperation. Conditional cooperation would be said to occur in the context of 
NIMBY projects when individuals raise (lower) their support for a given project the more (less) 
they think that others support it or would support it in the same situation. In the lab, conditional 
cooperation has been found to significantly increase contributions in public goods experiments 
(e.g. Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr 2001). In real world settings, conditional cooperation has 
been tapped to boost tax compliance (Coleman 1996), energy conservation (Schultz et al. 2007), 
and charitable contributions (Frey and Meier 2004). While the effect of conditional cooperation 
is often small, tapping into people’s tendency to conditionally cooperate can be as inexpensive as 
simply informing people that there is more support for a project than they thought. Consequently, 
tapping into this norm represents a potentially cost effective way to boost support for NIMBY 
projects.  
By their very nature, NIMBY projects routinely encounter significant local opposition. 
Yet, a number of factors have been to significantly boost support for these locally undesirable 
land uses (LULUs). These factors range from focusing the siting process on communities that 
                                                
1 NIMBY projects are defined as land uses that are expected to yield net benefits for society but net costs for the 
communities in which they are developed (Frey, Oberholzer-Gee, and Eichenberger 1996). 
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have yet to host their “fair share” of LULUs (Easterling 1992; Easterling and Kunreuther 1995) 
to trying to match projects that address particular problems to communities that helped create the 
problems in the first place (Carnes et al. 1983; Easterling 1992; Easterling and Kunreuther 1995; 
Kunreuther and Easterling 1992, 1996; Kunreuther, Fitzgerald, and Aarts 1993; Lober 1993). A 
community that has not hosted its “fair share” of NIMBY projects may have the same expected 
local benefits and costs as another area already packed with LULUs. But even if local costs 
exceed benefits, standard models predict that those who oppose a project should attempt to free-
ride on the effort of others who are also opposed. The end result should be that individuals 
expend little to no effort in fighting prospective LULUs. Yet there are times when even the most 
benign land uses face so much opposition that plans for their development are cancelled. It 
appears that behavior outside the traditional economic, purely self-regarding model is a 
motivating factor in determining individuals’ actions to support or oppose NIMBY projects.  
I test the effect of conditional cooperation on support for a hypothetical wind farm 
described in a survey. Wind farms fit the definition of a NIMBY project well since most people 
support wind power in general, but often oppose wind farm developments in their community 
(Loomis et al. 2010; Wolsink 2000). The survey is essentially designed as an experiment where 
each respondent is placed in a treatment group where s/he is either told that an overwhelming 
majority or small minority of respondents in an earlier survey said they would vote “yes” in a 
referendum for the same wind farm described in their survey. The treatment approach overcomes 
the false-consensus effect (Frey and Meier 2004; Heldt 2005; Neugebauer et al. 2009; Ross, 
Greene, and House 1977) whereby respondents who support (oppose) a wind farm may be more 
likely to think a large percent of the relevant population does also. The false-consensus effect 
may produce the result that individuals’ support for a wind farm is positively correlated with the 
120
proportion of others they believe also support it. In the case of the false consensus effect, it is the 
person’s support for the wind farm that drives his/her belief in the number of others who support 
it. But for someone to be a conditional cooperator, it must be the proportion of others’ support 
that drives an individuals’ support.  
There are two main contributions in this paper. The first is that this paper provides a test 
of conditional cooperation on a real world problem with adults who are likely to face the 
problem at hand in the foreseeable future. So far in the economic literature, this phenomenon has 
primarily been tested in lab settings with college students as subjects engaging in games that do 
not simulate real-world situations. The second contribution is that this paper provides a 
methodology and testable way to tell whether conformity, reciprocity, or seeing others’ support 
as a signal regarding a project’s risk seems to drive people’s tendency to conditionally cooperate 
with regard to selecting their own support for a public land use. The research in this chapter can 
also be used to help boost support for public works projects and wind farm developments in 
particular.  
The remainder of this paper consists of the following sections. Section 3.2 surveys the 
relevant literature. Section 3.3 describes the survey used to gather data necessary to test for the 
significance of conditional cooperation in wind farm siting. Section 3.4 describes the estimation 
methods used. Section 3.5 discusses the results. Finally, section 3.6 summarizes and concludes 
the paper. 
3.2 Literature Review 
One way to boost support for a NIMBY project is to make it fairer—either in the process 
to site it or in its outcome. There are many ways noted in the literature to make the siting process 
for a NIMBY project fairer. These include the following: increasing the consideration given to a 
number of possible locations before making the final siting decision (Kunreuther et al. 1990; 
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Swallow, Opaluch, and Weaver 1992), only considering communities that have volunteered to 
host the project (Easterling and Kunreuther 1995; Swallow, Opaluch, and Weaver 1992), 
decreasing the consideration of communities in proportion to the other NIMBY projects they 
have already accepted (Easterling 1992; Easterling and Kunreuther 1995), soliciting input from 
all interested parties (Easterling and Kunreuther 1995), and allowing communities to ultimately 
reject projects they find unsatisfactory (O'Hare, Bacow, and Sanderson 1983). The literature also 
notes a number of ways to make a NIMBY project fairer in its outcome. These include the 
following: choosing a project that provides one of the best ways (highest social benefit-cost 
ratio) to address the problem it is supposed to help solve (Easterling and Kunreuther 1995; 
Kunreuther and Easterling 1992, 1996; Opaluch et al. 1993; Swallow, Opaluch, and Weaver 
1992), choosing a location that represents a better (higher benefit-to-cost ratio) or safer site than 
other possible sites (Dunlap et al. 1993; Easterling 1992; Easterling and Kunreuther 1995; 
Kunreuther et al. 1990), making the projects’ risks more equitable temporally (imposing less 
risks on future generations than alternative projects or the same project would if sited elsewhere) 
(Carnes et al. 1983; Easterling 1992; Kunreuther and Easterling 1990, 1992, 1996; Lober 1993), 
and making the project more equitable geographically (increasing the equality between how 
much the project contributes to solving a societal problem and how much a community 
contributes to creating the problem) (Carnes et al. 1983; Easterling 1992; Easterling and 
Kunreuther 1995; Kunreuther and Easterling 1992, 1996; Kunreuther, Fitzgerald, and Aarts 
1993; Lober 1993).  
Another behavioral norm that is not well explained by traditional economic models and 
may hold promise for boosting support for NIMBY projects is conditional cooperation. In the 
context of support for NIMBY projects, conditional cooperation is the norm whereby individuals 
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raise (lower) their support for a given project when they learn that others support the project 
more (less) than they previously thought. This behavioral norm has been consistently noted in 
lab experiments in the experimental economic literature (Chaudhuri and Paichayontvijit 2006; 
Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr 2001; Herrmann and Thöni 2009; Kocher et al. 2008; 
Neugebauer et al. 2009). These experiments typically find that between 40 and 60 percent of 
individuals are conditional cooperators.  
The behaviors that can motivate conditional cooperation in a NIMBY context include 
reciprocity, conformity, and high levels of others’ support signaling fewer costs/more benefits 
than previously expected. Reciprocity is the norm whereby people are kind to those who are kind 
to them, and unkind to those who are unkind to them (Rabin 1993). Therefore, for someone to 
boost his/her support out of reciprocity, s/he would have to see high others’ support as stemming 
from others’ willingness to sacrifice by hosting a public good at a cost to themselves. In this 
case, high others’ support would have to carry the informational component of signaling a 
motive that drives the support. Individuals might boost (lower) their support for a NIMBY 
project out of reciprocity-motivated conditional cooperation if the following conditions are met: 
they believe supporting the NIMBY project is a kind thing to do (it confers benefits to others at a 
sacrifice to the self) and they learn that a higher (lower) proportion of individuals than they 
previously thought would make the same sacrifice (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004). For conformists, 
it does not matter whether they see the project as being good or bad for society or themselves—
they simply adjust their support to align with that of others (Bardsley and Sausgruber 2005).  
Just as there is there is support from lab experiments that conditional cooperation 
significantly affects economic decision-making, there is also support from experiments in the 
real world. Frey and Meier (2004), for example, find that tapping into this behavioral norm in 
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Swiss college students significantly increased their donations to charities on campus. The authors 
exposed one group of students to information that a large majority of students donated to the 
same charities in the past while exposing another group of students to information that a minority 
of students contributed. The experiment ruled out pure altruism since if this drove the students’ 
contributions, their contributions should have actually decreased as the total amount others’ 
contributions increased. It also rules out “warm-glow” (Andreoni 1990) where individuals 
receive utility purely as a function of how much they contribute since others’ contributions 
should have no effect on the utility someone gets from making his/her own contribution. 
Conditional cooperation has also been tapped to increase the amount of income people report on 
their tax returns and in turn raise the amount they pay in taxes (Coleman 1996). While these 
studies have found relatively small increases in contribution rates and taxes, the benefit-cost ratio 
is sizeable since the only costs were to provide subjects with a small amount of information 
regarding others’ rates of contributions and tax compliance.  
A study in the psychological literature has also found evidence consistent with the idea 
that the preference to conditionally cooperate can be tapped into in a way that causes people to 
reduce their household power usage (Schultz et al. 2007). Schultz et al. conducted a study in 
which the mean energy usage was calculated for 290 participating households in San Marco, CA. 
The respondents were then separated into 2 groups. In the first group, a hanger was left on each 
participant’s front doorknob showing the participant’s usage and mean usage for all participants. 
Among those with higher than average usage, energy use declined significantly. Among those 
with lower than average energy use, energy consumption increased significantly. Both results are 
consistent with conditional cooperation since low energy use by others caused individuals’ 
energy use to decline and high energy use by others caused it to increase.  
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In the other group, if a participant’s usage was below the mean, an investigator drew a 
happy face on the door hanger. If a participant’s use was higher than average, the investigator 
drew a sad face. The emoticons were intended to respectively signal social approval and 
disapproval to prevent mean reversion. Mean reversion in this case is the undesirable effect 
where those who use less energy than average increase their mean usage when informed that 
others use more electricity than they do. The researchers found energy use did not increase 
significantly among those exposed to the happy face emoticon but did decrease significantly for 
those exposed to the sad face emoticon. The results show that conditional cooperation can affect 
people’s consumption choices regarding energy use.   
In the same way that informing individuals of their peers’ energy use can be helpful in 
getting consumers to conserve electricity, informing individuals of others’ support for wind 
farms in their backyard may be helpful at overcoming opposition. As in the NIMBY literature in 
general, the wind farm literature discusses how fairness in the siting process and in outcomes can 
have a significant effect on those facing a potential wind power project in their community 
(Burningham, Barnett, and Thrush 2006; Cass 2006; Cass and Walker 2009; Cowell, Bristow, 
and Munday 2011; Devine-Wright 2007; Gross 2007; Wolsink 2007a, 2007b; Wüstenhagen, 
Wolsink, and Bürer 2007). If concerns for fairness affect individuals’ support for wind farms, 
and reciprocity is one form of fairness, then a preference for conditional cooperation should be 
able to affect individuals’ support for wind farms insofar as it is likely sometimes motivated by 
reciprocity.  
3.3 Central Illinois Wind Farm Survey 
 The survey was conducted in the spring of 2012 using an online format administered to a 
random sample of employees at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. This population 
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is appropriate to sample from since many University employees lived in areas that were likely to 
face wind farm proposals in the foreseeable future.2  An initial e-mail and follow-up were sent to 
5,000 employees inviting them to participate in the survey. The survey was closed once 1,000 
respondents it, yielding a 20% response rate.3 Respondents who elected to participate clicked or 
pasted a link in their web browser and were randomly sent to a survey in the high or low 
treatment group.  
In the high treatment, respondents were exposed to information that in a previous survey 
conducted in central Illinois, 83% of respondents said they would vote “yes” for the wind farm in 
a referendum. Those in the low treatment were exposed to information that 22% would vote 
“yes.” These fictitious percentages were chosen to be extremely high and low yet still fall within 
the realm of possibility since, for a conditional cooperator’s behavior to be affected, the percent 
of others who support the wind farm have to differ significantly from expectations. Since the 
effect of conditional cooperation is generally small, the differences need to be large in order to 
pick up possible effects. While these large differences in others’ support are designed to trigger 
reactions in most conditional cooperators, the thresholds may not be high or low enough to get 
some individuals who are significantly affected by this behavioral norm to change their level of 
support (Frey and Meier 2003).  
 Respondents faced three scenarios in which they considered the same wind farm. The 
level of others’ support was held constant in each scenario to minimize the likelihood that 
respondents would feel manipulated or pressured to react. In the first scenario, respondents were 
exposed to information regarding the wind farm and the level of others’ support. In the second 
                                                
2 Both cities and the county the University lies in have approved wind farm ordinances with the expectation of future 
wind farm development. At the time of the survey, two large-scale wind farms were in operation within a one hour’s 
drive of the University.  
3 The survey was closed at 1,000 responses due to budgetary considerations.  
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and third scenarios, respondents were exposed to the same information regarding others’ support 
as well as one form of compensation ($1,000/year) or mitigation (shadow flicker mitigation4, 
noise mitigation, or property value insurance) in each.5 Respondents in the high and low 
treatments were exposed to the same forms of compensation and mitigation in the same orders. 
Respondents were asked to state the following: their level of support for the proposed wind farm 
in each scenario where support was measured on a Likert scale (1 = Strongly Oppose, 5 = 
Strongly Support); how directly they thought each compensation and mitigation measure 
addressed their concerns (1 = Very Indirectly, 5 = Very Directly, referred to as directness); 
which impacts they expected from a list provided (view would be tarnished, shadow flicker, 
losses in property value, noise, do not expect to be affected) and/or write in any impacts not 
listed; their support for wind power in general (1 = Strongly Oppose, 5 = Strongly Support); 
whether they presently did live or had ever lived near a wind farm; and to answer a series of 
demographic questions (gender, age, education, income, home ownership).6  
3.4  Estimation Methods 
3.4.1 Identification Strategy 
Hypothesis 1: As others’ support for a wind farm increases, individuals’ support should 
increase as well if conditional cooperation significantly drives their behavior. To test for this, I 
estimate the effect that others’ support has on individuals’ support for the proposed wind farm 
using the following groups: 1) all respondents, 2) those with initially (before compensation was 
offered) neutral or lower support for the wind farm, and those who have the following levels of 
support for wind power in general: 3) high support (strongly support or support), 4) neutral 
                                                
4 Shadow flicker is the alternating shadows cast by moving turbine blades. 
5 The effects of compensation and mitigation on individuals’ support are discussed in Chapter 2. 
6 The survey is discussed in greater detail in chapter 2. 
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support, or 5) low support (oppose or strongly oppose) (see Table 3.2). Regressions are run for 
all respondents to see how the sample in general reacted. They are also run for those with 
initially neutral or lower support since developers are likely most interested in how these groups 
might react. While those who were initially opposed or strongly opposed to the wind farm are 
likely of most interest, this grouping would result in an extremely small number of observations 
in the first scenario and not allow for enough variation between observations to pick up the 
potentially small effect of conditional cooperation.  
To estimate the effect that others’ support had on individuals’ support for the proposed 
wind farm, individuals’ support is specified as a linear function of others’ support and a vector of 
other variables that can affect their support for the wind farm (expected costs, how directly they 
perceive compensation and mitigation as addressing their concerns, demographics, etc.). Since 
some respondents may support the wind farm out of civic duty, informing them that a high 
proportion of respondents in an earlier survey said they would also support the facility may 
trigger their sense of civic duty if they are reciprocators. If this is the case, offering these 
respondents compensation may crowd out their support motivated by civic duty, leaving money 
as the primary factor that determines their support (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997). Similarly, 
compensation may diminish a positive effect driven by peer pressure, perceived compliance with 
a social norm, or some other signal associated with high others’ support. It may also be the case 
that in the first scenario, with no compensation to consider, the information provided there drives 
the person’s decision on how much to support the wind farm proposed. But in the second and 
third scenarios, information provided about others’ support may fall to the background in 
respondents’ decision making, causing others’ support to lose its significance for reasons that 
have nothing to do with a concern for money taking the place of a concern for civic duty, peer 
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pressure, compliance with a social norm, etc. For these reasons, an initially positive effect 
associated with high others’ support may become insignificant or negative after compensation 
has been offered. In the sequences of events above, the effect of others’ support may differ 
before and after compensation has been offered. In turn, the coefficient on the variable for 
others’ support is allowed to differ before and after compensation was offered.  
The model for support for the wind farm proposed specifies individual support as a 
function of the following variables: whether respondents were in the treatment with high others’ 
support, respondents’ support for wind power in general, how directly respondents stated that the 
compensation or mitigation offered addressed their concerns, a vector of respondents’ expected 
negative impacts, and a vector of demographic indicators. If high others’ support signals that 
supporting a wind farm is “the right thing,” then offering compensation may cause this otherwise 
positive effect to become insignificant.  
Variables for the specific types of compensation and mitigation are included to account 
for the direct effect these measures have on support. The demographic variables are constrained 
to be the same before and after compensation is offered since there is no a priori reason to 
believe their effect would change once compensation or mitigation has been introduced. 
Additionally, in preliminary regressions, all demographic variables failed to differ at statistically 
significant levels when allowed to differ based on their effect before and after compensation was 
offered.  
Regressions are run by group depending on how much respondents supported wind 
power in general to see if their behavior was more consistent with reciprocity or conformity. In 
order for reciprocity to drive behavior, someone must see accepting a wind farm as a kind act—
as something that is good for others. In turn, only those who supported wind power should have 
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been affected. Those who were neutral about and especially those who opposed or strongly 
opposed wind power likely did not see the proposed wind farm as good for others. If these 
individuals were affected by others’ support, it is unlikely that reciprocity drove their behavior.  
Hypothesis 2: Others’ support may positively affect individuals’ support for wind power 
in general. To test for this, I estimate individuals’ support for wind power in general is estimated 
as a function of others’ support for the wind farm proposed (Table 3.4). It is reasonable to expect 
that repeated exposure to high support among others for wind farms proposed in other 
communities could boost individuals’ support for wind power in general. Alternatively, the effect 
may be short lived within the survey. I include the vector of variables for expected impacts 
associated with the wind farm proposed since respondents who expect particular costs for the 
wind farm in this survey may expect those costs from wind farms in general. This general 
association with costs may drive down support for wind power in general. The demographic 
variables are included as controls.  
Hypothesis 3: Others’ support may positively affect how directly individuals see 
compensation as addressing their concerns. High others’ support may send a signal that 
legitimizes compensation in the eyes of respondents, causing them to see compensation as more 
directly addressing their concerns than it would otherwise. In turn, how directly individuals see 
compensation and mitigation as addressing their concerns is estimated as a function of others’ 
support for the wind farm proposed, the particular types of compensation and mitigation, 
expected impacts, and demographics (Table 3.5). Variables for the particular types of 
compensation are included since some may be seen as more directly addressing respondent 
concerns. The variables for expected impacts are included since some of them may be seen as 
more easily directly addressed than others. The demographic variables are included in case 
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personal characteristics make respondents more likely to view compensation as directly 
addressing their concerns.  
3.4.2 Estimation Procedures (Relevant to All Hypotheses) 
The models here estimate support for the wind farm proposed (Table 3.2), support for 
wind power in general (Table 3.7), and directness (Table 3.9) respectively as a linear function of 
the variables of interest and a vector of controls. This specification for support for the project 
proposed is common in the NIMBY literature (e.g. Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997; Kunreuther 
and Easterling 1990; Lober 1993). It appears that estimating support for the type of facility 
proposed in general and how directly different forms of compensation address respondent 
concerns as a function of other variables are new contributions to the NIMBY literature. While 
support for wind power in general and directness may not be independent, they are specified as 
functions of variables that are all already in the regression for support for the wind farm 
proposed. Since they are not hypothesized to be a function of components of the error term, this 
should not pose problems for estimation for the main regressions reported in Table 3.2. Two 
modifications are made to the regressions in Table 3.2 to provide additional tests for the effect 
that others’ support has on individuals’ support for wind power in general and on directness (See 
Table 3.5). The main regressions where individuals’ support for the wind farm proposed is 
specified as a function of others’ support is estimated for each group where the variable for 
support for wind power in general is omitted. It is also estimated for each group with the measure 
for directness omitted.  
Since each dependent variable in all regressions is ordinal and bounded, the models are 
candidates to be estimated as ordered probits or ordered logits. In preliminary regressions, the 
model variations run as ordered logits all had higher pseudo R-squared values and more positive 
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log likelihoods indicating that an ordered logit fits the data better than an ordered probit. Since 
the coefficients for ordered logits do not have straightforward interpretations, the changes in the 
average predicted probabilities of observing a particular value of the dependent variable due to 
being in either the high or the low treatment are provided (Long 2009). 
The models are estimated for all respondents who completed the survey, respondents who 
had initially neutral or lower support for the proposed wind farm and those who had either high 
(strongly support or support), neutral, or low (oppose or strongly oppose) support for wind power 
in general. The models are estimated for all respondents to simulate the initial reaction of 
community members in general to a wind farm proposal and offers of compensation. While the 
general population in areas facing prospective wind farm developments is of interest, the 
population in these areas who are neutral about or opposed to wind farms in their area are likely 
of most of interest to developers. While it would be most desirable to estimate the effect of 
compensation and mitigation only on those who initially opposed or strongly opposed the wind 
farm, relatively few respondents selected these low levels of initial support. In turn, regressions 
on this subpopulation would likely yield statistically insignificant estimates for parameters that 
may be significant in reality.  
3.4.3 Robustness Tests 
Each of the three main specifications (individuals’ support for the wind farm proposed, 
individuals’ support for wind power in general, and how directly individuals see compensation as 
addressing their concerns—each as a function of others’ support) is estimated in a number of 
variations to test for the robustness of the main results reported in Tables 3.2, 3.7, and 3.9. These 
variations each include one set of interactions per regression between the variable for others’ 
support and the following variables of interest: experience living near a wind farm, home 
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ownership, weak NIMBYism (lower support for the wind farm proposed than for wind power in 
general), income, whether a respondent was in the highest income group, if a respondent 
believed a wind farm could be built one mile from his/her home, and if a respondent expected 
negative impacts from the wind farm.  
The first group of interest tested is those with experience living near a wind farm since 
they are likely to be more familiar with a wind farm’s negative impacts. In turn, they are less 
likely to see others’ support as signaling fewer costs. The second group tested is homeowners 
since they may have taken the survey more seriously. If a wind farm was actually built in their 
area, they would face more costs and receive more of the benefits in a compensation package 
(for example, renters would not receive neighbor payments of $1,000/year). The third group is 
those who exhibited weak NIMBY behavior. The population is of interest since those in it may 
react differently to others’ support than respondents in general, although it is not clear if they 
would be more likely to react positively or negatively to information that a high proportion of 
others support the wind farm. The group may be especially prone to see the information as 
manipulative and therefore react negatively. However, if they held this weak NIMBY attitude 
because they thought the wind farm was a bad wind farm, news that a high proportion of others 
support it could cause their support to rise. The fourth and fifth interactions are respectively for 
the variables for income and whether respondents fell in the highest income group. It can be 
argued that as people’s income increases, they have the luxury of being influenced by others’ 
support—that the more money individuals have, the more they can offset losses associated with 
the wind farm. Since the effect may be non-linear, interactions are included separately for the 
variable income and a dummy variable for if respondents fell in the highest income group 
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($100,000 or more).7 The sixth group is made up of those who did not expect any negative 
impacts since when costs are seen as insignificant, respondents may be especially sensitive to 
others’ support.  
Lastly, each of the regressions in Tables 3.2, 3.7 and 3.9 is run as an ordered probit and 
ordered logit without the demographic variables to see if the results are sensitive to using a 
different estimator or the particular mix of control variables included.  
3.5 Results 
 
3.5.1 Effect of High Others' Support on Respondents’ Support for Proposed Wind 
Farm (Testing Hypothesis 1) 
 In this sub-section, I ask if learning of increases in others’ support for a wind farm will 
cause individuals’ to increase their support for the project as well. I also ask if this change is 
driven by a preference for reciprocity, conformity, or individuals seeing an increase in others’ 
support as a signal that the facility is likely to be less costly than previously expected. I test for 
the effect of others’ support by specifying individuals’ support as a function of others’ support 
and a number of other variables as described in the estimation methods section. I test to see what 
drives individuals to increase their support in response to that of others by checking to see if 
those affected are likely to see supporting the wind farm as a kind act and if they see other’s 
support signaling less that the facility is less risky than previously thought (see estimation 
methods section for further discussion).  
I find evidence that conditional cooperation may affect support for the wind farm 
proposed for two groups of those surveyed. Among those with neutral support for wind power in 
                                                
7 For example, it can be argued that people with more money can more easily afford to be affected by others’ 
support. Although the data on income was gathered based on which income group respondents fell into, providing 
non-linear estimates, the estimates assume the same effect from moving from one income group to the next.  
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general, others’ support had a positive effect on respondents’ support for the wind farm proposed 
at the five percent level before compensation was offered (see Table 3.2). Additionally, for those 
who were opposed or strongly opposed (“Low” support for wind power in general, column 5) to 
wind power in general, others’ support had a positively significant impact on respondents’ 
support for the proposed wind farm at the five percent level—but only after compensation was 
offered. It appears that conditional cooperation alone moved respondents who were neutral about 
wind power but that knowledge of others’ support needed to be supplemented with compensation 
to move those who were opposed or strongly opposed to wind power in general.  
The coefficients for others’ support are both insignificant for those who had high support 
for wind power in general. That the effect of others’ support is insignificant for this group is to 
be expected. Support for wind power in general is the strongest predictor of any variable here 
regarding how much respondents supported the wind farm proposed. In turn, respondents in this 
group were highly likely to have high levels of support for the wind farm proposed and therefore 
have little room left for others’ support to improve their own support. Additionally, since support 
for wind power in general had such a strong effect, low levels of other’s support may have failed 
to decrease individuals’ support for the wind farm proposed in this group. 
The effect of others’ support on respondents’ support for the wind farm proposed appears 
to have depended on how much respondents supported wind power in general. When 
respondents are not grouped according to their support for wind power in general, the 
coefficients are never significant. Others’ support had no significant effect on support for the 
wind farm proposed for all respondents or those with initially neutral or lower support for the 
wind farm.  
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For those who were neutral about wind power in general, respondents in the high 
treatment were 29% more likely to have been neutral about the wind farm proposed than those in 
the low treatment group (significant at the one percent level). Similarly, they were 24% less 
likely to oppose the wind farm (significant at the five percent level). Yet, being in the high 
treatment made respondents in this group only slightly more likely than those in the low 
treatment group to have supported (significant at the one percent level) or strongly supported 
(significant at the five percent level) the wind farm (see Figure 3.1). Since respondents on 
average exhibited weak NIMBY behavior (support for wind power in general tended to be higher 
than support for the wind farm proposed), being in the high treatment may have made a 
difference between whether someone chose to support the wind farm less than s/he did wind 
power in general or whether s/he chose the same level of support for the wind farm. 
For those opposed or strongly opposed to wind power in general, high others’ support 
after compensation was offered appears to have significantly decreased their opposition to the 
proposed wind farm. The coefficient for others’ support after compensation was offered is 
significant at the five percent level.8 The positive effect in this group appears to have been in 
moving respondents from being strongly opposed to simply opposing the wind farm. Others’ 
support had essentially zero effect on whether these respondents were neutral about the wind 
farm. However, the respondents in this group in the high others’ support treatment were both 
31% less likely to strongly oppose the wind farm than those in the low treatment and 31% more 
likely to simply oppose the wind farm. However, with p-values of 0.153 for these two point 
estimates, neither are significant at any traditional level of significance. While significant results 
for both the coefficient and average predicted probabilities would have been ideal, that the 
                                                
8 Support for the wind farm in Figure 3.2 was only shown for the levels of support corresponding to 1 (strongly 
oppose), 2 (oppose), and 3 (neutral) since no respondents in this group chose “support” in any scenario, and only 
one individual chose “strongly support” in one scenario. 
136
coefficient is significantly positive at the five percent level suggests that others’ support 
increased support for the wind farm proposed among those opposed or strongly opposed to wind 
power in general. The small number of respondents in this group (out of 892 respondents who 
completed the survey, only 48 respondents opposed or strongly opposed wind power in general) 
likely contributed to the lack of significance for the average predicted probabilities.  
The change in average predicted probabilities for those opposed or strongly opposed to 
wind power in general can be interpreted as simultaneously being excessively large or quite 
realistic. The percent changes above are large compared to those generally found in the literature 
on conditional cooperation that looks at real world problems. These changes may be larger than 
they would be in reality though since the situation described in the survey was hypothetical 
(Diamond and Hausman 1994; Johnston 2006). At the same time, it is encouraging that simply 
being exposed to information that a large proportion of other people said they would support the 
wind farm only appears to have weakened opposition to the wind farm—it did not turn 
respondents in this group from being opposed to supporting the wind farm. Had it turned these 
respondents into supporters, the results would not be very plausible.  
 It appears that others’ support primarily affected those opposed or strongly opposed to 
wind power by tapping into their tendency to conform to others’ behavior to decrease their 
opposition to the proposed wind farm. According to the behavioral norm of reciprocity, these 
respondents would have had to see supporting (or decreasing their opposition to) the wind farm 
as a kind act—an act that benefits society. But it is unlikely that individuals opposed or strongly 
opposed to wind power would have seen hosting a wind farm as a kind act. Further it does not 
appear they saw high others’ support as a signal that the wind farm posed fewer risks than 
previously expected. The percent of respondents who expected each impact (tarnished view, 
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shadow flicker, losses in property value, noise, or do not expect to be affected) did not differ 
significantly between the high and low treatments for any group of respondents (see Table 3.3). 
This only primary motivating behavior left is conformity. However, the results here may be 
sensitive to the particular individuals in the sample since such a small number of respondents 
opposed or strongly opposed wind power.9 Further, while there is no difference in expected 
impacts between the high and low treatment groups at any statistical level of significance, the 
proportion of respondents who do not expect to be affected by the wind farm is consistently 
higher among all respondent groupings in Table 3.3 (all respondents, those with initially neutral 
or lower support for the proposed wind farm, respondents with strong support for wind power in 
general, etc.)—even if only slightly—for the high treatment group.  
3.5.2 Robustness Tests for the Effect of High Others' Support on Respondents’ 
Support for Proposed Wind Farm (Testing Hypothesis 1) 
 The robustness tests in Table 3.4 largely support the results reported in Table 3.2, 
however all but two of the groupings for those who were neutral about or had low support for 
wind power in general were so stratified that they left too few individuals in each subgroup to 
make inferences (see Table 3.6). For example, among those with neutral support for wind power 
in general, only eight respondents had experience living near a wind farm. Among those with 
low support for wind power in general, only 13 respondents had experience living near a wind 
farm. Since the respondents were approximately evenly split between the high and low treatment 
groups, this means that, for example, only about 4 respondents were in the subgroup defined by 
being in the high treatment group, having experience living near a wind farm, and being neutral 
about wind power in general. For the regressions with fewer than 20 respondents per 
                                                
9 A comprehensive discussion of the effect that the remaining variables in the regressions can have on support for 
the proposed wind farm is provided in chapter 2.  
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subgrouping, no analysis is provided since it is not justifiable to make inferences with numbers 
this small.  
The two regressions with more than 20 respondents (still small) per subgroup for 
respondents with neutral or low support for wind power are the following: Table 3.4C, column 4 
where respondents who were neutral about wind power in general have interactions between 
weakly defined NIMBY attitudes and others’ support and; Table 3.4D where others’ support is 
interacted with income. In the regression where others’ support is interacted with NIMBY 
attitudes, the isolated coefficient on others’ support maintains its sign and is still significant at 
the ten percent level. None of the coefficients interacted with NIMBYism are significant.10 This 
suggests that among those with neutral or lower support for wind power in general, those with 
NIMBY attitudes reacted no differently than other respondents to others’ support when making 
their decision on how much to support the wind farm. The results for interactions with income 
suggest that the greater respondents’ income was, the more likely they were to be positively 
affected by others’ support. Both the interactions with income before and after compensation was 
offered are positively significant at the one percent level. However, when income is accounted 
for, the isolated (non-interacted) effect of others’ support is insignificant. This is consistent with 
the idea that as income increases, people can afford to be affected by others’ support.  
Although only those with neutral or lower support for wind power in general were 
significantly affected by others’ support in the main results, the robustness tests include results 
for all respondents, respondents with neutral or lower initial support for the wind farm proposed, 
and those with high support for wind power in general. The results largely support the notion that 
others’ support positively affects individuals’ support for wind farms. The isolated effect of 
                                                
10 The standard error for the isolated effect of NIMBYism in this regression appears to be inflated due to 
multicolinearity with the cut points (See Table B.5).  
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others support for all groups except those who did not expect to be affected by the wind farm 
(i.e. Tables 3.4A-3.4F) is positively significant four times and negatively significant once at the 
ten percent level.  
For those who did not expect to be affected by the wind farm who have high support for 
wind power in general, the effect of others’ support is positively significant both before and after 
compensation has been offered. Before compensation is offered, the interacted coefficient is 
significant at the ten percent level but afterwards is significant at the one percent level. However, 
the isolated coefficients for others’ support are negatively significant both before and after 
compensation has been offered—respectively at the five and one percent levels. When the 
isolated coefficient for others’ support before compensation is added to the corresponding 
interacted coefficient, the net effect is close to zero. However when the effects after 
compensation are summed, the net effect is positive. This result is consistent with the main 
results earlier that for some respondents, others’ support can have a more positively significant 
effect when paired with compensation.11 
Each of the regressions in Table 3.2 is run as an ordered probit and without the 
demographic variables as an ordered logit (Tables 3.4H and 3.4I). The variables for others’ 
support keep their sign and significance in both specifications. When run without demographics, 
among those with low support for wind power in general, the coefficient for others’ support after 
compensation was offered actually gains significance at the one percent level. Additionally, 
when demographics are dropped, among those who had neutral or lower initial support for the 
                                                
11 The results for all respondents in Table 3.4G indicate that after compensation was offered, the effect of others’ 
support declined somewhat for respondents in general (negative effect of others’ support after compensation 
significant at the ten percent level). For those who had neutral or lower initial support for the wind farm, the isolated 
effect of others’ support before compensation is positively significant at the ten percent level but is insignificant 
after compensation was offered. 
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wind farm, others’ support before compensation was offered is positively significant at the five 
percent level.    
3.5.3 Effect of High Others' Support on Support for Wind Power (Testing 
Hypothesis 2) 
 In this sub-section, I ask if providing information to individuals that a high proportion of 
others support a wind farm proposed near their home can cause these individuals’ to increase 
their support for wind power in general. I test for the effect of others’ support for a proposed 
wind farm on individuals’ support for wind power in general by specifying individuals’ support 
for wind power as a function of others’ support as well as a host of control variables as described 
in the estimation methods section. I find that others’ support appears to have had a positive, if 
weak, effect on individuals’ support for wind power in general. 
The effect of others’ support on individuals’ support for wind power in general appears to 
be only slightly positive—and only for all respondents. The coefficient for the effect of others’ 
support on individuals’ support for wind power is positively significant at the ten percent level, 
but the change in average predicted probabilities indicates the effect is weak—all changes in 
predicted probabilities were very small.12 Respondents in the high treatment group were only six 
percent more likely to strongly support the wind farm and four percent less likely to support the 
wind farm than those in the low treatment group. The remaining effects were one percent or less.  
  
                                                
12 The figure with these changes in average predicted probabilities is not reported since the estimates were so small. 
The figure is available upon request. 
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3.5.4 Robustness Tests for the Effect of High Others' Support on Support for 
Wind Power (Testing Hypothesis 2) 
 The same robustness tests were run for the effect of others’ support on respondents’ 
support for wind power in general as were run for the effect on support for the wind farm 
proposed (see Table 3.8). The effect of others’ support on respondents’ support for wind power 
in general is inconsistent. None of the interacted variables are significant, but they have the same 
problem with small numbers of respondents per subgroup as were encountered earlier. The 
isolated effect of others’ support on support for wind power is only ever significant at the ten 
percent level, and only in the following regressions: home-owner ship accounted for with 
respondents who had neutral or lower initial support for the wind farm, respondents with the 
highest incomes for both all respondents and those with neutral or lower initial support, and 
experience living near a wind farm accounted for among all respondents. When run as an ordered 
probit, the coefficient for others’ support is insignificant for both groups. When demographics 
are excluded, the effect is significant at the ten percent level for all respondents. While the effect 
of others’ support on respondents’ support for wind power is only sporadically positively 
significant, the coefficient never becomes negatively significant. In turn, while the relationship 
between others’ support and respondents’ support for wind power appears weak, if the 
relationship is significant in reality, the evidence here suggests that others’ support has a positive 
effect on individuals’ support for wind power.  
3.5.5 Effect of High Others’ Support on How Directly Respondents See 
Compensation as Addressing Their Concerns (Testing Hypothesis 3) 
 In this sub-section, I ask if providing information to individuals that a high proportion of 
others support a proposed wind farm can cause these individuals to see compensation and 
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mitigation measures as more directly addressing their concerns over the wind farm proposed. I 
test for the effect of others’ support on how directly people saw compensation and mitigation as 
addressing their concerns by estimating directness as a function of others support and a vector of 
control variables as described in the estimation methods section. I find that others support does 
appear to have a positive, strong, significant impact on how directly respondents saw 
compensation and mitigation measures as addressing their concerns.  
 One of the strongest, most consistent relationships found in this paper is that learning that 
a high proportion of others support a wind farm appears to have caused individuals’ to see 
compensation as more directly addressing their concerns. It may be that others’ support has a 
positive effect on the factors that make wind farms more acceptable, and one factor that makes 
wind farms more acceptable is how directly people see compensation as addressing their 
concerns. When directness is the dependent variable, the coefficient for others’ support is 
positively significant at the one percent level for the following groups: those with initially neutral 
or lower support for the wind farm, those with neutral support for wind power in general, and 
those opposed or strongly opposed to wind power in general (see Table 3.9). It is especially 
important that those who are opposed or strongly opposed to wind power appear to be among the 
most affected by others’ support. The effect appears to be the largest for those who were neutral 
about, opposed, or strongly opposed to wind power.  
Among those who had initially neutral or lower support for the wind farm, those in the 
high treatment group were four percent more likely to say the compensation offered very directly 
addressed their concerns and eight percent more likely to say it somewhat directly addressed 
their concerns (both significant at the one percent level) (see Table 3.4). Being in the high 
treatment had essentially no effect on the likelihood that an individual would be neutral about 
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how directly the compensation addressed their concerns. Respondents in the high treatment in 
this group were four percent less likely to say compensation somewhat indirectly addressed their 
concerns (significant at the five percent level) and were nine percent less likely to say the 
compensation very indirectly addressed their concerns (significant at the one percent level).  
Among those who were neutral about wind power, being in the high treatment made 
respondents six percent more likely to give the compensation offered the highest rating for 
directness (significant at the five percent level), 23% more likely to give it the next highest rating 
(significant at the one percent level), nine percent more likely to give it a neutral rating 
(statistically insignificant), and respectively ten and 28% less likely to say the compensation 
offered somewhat directly or only very indirectly addressed their concerns (both significant at 
the one percent level) (see Figure 3.4).  
For those opposed or strongly opposed to wind power, the effect of others’ support on 
directness was still large in magnitude (see Figure 3.5). Respondents in the high treatment in this 
final group were 14% more likely to say the compensation very directly addressed their concerns 
(significant at the one percent level), 12% more likely to say somewhat directly (significant at 
the one percent level), 11% more likely to say neutral (significant at the five percent level), seven 
percent less likely to say somewhat indirectly (significant at the five percent level), and 30% less 
likely to say very indirectly (significant at the one percent level). Even among those most 
opposed to wind power in general, high others’ support appears to have made these respondents 
more likely to say compensation and mitigation measures directly and very directly addressed 




3.5.6 Robustness Tests for the Effect of High Others’ Support on How Directly 
Respondents See Compensation as Addressing Their Concerns (Testing 
Hypothesis 3) 
That others’ support appears to have little effect on support for wind power in general is 
mirrored when support for the proposed wind farm is specified partly as a function of support for 
wind power in general and directness and each of the latter two variables are separately swapped 
out of the regression (see Table 3.5 compared to Table 3.2). Referring to Table 3.5, when 
directness is omitted, the coefficient for wind power changes little from its counterpart in Table 
3.2. But when the variable for respondents’ support for wind power in general is omitted, the 
coefficient on directness is reduced to approximately one-fourth of its size in Table 3.2. The 
estimates in Table 3.2 indicate that directness does not affect support for the wind farm for those 
who are neutral about or have some degree of opposition to wind power. In turn, these positive 
effects of others support on directness may not translate into higher support for the proposed 
wind farm.  
The robustness tests for the effect of others’ support on directness largely support the 
results found earlier. Specifically the robustness tests generally support the finding that others’ 
support has a significantly positive impact on perceived directness among those who had neutral 
or lower initial support for the wind farm as well as those who had either neutral or low support 
for wind power in general (see Table 3.10). However, as with the robustness test discussed 
earlier, many of the robustness tests cannot be relied upon for inferences since the number of 
respondents per sub-group is often very small. The discussion that follows is limited to 
regressions with sub-groups that have at least 20 respondents.  
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The robustness tests for respondents who had initially neutral or lower support are 
consistent with the main findings. The isolated (non-interacted) effect of others’ support is 
positively significant six times and is never negatively significant. The only interacted significant 
coefficient is for those with wind farm experience where the coefficient is positively significant 
at the five percent level. This result indicates that others’ support can affect even those who have 
experience with wind farms despite their being more likely to be familiar with how directly each 
compensation mechanism actually addresses respondent concerns when put into practice. Indeed, 
the result indicates that high others’ support is associated with a larger increase in directness 
among the respondents with wind farm experience than those with none. This implies that results 
for those who have no experience with farms actually represent conservative estimates of how 
people might respond to others’ support in making their decision for how directly compensation 
addresses their concerns.  
Regarding the interactions for those who had initially neutral or lower support, only the 
interactions for NIMBYism have enough respondents to yield inferential statistics. The results 
for this groups support the notion that others’ support can have a positive impact on how directly 
respondents see compensation as addressing their concerns. The isolated coefficient for others’ 
support is positively significant and the interaction is insignificant.13 According to this result, 
among those with initially neutral or lower support for the wind farm, those with weak-NIMBY 
attitudes were just as likely as other respondents to increase how directly they saw compensation 
as addressing their concerns as other respondents were. The ordered probit and ordered logit 
without demographics both produce positively significant estimates for the effect of others’ 
support on directness. 
                                                
13 In the robustness checks for all respondents, all isolated and interaction terms for others’ support are insignificant 
as are the main results in Table 3.9. 
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3.5.7 The Effect of Other Variables on Support for Wind Power in General and on 
Directness 
 For both all respondents and those with initially neutral or lower support for the wind 
farm, several negative impacts associated with the wind farm proposed (for all respondents: the 
view and losses in property value; for those with initially neutral or lower support: the view, and 
shadow flicker) are significantly negatively correlated with support for wind power in general. 
Not expecting to be affected is positively related to support for wind power for all respondents 
but is insignificant for those with initially neutral or lower support. Among all respondents, 
education is positively related to support for wind power and men were less likely to support 
wind power. Among those with initially neutral or lower support, income had a significantly 
positive effect on support for wind power, men were again less likely to support wind power, and 
those who had experience living near a wind farm were less likely to support wind power in 
general.  
 Regarding the regressions for directness, age has a negatively significant effect for every 
group except those who were neutral about wind power. Meanwhile home ownership has a 
positively significant effect for every group except those who had high or neutral support for 
wind power. The coefficient for income is negative for every group but only significant for those 
who had initially neutral or lower support for the wind farm. Gender has no significant effect on 
directness for any group. Having had some experience living near a wind farm has a significantly 
positive effect on directness for those who had initially neutral or lower support for the wind 
farm. Among those who had neutral support for wind power, wind farm experience has a 
negatively significant effect. Lastly wind farm experience has a significantly positive effect on 
those who had low support for wind power.  
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3.6 Conclusions 
 This paper primarily examines the effect of others’ support on individuals’ support for a 
wind farm hypothetically proposed one mile from their home. It also investigates how others’ 
support may affect individuals’ support for wind power in general and how directly individuals 
see compensation as addressing their concerns. Others’ support is only found to significantly 
affect support for the wind farm among those who have neutral or lower support for wind power 
in general. It is especially noteworthy that others’ support significantly affects these groups since 
the finding is consistent with conformity as a driving force, but not reciprocity—two of the 
primary behaviors believed to motivate conditional cooperation. Others’ support will only move 
a reciprocator to engage in a kind act—one that s/he believes will confer some benefit to others 
or society. It is unlikely that those who have neutral or lower support for wind power believe 
hosting a wind farm constitutes a kind act. Alternatively, it could be that respondents in these 
groups saw high others’ support as signaling fewer impacts from the wind farm than they 
previously expected. However, for respondents in these groups, there was no significant 
difference in the impacts expected among those in the high treatment group versus those in the 
low group. This appears to the first paper in the conditional cooperation literature looking at a 
real world problem that can attribute a particular behavioral norm as driving conditional 
cooperation. However, the results for those with neutral or lower support for wind power may be 
sensitive to the small number of respondents who indicated these levels of support.  
 It also appears that others’ support for the wind farm proposed positively affects 
individuals’ support for wind power in general. Whether this effect is long-lasting or fleeting 
cannot be determined from the data gathered. It also appears that others’ support positively 
affected how directly the following groups saw compensation as addressing their concerns: those 
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with initially neutral or lower support for the proposed wind farm and those with neutral or lower 
support for wind power in general. These increases in how directly respondents saw 
compensation as addressing their concerns however may not translate into higher levels of 
support for the wind farm for these groups. While the effect of how directly respondents saw 
compensation as addressing their concerns is positively significant for all respondents, those with 
initially neutral or lower support for the wind farm proposed, and those with high support for 
wind power in general, it is not for those with neutral or lower support for wind power in 
general.  Overall, the work here finds that others’ support does appear to have significantly 
affected individuals’ behavior in a real world setting—providing further evidence to the literature 
that conditional cooperation may matter in how individuals make significant economic decisions 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Respondents
Neutral or Lower 
Initial Support High Neutral Low
-0.0688 0.5049 -0.2108 1.5039** 1.2862
(0.1417) (0.3224) (0.1555) (0.6139) (0.9445)
-0.0747 0.0186 -0.1745 0.4420 2.0324**
(0.1013) (0.2408) (0.1098) (0.4886) (0.8129)
2.2429*** 1.2975*** 2.6970*** . 7.3468***
(0.0712) (0.1153) (0.1114) . (1.4515)
0.3189*** 0.8126*** 0.5914*** 0.9900 1.2099
(0.0445) (0.1072) (0.1422) (0.6249) (1.2067)
View would be tarnished -0.6110*** -1.3294*** 0.2679*** 0.9935*** 0.6101**
(0.1171) (0.2309) (0.0485) (0.1982) (0.2813)
Shadow Flicker -0.1418 -0.0324 -1.3881*** -2.3452*** -3.1040*
(0.1406) (0.2403) (0.2696) (0.8983) (1.6784)
Losses in property value -0.7443*** -0.4393* -1.2255*** -2.1503** -2.9101*
(0.1159) (0.2353) (0.2546) (0.8744) (1.5934)
Noise -0.2068* -0.3593 -0.9343*** -1.7657** -2.5458**
(0.1170) (0.2201) (0.2280) (0.7010) (1.0962)
Do not expect to be affected 0.5705*** 0.7521** -1.3095*** -1.6467** -2.4958**
(0.1266) (0.3667) (0.2238) (0.7100) (1.1476)
Property Value Insurance -1.5087*** -1.8986*** -0.4053*** -1.9836*** -4.4165***
(0.2454) (0.5120) (0.1313) (0.4534) (1.1120)
Shadow Flicker Mitigation -1.3147*** -1.8992*** -0.0637 0.0733 0.6000
(0.2317) (0.5045) (0.1613) (0.4506) (0.7816)
Noise Mitigation -1.0560*** -1.6208*** -0.7300*** -1.5627*** -0.0031
(0.2034) (0.4285) (0.1300) (0.4578) (1.0291)
$1,000/year -1.3650*** -1.6372*** -0.2529* 0.5799 -0.4036
(0.2016) (0.4264) (0.1321) (0.3868) (0.8397)
Age 0.0125 0.2408 -0.0060 0.2141 -0.8703
(0.0625) (0.1550) (0.0676) (0.2476) (0.7153)
Education -0.0264 -0.1994*** -0.0333 -0.0677 -0.2301
(0.0276) (0.0647) (0.0303) (0.1118) (0.2048)
Income -0.0445 -0.1620* -0.0146 -0.4721*** -0.9165**
(0.0356) (0.0957) (0.0381) (0.1826) (0.4013)
Home ownership -0.0711 -0.4619 -0.1097 0.9815 -3.0985*
(0.1368) (0.3687) (0.1481) (0.6543) (1.6118)
Gender 0.1304 0.0419 0.1376 0.2468 -1.2449*
(0.0879) (0.2070) (0.0962) (0.3625) (0.6856)
0.0952 -0.5297* 0.0718 -0.6777 0.1708
(0.1315) (0.2761) (0.1485) (0.5491) (0.8092)
Cut 1 3.0235*** -0.4559 5.7153*** -4.5467*** -1.3137
(0.3617) (0.6714) (0.5842) (1.0780) (2.7237)
Cut 2 5.4322*** 2.0981*** 7.7540*** -2.4768** 5.6962**
(0.3688) (0.6847) (0.5384) (1.0187) (2.6225)
Cut 3 7.1094*** 5.9849*** 9.0314*** 1.6690 11.5592***
(0.3788) (0.7274) (0.5333) (1.0501) (3.2145)
Cut 4 10.1333*** 8.1685*** 12.2300*** 3.4524*** .
(0.4085) (0.8568) (0.5773) (1.1265) .
Observations 2676 489 2367 165 144
Pseudo R-Squared 0.3462 0.3086 0.2431 0.2867 0.6095
Prob > Chi-Squared 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Log Likelihood -2253.5178 -429.4062 -1931.1645 -155.8532 -50.5750
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: There is no coefficient for wind power in regression 4 since the variable is constant by definition within the group. 
There are only 3 cuts for the group with low support for wind power in general since no individual in this group chose 
"support" for the wind farm in any of the scenarios.
High Others' Support Before 
Compensation/Mitigation
High Others' Support After 
Compensation/Mitigation
Support for wind power in general as a 
source of energy
Table 3.2. Individuals' Support as a Function of Others' Support
Support for Wind Power in General
How directly compensation/mitigation 
addresses expected impacts
Presently live or have ever lived near a 
wind farm
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Table 3.3. Expected Impacts - Mean Responses
A. All Respondents
Respondents in Low Others' Support Group = 445, Respondents in High Others' Support Group = 447
 (0 = No, 1 = Yes)
Low Others' Support High Others' Support
T-Test for difference between means 
in High and Low Others' Support 
(Two-tailed p-value)
View would be tarnished 0.22 0.20 0.4421
Shadow Flicker 0.11 0.11 0.8137
Losses in property value 0.23 0.24 0.7809
Noise 0.22 0.24 0.6047
Do not expect to be affected 0.51 0.56 0.1603
B. Respondents Initially with Initially Neutral or Lower Support for the Proposed Wind Farm
Respondents in Low Others' Support Group = 80 Respondents in High Others' Support Group = 83
 (0 = No, 1 = Yes)
Low Others' Support High Others' Support
T-Test for difference between means 
in High and Low Others' Support 
(Two-tailed p-value)
View would be tarnished 0.58 0.52 0.4686
Shadow Flicker 0.31 0.27 0.5069
Losses in property value 0.66 0.65 0.8739
Noise 0.50 0.48 0.8189
Do not expect to be affected 0.09 0.12 0.4940
C. Respndents with Strong Support or Support for Wind Power in General
Respondents in Low Others' Support Group = 390, Respondents in High Others' Support Group = 399
 (0 = No, 1 = Yes)
Low Others' Support High Others' Support
T-Test for difference between means 
in High and Low Others' Support 
(Two-tailed p-value)
View would be tarnished 0.18 0.16 0.3652
Shadow Flicker 0.08 0.09 0.9760
Losses in property value 0.17 0.20 0.3909
Noise 0.19 0.21 0.5242
Do not expect to be affected 0.57 0.61 0.2277
D. Respndents with Neutral Support for Wind Power in General
Respondents in Low Others' Support Group = 29 Respondents in High Others' Support Group = 26
 (0 = No, 1 = Yes)
Low Others' Support High Others' Support
T-Test for difference between means 
in High and Low Others' Support 
(Two-tailed p-value)
View would be tarnished 0.48 0.46 0.8778
Shadow Flicker 0.28 0.23 0.7079
Losses in property value 0.62 0.50 0.3769
Noise 0.45 0.42 0.8541
Do not expect to be affected 0.14 0.15 0.8703
E. Respndents who Oppose or Strongly Oppose Wind Power in General
Respondents in Low Others' Support Group = 22, Respondents in High Others' Support Group = 26
 (0 = No, 1 = Yes)
Low Others' Support High Others' Support
T-Test for difference between means 
in High and Low Others' Support 
(Two-tailed p-value)
View would be tarnished 0.62 0.77 0.2505
Shadow Flicker 0.38 0.41 0.8664
Losses in property value 0.69 0.73 0.7959
Noise 0.46 0.55 0.5720
Do not expect to be affected 0.08 0.09 0.8649
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Table 3.4. Individuals' Support as a Function of Others' Support
Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Ordered Logit - Interactions for 
respondents with experience living 
near a wind farm All Respondents
Neutral or Lower 
Initial Support High Neutral Low
-0.0567 0.6058* -0.2303 1.8591*** 2.9396**
(0.1470) (0.3395) (0.1607) (0.6574) (1.2612)
-0.0195 0.2142 -0.1454 0.6420 3.9576***
(0.1065) (0.2578) (0.1151) (0.5076) (1.1408)
-0.1061 -0.6284 0.2245 -3.5822** -5.2248**
(0.3763) (0.7484) (0.4331) (1.6456) (2.2764)
-0.4900* -1.2639** -0.2876 -3.2576** -7.8138***
(0.2894) (0.5862) (0.3284) (1.4866) (2.2966)
0.2804 -0.0407 0.1352 1.9365 1.8216*
(0.1870) (0.3641) (0.2119) (1.2325) (1.0316)
Pseudo R-Squared 0.3466 0.3124 0.2434 0.2996 0.6742
Prob > Chi-Squared 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
B. Ordered Logit - Interactions for respondents who are homeowners
-0.0674 0.5333 -0.1675 2.1211* -1.4742
(0.3011) (0.8532) (0.3310) (1.2211) (3.5806)
-0.0971 0.8832 -0.2892 1.8939* 1.4373
(0.2400) (0.7353) (0.2576) (1.0868) (2.9171)
-0.0023 0.0249 -0.0535 -0.6383 3.0134
(0.3168) (0.8809) (0.3464) (1.3307) (3.6930)
0.0267 -0.9700 0.1366 -1.8613 0.5923
(0.2568) (0.7607) (0.2756) (1.2102) (2.9771)
Home ownership -0.0814 -0.0048 -0.1544 2.0343* -3.7880*
(0.1963) (0.6451) (0.2103) (1.0720) (2.0364)
Pseudo R-Squared 0.3462 0.3106 0.2432 0.2932 0.6129
Prob > Chi-Squared 0.0000 0.0000 0.2432 0.0000 0.0000
0.4088** 0.6533 0.3588 1.7762* 0.3897
(0.1909) (0.4935) (0.2241) (0.9374) (1.9422)
-0.0921 -0.2906 -0.2075 -0.9749 3.1663*
(0.1367) (0.3814) (0.1545) (0.7709) (1.7326)
-0.8538*** -0.5227 -0.7942** -1.8099 -0.9321
(0.2845) (0.5795) (0.3139) (1.2149) (8,215.8987)
0.4322* 0.1441 0.6101** 1.0162 -5.3878
(0.2303) (0.4779) (0.2479) (1.0647) (5,045.2867)
-3.7965*** -3.2410*** -3.8947*** -21.3843 -26.1853
(0.1713) (0.4214) (0.1863) (1,412.1685) (2,053.3354)
Pseudo R-Squared 0.5097 0.3824 0.4429 0.4932 0.8310
Prob > Chi-Squared 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Support for Wind Power in General
High Others' Support 
After*Homeownership
High Others' Support Before 
Compensation/Mitigation
High Others' Support After 
Compensation/Mitigation
High Others' Support 
Before*NIMBY
C. Ordered Logit - Interactions for respondents with higher support for wind power in general than for the wind 
farm proposed in the survey
High Others' Support Before 
Compensation/Mitigation
High Others' Support Before*Wind 
Farm Experience
High Others' Support After*Wind 
Farm Experience
Presently live or have ever lived near 
a wind farm
High Others' Support Before 
Compensation/Mitigation
High Others' Support After 
Compensation/Mitigation
High Others' Support 
Before*Homeownership
High Others' Support After*NIMBY
NIMBY (Support for Wind Power > 
Support for Wind Farm)
High Others' Support After 
Compensation/Mitigation
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Table 3.4. Indivudal Support as a Function of Others' Support (Continued)
Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
D. Ordered Logit - Interactions with 
Income All Respondents
Neutral or Lower 
Initial Support High Neutral Low
-0.2783 -0.5443 -0.0957 -5.7240*** 0.9565
(0.3958) (1.0667) (0.4253) (1.7839) (4.2610)
-0.5001 -0.3159 -0.4150 -5.8974*** 4.4045
(0.3143) (0.8808) (0.3342) (1.4939) (3.7782)
0.0454 0.2233 -0.0271 1.6330*** 0.0697
(0.0831) (0.2160) (0.0890) (0.3843) (0.8735)
0.0948 0.0674 0.0543 1.4180*** -0.5032
(0.0664) (0.1782) (0.0707) (0.3205) (0.7802)
Income -0.0841* -0.2304* -0.0284 -1.4272*** -0.7941
(0.0469) (0.1331) (0.0502) (0.2747) (0.5199)
Pseudo R-Squared 0.3465 0.3094 0.2433 0.3481 0.6118
Prob > Chi-Squared 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
E. Ordered Logit - Interactions for respondents with the highest incomes
-0.1537 0.5850 -0.2570 0.3828 1.3446
(0.1611) (0.3761) (0.1770) (0.7097) (1.0778)
-0.1450 0.2397 -0.2327* -0.4979 2.4573***
(0.1190) (0.2885) (0.1293) (0.5808) (0.8960)
0.2558 -0.2153 0.1110 4.0589*** -0.9940
(0.2535) (0.5630) (0.2721) (1.1466) (1.7878)
0.2088 -0.6382 0.1564 3.1329*** -2.8598*
(0.1992) (0.4550) (0.2144) (0.8918) (1.7284)
High Income -0.3399*** -0.3622 -0.2526* -2.5945*** -0.0046
(0.1257) (0.2989) (0.1377) (0.6157) (0.9590)
Pseudo R-Squared 0.3471 0.3138 0.2438 0.3225 0.6059
Prob > Chi-Squared 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
-0.0105 1.1720** -0.1291 1.8534* 1.9424
(0.2181) (0.4949) (0.2379) (0.9615) (1.5440)
-0.0084 0.6726* -0.1001 0.7588 2.8673**
(0.1684) (0.4001) (0.1817) (0.8080) (1.4428)
-0.0797 -0.9836* -0.1135 -0.4964 -0.5607
(0.2467) (0.5648) (0.2672) (1.0948) (1.7749)
-0.0924 -0.9501** -0.1034 -0.5399 -0.6466
(0.1976) (0.4673) (0.2132) (0.9425) (1.5656)
0.2229* 0.4197 0.2612* -0.2919 2.1832*
(0.1273) (0.3056) (0.1396) (0.5302) (1.3079)
Pseudo R-Squared 0.3468 0.3129 0.2441 0.2918 0.6281
Prob > Chi-Squared 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
High Others' Support After*High 
Income
High Others' Support Before 
Compensation/Mitigation
High Others' Support After 
Compensation/Mitigation
F. Ordered Logit - Interactions for respondents who believe a wind farm could be built 1 mile from home
Support for Wind Power in General
High Others' Support Before 
Compensation/Mitigation
High Others' Support After 
Compensation/Mitigation
High Others' Support 
Before*Income
High Others' Support After*Income
High Others' Support Before*Wind 
Farm Possible
High Others' Support After*Wind 
Farm Possible
Believe Wind Farm Could Be Built 1 
Mile From Home
High Others' Support Before 
Compensation/Mitigation
High Others' Support After 
Compensation/Mitigation
High Others' Support Before*High 
Income
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Table 3.4. Indivudal Support as a Function of Others' Support (Continued)
Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
G. Ordered Logit - Interactions with 
respondents who did not expect to be 
affected by the wind farm All Respondents
Neutral or Lower 
Initial Support High Neutral Low
-0.1994 0.5645* -0.4614** 1.8403*** 1.4357
(0.1817) (0.3349) (0.2032) (0.6497) (1.0034)
-0.2375* 0.0182 -0.4840*** 0.8677* 2.3438***
(0.1359) (0.2519) (0.1525) (0.5244) (0.8901)
0.2704 -0.5437 0.4808* -2.2968* -2.2309
(0.2323) (0.8520) (0.2521) (1.3602) (2.6724)
0.3320* -0.0201 0.5842*** -2.5459** -2.7825
(0.1843) (0.6851) (0.1999) (1.1074) (2.4154)
0.4207*** 0.8617* 0.3355** 2.5105*** 2.2805
(0.1492) (0.5072) (0.1649) (0.8833) (1.5197)
Pseudo R-Squared 0.3467 0.3089 0.2450 0.3008 0.6146
Prob > Chi-Squared 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
H. Ordered Probit
-0.0270 0.2908 -0.1040 0.8331** 0.4845
(0.0817) (0.1868) (0.0888) (0.3349) (0.5107)
-0.0431 -0.0134 -0.0951 0.1516 1.0312**
(0.0572) (0.1352) (0.0616) (0.2725) (0.4288)
Pseudo R-Squared 0.3311 0.3101 0.2275 0.2839 0.5955
Prob > Chi-Squared 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
I. Ordered Logit - Without demographics
-0.0527 0.6402** -0.1957 1.3823** 1.2456
(0.1413) (0.3169) (0.1551) (0.5608) (0.8051)
-0.0575 0.1804 -0.1595 0.2379 1.8347***
(0.1008) (0.2356) (0.1092) (0.4175) (0.6352)
Pseudo R-Squared 0.3452 0.2900 0.2422 0.2614 0.5297
Prob > Chi-Squared 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
High Others' Support Before 
Compensation/Mitigation
High Others' Support After 
Compensation/Mitigation
High Others' Support Before*No 
Affect
High Others' Support After*No 
Affect
Support for Wind Power in General
High Others' Support Before 
Compensation/Mitigation
Do not expect to be affected
High Others' Support After 
Compensation/Mitigation
High Others' Support After 
Compensation/Mitigation









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.7. Individuals' Support for Wind Power In General as a Function of Others' 











































































































































































Table 3.9. Individuals' Ratings for Directness as a Function of Others' Support 
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Figure 3.1. Change in Average Predicted Probability of Each Level of Support for 
Proposed Wind Farm Before Compensation Offered Due to Being in High vs. Low 
Treatment—Respondents Neutral About Wind Power in General 
 
*Estimates for Support for Wind Farm Proposed = 4 and 3 are significant at the 1% level. Estimates for Support for 
Wind Farm Proposed = 5 and 2 are significant at the 5% level. The remaining estimate is insignificant. 
 
Figure 3.2. Change in Average Predicted Probability of Each Level of Support for 
Proposed Wind Farm After Compensation Offered Due to Being in High vs. Low 
Treatment—Respondents Opposed or Strongly Opposed to Wind Power in General 
 
*None of the estimates above are significant at any traditional level of significance. The p-values for Support for 





































































Figure 3.3. Change in Average Predicted Probability of Each Level of Directness Due to 
Being in High vs. Low Treatment—Respondents with Neutral or Lower Initial Support for 
the Wind Farm Proposed 
 
*Estimates for Directness = 5, 4 and 1 are significant at the 1% level. Estimate for Directness = 2 is significant at the 
5% level. The remaining estimate is insignificant. 
 
Figure 3.4. Change in Average Predicted Probability of Each Level of Directness Due to 
Being in High vs. Low Treatment—Respondents with Neutral Support for Wind Power in 
General 
 
*Estimates for Directness = 4, 2 and 1 are significant at the 1% level. Estimate for Directness = 5 is significant at the 






































































Figure 3.5. Change in Average Predicted Probability of Each Level of Directness Due to 
Being in High vs. Low Treatment—Respondents Opposed or Strongly Opposed to Wind 
Power in General 
 
*Estimates for Directness = 5, 4 and 1 are significant at the 1% level. Estimates for Directness = 3 and 2 are 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A.2. E-mail Invitation 
 
Subject Line: 
Central Illinois Wind Farm Survey 
 
The e-mail body: 
 
Dear University of Illinois Employee, 
 
We are writing to ask for your participation in a survey we are conducting for Ph.D. 
dissertation research on several of the factors that affect people’s support for or 
opposition to wind farms.  
 
The survey will ask you to reflect on a few hypothetical wind farm projects. 
 
Your responses to this survey are very important. Reports and publications from this 
research will be shared with economists, government agencies, and city planners to help 
them better address community concerns.  
 
This is a short survey—people who have taken it finished in 5-10 minutes. 
 
Please click on the link below to go to the survey (or copy and paste the survey link into 
your Internet browser). 
 
Central Illinois Wind Farm Survey  
Survey Link:  https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/rhanig2/www/windfarmsurvey.htm 
 
At the end of the survey, you will be given the option to choose if you would like to 
receive copies of reports with findings from this survey. 
 
You will also be given the option to enter a drawing for one of the following three awards 
of your choosing:  
 
-------Scratch-off parking tags for 3 days of free parking on campus;  
-------$25 delivered to you through PayPal or as a gift certificate on Amazon.com; or  
-------$25 donated in your name to the Eastern Illinois Food Bank which serves 
Champaign County.  
 
One award will be made available for every 25 people who respond. These are great 
odds—much better than the lottery! 
 
Your participation in this survey is entirely voluntary and all of your responses will be 
kept confidential. No personally identifiable information will be associated with your 
responses in any reports of this data. Should you have any further questions or comments, 
please feel free to contact Ross Hanig at rhanig2@illinois.edu or by phone at 217-621-
8484 or Prof. Kathy Baylis at baylis@illinois.edu or by phone at 217-244-6653. 
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Thank you for your time and consideration in completing this survey.  
 
It is only through the help of people like you that we can learn how to better address 






Agricultural and Consumer Economics 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
Email: rhanig2@illinois.edu 




Agricultural and Consumer Economics 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
Email: baylis@illinois.edu 
Tel:  (217) 244-6653 
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A.3. E-mail Follow-Up 
 
The subject line 
Last Chance to Take Wind Farm Survey 
 
The e-mail body: 
 
Dear University of Illinois Employee, 
 
We recently sent you an e-mail asking you to respond to a brief survey about wind farms. 
 
Your responses to this survey are very important. Reports and publications from this 
research will be shared with economists, government agencies, and city planners to help 
them better address community concerns.  
 
If you have already completed this survey, we greatly appreciate your participation. 
 
If you have not yet responded to the survey, we encourage you to take a few minutes and 
complete the survey. People who have taken the survey finished in 5-10 minutes. 
 
Please click on the link below to go to the survey (or copy and paste the survey link into 
your Internet browser). 
 
Lincoln Land Wind Farm Survey 
Survey Link:  https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/rhanig2/www/windfarmsurvey.htm 
 
At the end of the survey, you will be given the option to choose if you would like to 
receive copies of reports with findings from this survey. 
 
You will also be given the option to enter a drawing for one of the following three awards 
of your choosing:  
 
-------Scratch-off parking tags for 3 days of free parking on campus;  
-------$25 delivered to you through PayPal or as a gift certificate on Amazon.com; or  
-------$25 donated in your name to the Eastern Illinois Food Bank which serves 
Champaign County.  
 
One award will be made available for every 25 people who respond. These are great 
odds—much better than the lottery! 
 
Your response is important. It is only through the help of people like you that we can 
learn how to better address community concerns about wind farms.  
 







Agricultural and Consumer Economics 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
Email: rhanig2@illinois.edu 




Agricultural and Consumer Economics 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
Email: baylis@illinois.edu 
Tel:  (217) 244-6653 
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Header: Central Illinois Wind Farm Survey 
 
Graphic: 
Wind farm graphic 
 
Text: 
This survey is part of research being conducted by graduate student Ross Hanig for his 
dissertation in the Department of Agricultural and Consumer Economics at the University 
of Illinois.  
 
You must be at least 18 years old to complete this survey. 
 
Participants may print copies of any pages of this survey for their records if they wish. 
 
If you have any questions about this survey research or its results please contact Ross 
Hanig at rhanig2@illinois.edu or by phone at 217-621-8484 or Prof. Kathy Baylis at 
baylis@illinois.edu or by phone at 217-244-6653. 
 
If you have any questions about your rights as a participant in this study, please contact 
the University of Illinois Institutional Review Board at 217-333-2670 (collect calls 














This survey is designed to gauge people’s support for wind farms and their preferences 
for how to best address potential costs to host communities. Participation is voluntary. 
People who have taken the survey finished in 5-10 minutes. You will not be asked to 
provide your name or address and your participation and answers to this survey will be 
held completely confidential. Only the compiled results will be made available. 
 
Your responses to this survey are very important. Reports and publications from this 
research will be shared with economists, government agencies, and city planners to help 
them better address community concerns.  
 
At the end of the survey, you will be given the option to choose if you would like to 
receive copies of reports with findings from this survey as well as the option to enter a 
drawing for one of the following three awards of your choosing: 
 
-------Scratch off parking tags for 3 days of free parking on campus 
-------$25 delivered to you through PayPal or as a gift certificate on Amazon.com 
-------$25 donated in your name to the Eastern Illinois Food Bank which serves 
Champaign County 
 
One award will be made available for every 25 people who respond. 
 
Please complete the survey to the best of your ability. You may choose not to answer 
specific questions or discontinue the survey at any time. Your decision to participate, 
decline, or withdraw from participation will have no effect on your grades at, status at, or 




Header: Wind Farms In Illinois - Past, Present, and Future 
 
Text: 
Communities throughout Illinois are faced with the prospect of hosting wind farms now 
and in the future. To date, wind farms have been built in Illinois in a number of counties 













These wind farms generate enough electricity to power approximately 646,000 homes. 
 










Expecting even more wind farm proposals, Champaign County and the cities of 
Champaign and Urbana have also recently passed ordinances to regulate future wind farm 
development. Given these trends, the odds are significant that as an employee at the 
University of Illinois, you will some day live in a community that considers hosting a 
wind farm. 
 
At the same time wind farms present a number of benefits, they also present a number of 
costs. 
 
A few of the most significant benefits of wind farms are that they: 
-------provide energy while producing no air or water pollution once in operation 
-------may raise the property value of the land the turbines are built on 
-------contribute to local taxes 
-------reduce dependence on coal for energy 
 
A few of the most significant costs are that they: 
-------cause noise pollution due to the sound of turbine blades turning 
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-------may lower the property values of neighboring homes 






Header: Scenario 1 of 3 (Please click "Next" at the bottom of the screen when done) 
 
Graphic: 
Size of turbines proposed 
 
Graphic: 
View 1 mile from wind farm with 1.5 megawatt turbines 
 
Question 1 
Suppose a developer has proposed to build a wind farm 1 mile from your home. 
-------The developer would build 70 1.5 megawatt wind turbines spread out over 6,300 
acres of farm land. 
-------Approximately 1 percent of the land would be taken out of production, the rest 
would continue to be used for agriculture. 
-------The wind farm would provide enough electricity to power approximately 28,000 
homes. 
 
One of the following sentences appears in this space in each survey. The survey in 
which each sentence appears is stated in parentheses. 
-------In an earlier survey, 83 percent of Central Illinois residents surveyed said they 
would vote yes for this project in a referendum. (Used in surveys 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 11, 13, 15, 
17, 19) 
-------In an earlier survey, 22 percent of Central Illinois residents surveyed said they 




Please select your level of support/opposition to the wind farm. 
 
5 = Strongly Support 
4 = Support 
3 = Neutral 
2 = Oppose 
1 = Strongly Oppose 
 
Question 2 
How would you expect to be affected by the wind farm described above? (Please select 
one or more choices) 
0 = No 
1 = Yes 
 
View would be tarnished 
Shadow flicker (alternating shadows would be cast on property) 
Losses in property value 
Noise 
Do not expect to be affected 





Header: Scenario 2 of 3 (Please click "Next" at the bottom of the screen when done) 
 
Graphic: 
Size of turbines proposed 
 
Graphic: 
View 1 mile from wind farm with 1.5 megawatt turbines 
 
Question 3 
Suppose a developer proposed to build exactly the same wind farm as described in the 
first scenario. 
-------The wind farm would be built 1 mile from your home. 
-------The developer would build 70 1.5 megawatt wind turbines spread out over 6,300 
acres of farm land. 
-------Approximately 1 percent of the land would be taken out of production, the rest 
would continue to be used for agriculture. 
-------The wind farm would provide enough electricity to power approximately 28,000 
homes. 
 
One of the following sentences appears in this space in each survey. The survey in 
which each sentence appears is stated in parentheses. 
-------In an earlier survey, 83 percent of Central Illinois residents surveyed said they 
would vote yes for this project in a referendum. (Used in surveys 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 11, 13, 15, 
17, 19) 
-------In an earlier survey, 22 percent of Central Illinois residents surveyed said they 
would vote yes for this project in a referendum. (Used in surveys 3, 4, 7, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 
18, 20) 
 
One of the following sentences appears in this space in each survey. The survey in 
which each sentence appears is stated in parentheses. (Sentences are numbered 
below for clarity. In the actual survey, they are not numbered since only 1 appears 
in each survey variation) 
1. In this scenario, the developer has offered to provide you with free insurance to 
make up any losses in property value that might be caused by the wind farm. 
(Used in surveys 1, 3) 
2. In this scenario, the developer has offered to install wind turbines designed to 
minimize noise. (Used in surveys 2, 4, 9, 10, 13, 14, 17, 18) 
3. In this scenario, the developer has offered to locate the wind turbines in such a 
way that they would not cause shadow flicker (alternating shadows cast by 
moving wind turbine blades) on your home. (Used in surveys 5, 7) 
4. In this scenario, the developer has offered to pay you $1,000 per year for the life 
of the wind farm. (Used in surveys 6, 8) 
5. In this scenario, the developer has offered to pay you $1,000 per year for the life 
of the wind farm. Landowners within 1 mile of another wind farm in Central 
Illinois accepted $1,000 per year for the life of the wind farm. (Used in surveys 
11, 12) 
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6. In this scenario, the developer has offered to pay you $1,000 per year for the life 
of the wind farm. Landowners within 1 mile of another wind farm in Central 
Illinois accepted $1,300 per year for the life of the wind farm. (Used in surveys 
15, 16) 
7. In this scenario, the developer has offered to pay you $1,000 per year for the life 
of the wind farm. Landowners within 1 mile of another wind farm in Central 
Illinois accepted $700 per year for the life of the wind farm. (Used in surveys 19, 
20) 
 
Please rate how directly this measure addresses the impacts you expect from the proposed 
wind farm. 
 
5 = Very Directly 
4 = Somewhat Directly 
3 = Neutral 
2 = Somewhat Indirectly 
1 = Very Indirectly 
 
Question 4 
Please select your level of support/opposition to the wind farm with the measure above. 
 
5 = Strongly Support 
4 = Support 
3 = Neutral 
2 = Oppose 





Header: Scenario 3 of 3 (Please click "Next" at the bottom of the screen when done) 
 
Graphic: 
Size of turbines proposed 
 
Graphic: 
View 1 mile from wind farm with 1.5 megawatt turbines 
 
Question 5 
Suppose a developer proposed to build exactly the same wind farm as described in the 
first scenario. 
-------The wind farm would be built 1 mile from your home. 
-------The developer would build 70 1.5 megawatt wind turbines spread out over 6,300 
acres of farm land. 
-------Approximately 1 percent of the land would be taken out of production, the rest 
would continue to be used for agriculture. 




One of the following sentences appears in this space in each survey. The survey in 
which each sentence appears is stated in parentheses. 
-------In an earlier survey, 83 percent of Central Illinois residents surveyed said they 
would vote yes for this project in a referendum. (Used in surveys 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 11, 13, 15, 
17, 19) 
-------In an earlier survey, 22 percent of Central Illinois residents surveyed said they 
would vote yes for this project in a referendum. (Used in surveys 3, 4, 7, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 
18, 20) 
 
One of the following sentences appears in this space in each survey. The survey in 
which each sentence appears is stated in parentheses. (Sentences are numbered 
below for clarity. In the actual survey, they are not numbered since only 1 appears 
in each survey variation) 
1. In this scenario, instead of offering to provide free insurance to make up any 
losses in property value, the developer has offered to locate the wind turbines in 
such a way that they would not cause shadow flicker (alternating shadows cast by 
moving wind turbine blades) on your home. (Used in surveys 1, 3) 
2. In this scenario, instead of offering to install wind turbines designed to minimize 
noise, the developer has offered to pay you $1,000 per year for the life of the wind 
farm. (Used in surveys 2, 4) 
3. In this scenario, instead of offering to locate the wind turbines in such a way that 
they would not cause shadow flicker, the developer has offered to provide you 
with free insurance to make up any losses in property value that might be caused 
by the wind farm. (Used in surveys 5, 7) 
4. In this scenario, instead of offering to pay $1,000 per year for the life of the wind 
farm, the developer has offered to install wind turbines designed to minimize 
noise. (Used in surveys 6, 8, 11, 12, 15, 16, 19, 20) 
5. In this scenario, instead of offering to install wind turbines designed to minimize 
noise, the developer has offered to pay you $1,000 per year for the life of the wind 
farm. Landowners within 1 mile of another wind farm in Central Illinois accepted 
$1,000 per year for the life of the wind farm. (Used in surveys 9, 10) 
6. In this scenario, instead of offering to install wind turbines designed to minimize 
noise, the developer has offered to pay you $1,000 per year for the life of the wind 
farm. Landowners within 1 mile of another wind farm in Central Illinois accepted 
$1,300 per year for the life of the wind farm. (Used in surveys 13, 14) 
7. In this scenario, instead of offering to install wind turbines designed to minimize 
noise, the developer has offered to pay you $1,000 per year for the life of the wind 
farm. Landowners within 1 mile of another wind farm in Central Illinois accepted 
$700 per year for the life of the wind farm. (Used in surveys 17, 18) 
 
 
Please rate how directly this measure addresses the impacts you expect from the proposed 
wind farm. 
 
5 = Very Directly 
4 = Somewhat Directly 
3 = Neutral 
2 = Somewhat Indirectly 




Please select your level of support/opposition to the wind farm with the measure above. 
 
5 = Strongly Support 
4 = Support 
3 = Neutral 
2 = Oppose 





Header: Central Illinois Wind Farm Survey 
 
Question 7 
Do you think it is possible that a wind farm could be built 1 mile from your home, as in 
the project described here? 
 
1 = Yes 
0 = No 
Other (please specify) 
 
Questions 8 and 9—Each respondent is asked the two questions below that 
correspond to the compensation and/or mitigation offers in the given survey. The 
questions below are asked in the order in which each form of 
compensation/mitigation was presented earlier. 
 
Do you think it is possible that a wind farm developer would offer to provide 
homeowners with free insurance to make up any losses in property value that might be 
caused by a wind farm? 
 
Do you think it is possible that a wind farm developer would offer to install wind turbines 
designed to minimize noise? 
 
Do you think it is possible that a wind farm developer would offer to locate wind turbines 
in such a way that they would not cause shadow flicker (alternating shadows cast by 
moving wind turbine blades) on nearby residents' homes? 
 
Do you think it is possible that a wind farm developer would offer to pay landowners 
within 1 mile of the wind farm $1,000 per year for the life of the wind farm? 
 
1 = Yes 
0 = No 








Header: Central Illinois Wind Farm Survey - Demographic Questions 
 
Question 10 
Please rate your support/opposition for wind power in general as a source of energy. 
 
5 = Strongly Support 
4 = Support 
3 = Neutral 
2 = Oppose 
1 = Strongly Oppose 
 
Question 11 
Do you presently live near a wind farm? 
 
1 = Yes 
0 = No 
 
Question 12 
Have you ever lived near a wind farm? 
 
1 = Yes 
0 = No 
 
Question 13 
What is your gender 
 
1 = Male 
0 = Female 
 
Question 14 
What is your age? 
 
1 = 18-29 years old 
2 = 30-49 years old 
3 = 50-64 years old 





What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
 
1 = some high school 
2 = high school graduate 
3 = some college 
4 = trade/technical/vocational training 
5 = college graduate 
6 = some postgraduate work 
7 = post graduate degree 
 
Question 16 
What is your total household income before taxes? 
 
1 = Less than $25,000 
2 = $25,000 to $34,999 
3 = $35,000 to $49,999 
4 = $50,000 to $74,999 
5 = $75,000 to $99,999 
6 = $1000,000 or more 
 
Question 17 
Do you own a home? 
1 = Yes 






Header: Central Illinois Wind Farm Survey 
 
Question 18 
To receive copies of reports with findings from this survey by e-mail, please enter your e-
mail in the space provided. If not, leave blank. 
 
Question 19 
To enter a drawing to win one of the awards offered, please enter your e-mail in the space 
provided. If not, leave blank. 
 
Question 20 
If you entered the drawing above, please select the award you would like to receive. 
 
Scratch off parking tags for 3 days of free parking on campus 
$25 delivered through PayPal or as a gift certificate on Amazon.com 




If you have any comments you would like to share, please enter them in the box below. 




(Thank you page) 
 
Thank you for completing the Central Illinois Wind Farm Survey! I greatly appreciate 







University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
Department of Agricultural and Consumer Economics 
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A.5. Central Illinois Wind Farm Survey (Sample of How the Survey Looked on the 
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Appendix B: Chapter 3 Supplementary Materials 
 
Table B.1. Individuals' Support as a Function of Others' Support  
Robustness Check - Ordered Logit Results  
Interactions - High Others' Support with Experience Living Near a Wind Farm 
 
( ( ( ( (
!"# !$# !%# !&# !'#
())*+,-./01,02-
3,4256)*/5*7/8,5*
90:2:6)*;4../52 <:=> 3,4256) 7/8
89:9;<= 9:<9;>? 89:@090 A:>;BA??? @:B0B<??
C9:AD=9E C9:00B;E C9:A<9=E C9:<;=DE CA:@<A@E
89:9AB; 9:@AD@ 89:AD;D 9:<D@9 0:B;=<???
C9:A9<;E C9:@;=>E C9:AA;AE C9:;9=<E CA:AD9>E
89:A9<A 89:<@>D 9:@@D; 80:;>@@?? 8;:@@D>??
C9:0=<0E C9:=D>DE C9:D00AE CA:<D;<E C@:@=<DE
89:DB99? 8A:@<0B?? 89:@>=< 80:@;=<?? 8=:>A0>???
C9:@>BDE C9:;><@E C9:0@>DE CA:D><<E C@:@B<<E
@:@D@<??? A:09>B??? @:<B<D??? >:B9@=???
C9:9=A@E C9:AA;BE C9:AAA;E CA:B9;DE
9:0AB0??? 9:>00;??? 9:@<=D??? A:9D;;??? A:9BB>???
C9:9DD<E C9:A9>9E C9:9D>;E C9:@9A>E C9:0<D0E
?:,8*8/4)1*@,*2650:->,1 89:<A@9??? 8A:0<;0??? 89:D9D0??? 8@:0A>B??? 8;:BA0@???
C9:AA=AE C9:@0A>E C9:A0A0E C9:D>B<E CA:;><@E
;>61/8*A):BC,5 89:A0B0 9:9A9< 89:9<D> 9:A@DA 9:=0<A
C9:AD9>E C9:@DA=E C9:A<ADE C9:D;D=E C9:>@;DE
7/--,-*:0*.5/.,52D*E6)4, 89:=D=@??? 89:0>B9 89:=000??? 8A:0DD@??? 9:<A;@
C9:AA;BE C9:@0=;E C9:A09@E C9:D<DBE CA:0<B@E
3/:-, 89:@9A9? 89:0<>D? 89:@;9;? 9:=D@B? 89:;0D;
C9:AA=AE C9:@@9BE C9:A0@0E C9:0B<@E C9:B9@<E
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C9:A0=@E C9:0<<<E C9:AD><E C9:<D0AE CA:>@99E
Q,01,5 9:A0@; 9:9;09 9:A0>= 9:AD;; 8A:;A=0?
C9:9>>9E C9:@9=9E C9:9B<0E C9:0<DDE C9:=>=DE
9:@>9D 89:9D9= 9:A0;@ A:B0<; A:>@A<?
C9:A>=9E C9:0<DAE C9:@AABE CA:@0@;E CA:90A<E
R42*" 0:9;>=??? 89:0<;@ ;:=@D>??? 8D:@AB>??? 8@:>>=>
C9:0<@DE C9:<=A@E C9:;>DDE CA:9>=BE C0:@<;0E
R42*$ ;:D<AA??? @:@9;<??? =:=<00??? 8@:A<=0?? <:;AB0??
C9:0<BAE C9:<>;;E C9:;0><E CA:9@B=E C@:=B@9E
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C9:D9B9E C9:><@=E C9:;==<E CA:A=09E
S@-,5E62:/0- @<=< D>B @0<= A<; ADD
I-,41/*+T;U465,1 9:0D<< 9:0A@D 9:@D0D 9:@BB< 9:<=D@
I5/@*V*R>:T;U465,1 9:9999 9:9999 9:9999 9:9999 9:9999
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Table B.2. Individuals' Support as a Function of Others' Support  
Robustness Check - Ordered Logit Results  
Interactions - High Others' Support with Homeownership 
  
!"# !$# !%# !&# !'#
())*+,-./01,02-
3,4256)*/5*7/8,5*
90:2:6)*;4../52 <:=> 3,4256) 7/8
!"#"$%& "#'((( !"#)$%' *#)*))+ !)#&%&*
,"#("))- ,"#.'(*- ,"#(()"- ,)#**))- ,(#'."$-
!"#"/%) "#..(* !"#*./* )#./(/+ )#&(%(
,"#*&""- ,"#%('(- ,"#*'%$- ,)#".$.- ,*#/)%)-
!"#""*( "#"*&/ !"#"'(' !"#$(.( (#")(&
,"#()$.- ,"#.."/- ,"#(&$&- ,)#(("%- ,(#$/("-
"#"*$% !"#/%"" "#)($$ !)#.$)( "#'/*(
,"#*'$.- ,"#%$"%- ,"#*%'$- ,)#*)"*- ,*#/%%)-
*#*&*.+++ )#*...+++ *#$/%.+++ %#'&&*+++
,"#"%)*- ,"#))'.- ,"#)))&- ,)#')/(-
"#()..+++ "#.)."+++ "#*$%.+++ )#"'$$+++ "#$*()++
,"#"&&$- ,"#)"%'- ,"#"&.'- ,"#*"*/- ,"#*.&$-
?:,8*8/4)1*@,*2650:->,1 !"#$))&+++ !)#(**&+++ !"#&"$/+++ !)#.%$.+++ !&#&"&$+++
,"#))%*- ,"#*()&- ,"#)()&- ,"#&$*.- ,)#)"')-
;>61/8*A):BC,5 !"#)&)" !"#"'$. !"#"$*( !"#)*.. "#$*).
,"#)&)"- ,"#*&*)- ,"#)$)'- ,"#&%'*- ,"#%..*-
7/--,-*:0*.5/.,52D*E6)4, !"#%&&)+++ !"#&%."++ !"#%("$+++ !)#%&')+++ "#)$)(
,"#))'/- ,"#*(/*- ,"#)(""- ,"#&.*/- ,)#"%*/-
3/:-, !"#*"$/+ !"#(&&/ !"#*'(*+ "#'..( !"#('%*
,"#))%"- ,"#**"$- ,"#)(*)- ,"#(.%(- ,"#.&$.-
F/*0/2*,G.,B2*2/*@,*6HH,B2,1 "#'%"&+++ "#%)/.+ "#'/"*+++ "#./*) )#&*"(
,"#)*$$- ,"#(%"$- ,"#)&*(- ,"#$("(- ,)#*%/*-
I5/.,52D*?6)4,*90-4560B, !)#'".%+++ !)#/"%"+++ !)#(./(+++ !*#'%'/+++ !(#"*(&+
,"#*&'&- ,"#')*%- ,"#*$/$- ,"#/)%&- ,)#$%("-
;>61/8*A):BC,5*J:2:=62:/0 !)#()&.+++ !)#/"%"+++ !)#**$'+++ !*#($%&+++ !*#.()%+
,"#*()%- ,"#'"'*- ,"#*'&$- ,"#./""- ,)#'/*)-
3/:-,*J:2:=62:/0 !)#"'''+++ !)#$&('+++ !"#/(()+++ !)#/(()+++ !*#'$))++
,"#*"('- ,"#&*/&- ,"#**."- ,"#%)'.- ,)#".%)-
K"LMMMND,65 !)#($&$+++ !)#$'))+++ !)#(".$+++ !)#%/%*++ !*#')."++
,"#*")$- ,"#&*%"- ,"#**(.- ,"#%*)$- ,)#)&"%-
(=, "#")*. "#**." !"#""&. "#*"%& !"#/&"/
,"#"$*$- ,"#)'$'- ,"#"$%%- ,"#*&//- ,"#%*'(-
O14B62:/0 !"#"*$' !"#)//'+++ !"#"((. !"#"*") !"#*)(*
,"#"*%%- ,"#"$&.- ,"#"("&- ,"#))%"- ,"#*"/(-
90B/P, !"#"&&& !"#)'&$ !"#")&" !"#&/*.+++ !"#/./$++
,"#"('%- ,"#"/$(- ,"#"(.*- ,"#).(&- ,"#&("(-
</P,*/80,5->:. !"#".)& !"#""&. !"#)'&& *#"(&(+ !(#%.."+
,"#)/$(- ,"#$&')- ,"#*)"(- ,)#"%*"- ,*#"($&-
Q,01,5 "#)("& "#"*(' "#)(%. "#)..' !)#)%./+
,"#".%/- ,"#*".*- ,"#"/$*- ,"#($&)- ,"#$/*%-
"#"/'% !"#'((*+ "#"%&. !"#$&'* "#)$((
,"#)()%- ,"#*%$$- ,"#)&./- ,"#'&."- ,"#.)*"-
R42*" (#")'"+++ !"#".'* '#$.()+++ !(#$&**+++ !)#%$%'
,"#(.")- ,"#."")- ,"#'/&.- ,)#*/$%- ,*#.*(%-
R42*$ '#&*($+++ *#&%''+++ %#%*)$+++ !)#'*)* '#*'"/++
,"#(.%*- ,"#.)($- ,"#'&/.- ,)#*$)&- ,*#$%'&-
R42*% %#)""/+++ $#(%&(+++ .#//.'+++ *#$)**++ ))#"*$)+++
,"#(/$&- ,"#.'**- ,"#'&&/- ,)#*.&.- ,(#$").-
R42*& )"#)*&.+++ .#'.&"+++ )*#)/%$+++ &#(./$+++
,"#&*&/- ,"#/$/.- ,"#'..)- ,)#(&$"-
S@-,5E62:/0- *$%$ &./ *($% )$' )&&
I-,41/*+T;U465,1 "#(&$* "#()"$ "#*&(* "#*/(* "#$)*/
I5/@*V*R>:T;U465,1 "#"""" "#"""" "#*&(* "#"""" "#""""
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Table B.3. Individuals' Support as a Function of Others' Support  
Robustness Check - Ordered Logit Results  
Interactions - High Others' Support with NIMBYism 
 
!"# !$# !%# !&# !'#
())*+,-./01,02-
3,4256)*/5*7/8,5*
90:2:6)*;4../52 <:=> 3,4256) 7/8
!"#!$$%% !"&'(( !"('$$ )"**&+% !"($,*
-!"),!,. -!"#,('. -!"++#). -!",(*#. -)",#++.
/!"!,+) /!"+,!& /!"+!*' /!",*#, (")&&(%
-!")(&*. -!"($)#. -!")'#'. -!"**!,. -)"*(+&.
/!"$'($%%% /!"'++* /!"*,#+%% /)"$!,, /!",(+)
-!"+$#'. -!"'*,'. -!"()(,. -)"+)#,. -$0+)'"$,$*.
!"#(++% !")##) !"&)!)%% )"!)&+ /'"($*$
-!"+(!(. -!"#**,. -!"+#*,. -)"!&#*. -'0!#'"+$&*.
/("*,&'%%% /("+#)!%%% /("$,#*%%% /+)"($#( /+&")$'(
-!")*)(. -!"#+)#. -!")$&(. -)0#)+")&$'. -+0!'("(('#.
("(''$%%% +"*)+!%%% (",$$+%%% )'",!#,%%%
-!"!,+$. -!"+)),. -!")('!. -#"!)&,.
!"('',%%% !"*$+&%%% !"('!'%%% )")$$'%%% +"&&+$%%%
-!"!')(. -!")))!. -!"!'*#. -!"+'+'. -!",#$#.
?:,8*8/4)1*@,*2650:->,1 /!"(#*)%%% /!"$$*'%%% /!"++,$ /!"+&&, /'"&!!(%%
-!")((+. -!"+#,&. -!")'+*. -!"'(+$. -+"#$#'.
;>61/8*A):BC,5 /!")!$# !"!#*# /!")))) /!"#$*# /!"+,*+
-!")',#. -!"+'*!. -!")$$!. -!"'+'*. -+"!!#&.
7/--,-*:0*.5/.,52D*E6)4, /!")&#, /!"),') /!")+!$ /)"&#(#%% !"'(!'
-!")(+). -!"+#,+. -!")'+#. -!"&')#. -)"*'$#.
3/:-, /!"!++# /!"+&&' /!"!')# !"($#! ("+)#+
-!")(),. -!"+(!'. -!")'(). -!"#*((. -+"#()).
F/*0/2*,G.,B2*2/*@,*6HH,B2,1 !"#+**%%% !"&&),% !"(,!!%% !"&$+& )",&))
-!")##'. -!"($'$. -!")&#&. -!"*),!. -)"&)*$.
I5/.,52D*?6)4,*90-4560B, /)"#&+#%%% /)"&')&%%% /)"')*'%%% /+"+$'!%% /))"',*'%%
-!"+*,$. -!"'(*(. -!"()&&. -)"!'!$. -#",+&#.
;>61/8*A):BC,5*J:2:=62:/0 /)"(#'(%%% /)"*!*'%%% /)"#)$#%%% /+")*,'%% /))"$*')%%
-!"+&'$. -!"'(+(. -!"(!!$. -)"!*$+. -#"&''$.
3/:-,*J:2:=62:/0 /)"+!#*%%% /)"'))&%%% /)"+,))%%% /)"$#('%% /)!"$!#(%%%
-!"+(+,. -!"##,*. -!"+&,$. -!"$#!*. -("&)#*.
K"LMMMND,65 /)"&#&'%%% /)"#$,*%%% /)"$'$'%%% /)"&#,!%% /))"#'+'%%%
-!"+(!+. -!"##*). -!"+&#). -!"$(,(. -(",*)+.
(=, /!"!&&, !"+#$& /!")!$' !"','(%% !"$$'&
-!"!*)'. -!")&+*. -!"!*,). -!"+,#+. -+"+&&&.
O14B62:/0 /!"!!&& /!"+&(!%%% /!"!!!* /!"!)&* /!"(')&
-!"!(),. -!"!&$+. -!"!(&!. -!")(&#. -!"#)$).
90B/P, /!"!*#!% /!")'(' /!"!#$# /!"&#+&%%% /)")'$!
-!"!#)). -!"!,,(. -!"!#'+. -!"+#(#. -!",+'#.
</P,*/80,5->:. /!"!++! /!"*$')%% !"!,*) )"#*(* /'"+,+)%%
-!")&!+. -!"($*'. -!")**#. -!",)(,. -+"#!(+.
Q,01,5 !")*''% !"!#+$ !"++,+%% /!"(*)+ )"$('#
-!")!)!. -!"+)&,. -!"))($. -!"#(+). -+")!),.
/!"!!$$ /!"#(&& /!")')+ !"(*+! )"'!&*
-!")'+,. -!"+,*(. -!")**,. -!"&(*+. -)"$$!,.
R42*" #"&(,*%%% )"(#,*% $"$*&$%%% /+(",$() )+"+)$+
-!"#!&$. -!"*#!+. -!"&&!(. -)0#)+")&,+. -$"!#',.
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-!"#(++. -!"*,+). -!"&),$. -)0#)+")&,!. -,"&&+&.
R42*% )!"'+))%%% $"'$*+%%% )("+$!!%%% +"!'$,% (("+*(*%%%
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Table B.4. Individuals' Support as a Function of Others' Support  
Robustness Check - Ordered Logit Results  




!"# !$# !%# !&# !'#
())*+,-./01,02-
3,4256)*/5*7/8,5*
90:2:6)*;4../52 <:=> 3,4256) 7/8
!"#$%&' !"#())' !"#"*(% !(#%$)"+++ "#*(,(
-"#'*(&. -/#",,%. -"#)$('. -/#%&'*. -)#$,/".
!"#(""/ !"#'/(* !"#)/(" !(#&*%)+++ )#)")(
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"#")() "#$$'' !"#"$%/ /#,''"+++ "#",*%
-"#"&'/. -"#$/,". -"#"&*". -"#'&)'. -"#&%'(.
"#"*)& "#",%) "#"()' /#)/&"+++ !"#("'$
-"#",,). -"#/%&$. -"#"%"%. -"#'$"(. -"#%&"$.
$#$)((+++ /#'"'&+++ $#,*&&+++ %#'(%,+++
-"#"%/'. -"#//(&. -"#///). -/#)'),.
"#'/%*+++ "#&"*)+++ "#$,%&+++ "#*$)*+++ "#(%'%++
-"#"))(. -"#/"%'. -"#")&(. -"#$"&&. -"#$&)&.
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-"#//%/. -"#$'/$. -"#/'/'. -"#("$%. -/#/$%%.
;>61/8*A):BC,5 !"#/'() !"#"$(, !"#",$/ "#(*'$ "#('"*
-"#/)"%. -"#$)"(. -"#/,/(. -"#)&,(. -"#&""(.
7/--,-*:0*.5/.,52D*E6)4, !"#%)$,+++ !"#)),"+ !"#%$*%+++ !/#%%(*+++ !"#")*"
-"#//(*. -"#$'(). -"#/'"". -"#)&,,. -/#",/).
3/:-, !"#$/,$+ !"#'%/'+ !"#$(,,+ "#((,/ !"#'%*"
-"#//%$. -"#$$"*. -"#/'$). -"#'*$). -"#&)(%.
F/*0/2*,G.,B2*2/*@,*6HH,B2,1 "#(,,&+++ "#%'))++ "#(*"/+++ "#,*%, /#/'''
-"#/$,%. -"#',&". -"#/)$'. -"#,$*&. -/#$'($.
I5/.,52D*?6)4,*90-4560B, !/#("$*+++ !/#&,&/+++ !/#'&%,+++ !/#&&*/++ !'#")$/+
-"#$)(). -"#(/',. -"#$,*,. -"#*),/. -/#,,%/.
;>61/8*A):BC,5*J:2:=62:/0 !/#'/",+++ !/#&,%'+++ !/#$$(&+++ !/#%",,+ !$#&%(/+
-"#$'/%. -"#(",/. -"#$(),. -"#*$/%. -/#(&),.
3/:-,*J:2:=62:/0 !/#"(/$+++ !/#,/,%+++ !"#*'$%+++ !/#((,(++ !$#))&'++
-"#$"'). -"#)$&,. -"#$$%*. -"#%)/&. -/#"***.
K"LMMMND,65 !/#',$*+++ !/#,''/+++ !/#'"*)+++ !/#)"%,+ !$#'&,)++
-"#$"/,. -"#)$,). -"#$$'&. -"#%)(". -/#/('*.
(=, "#"/,/ "#$($( !"#""(/ "#('&/++ !"#&$''
-"#",$,. -"#/((*. -"#",%,. -"#$,$". -"#%$,&.
O14B62:/0 !"#"$*$ !"#$")/+++ !"#"')' !"#'/,"++ !"#$)$/
-"#"$%%. -"#",(". -"#"'"). -"#/$*,. -"#$"*".
90B/P, !"#"&)/+ !"#$'")+ !"#"$&) !/#)$%$+++ !"#%*)/
-"#"),*. -"#/''/. -"#"("$. -"#$%)%. -"#(/**.
</P,*/80,5->:. !"#"&"& !"#(/%* !"#//$& "#(%,& !$#*&*'+
-"#/'%". -"#'%,). -"#/)&'. -"#,(/$. -/#,$//.
Q,01,5 "#/'$) "#"(%' "#/'%* "#('&( !/#/*,*+
-"#"&&". -"#$"&$. -"#"*,'. -"#'%,*. -"#,*'".
"#"*(, !"#(/%)+ "#"%/& !"#*&''+ "#/%%)
-"#/'/(. -"#$%,%. -"#/)&(. -"#((,&. -"#&/"*.
R42*" $#&$%'+++ !"#&$%( (#,('(+++ !/"#((/*+++ !"#(&/&
-"#'*/". -"#&)%). -"#,"/&. -/#%(,*. -'#'/"'.
R42*$ (#$)")+++ /#%'/)++ %#,*/"+++ !&#/()"+++ ,#)*,'+
-"#'*,'. -"#&(($. -"#((%%. -/#,(*%. -'#')"/.
R42*% ,#*/*/+++ (#,$$'+++ &#*,%*+++ !'#)&(/++ /$#$(,&+++
-"#)"(/. -"#&&(". -"#(($*. -/#(")&. -'#,)&'.
R42*& *#*)),+++ %#&"*%+++ /$#/,%&+++ !/#,%,&
-"#)'$). -"#**)/. -"#(*($. -/#())$.
S@-,5E62:/0- $,%, )&* $',% /,( /))
I-,41/*+T;U465,1 "#'),( "#'"*) "#$)'' "#')&/ "#,//&
I5/@*V*R>:T;U465,1 "#"""" "#"""" "#"""" "#"""" "#""""





* * * * * * * * *
* * * * *














Table B.5. Individuals' Support as a Function of Others' Support  
Robustness Check - Ordered Logit Results  
Interactions - High Others' Support with High Income 
 
!"# !$# !%# !&# !'#
())*+,-./01,02-
3,4256)*/5*7/8,5*
90:2:6)*;4../52 <:=> 3,4256) 7/8
!"#$%&' "#%(%" !"#)%'" "#&()( $#&**+
,"#$+$$- ,"#&'+$- ,"#$''"- ,"#'".'- ,$#"''(-
!"#$*%" "#)&.' !"#)&)'/ !"#*.'. )#*%'&///
,"#$$."- ,"#)((%- ,"#$).&- ,"#%("(- ,"#(.+"-
"#)%%( !"#)$%& "#$$$" *#"%(./// !"#..*"
,"#)%&%- ,"#%+&"- ,"#)')$- ,$#$*++- ,$#'('(-
"#)"(( !"#+&() "#$%+* &#$&)./// !)#(%.(/
,"#$..)- ,"#*%%"- ,"#)$**- ,"#(.$(- ,$#')(*-
<:=>*90?/@, !"#&&../// !"#&+)) !"#)%)+/ !)#%.*%/// !"#""*+
,"#$)%'- ,"#).(.- ,"#$&''- ,"#+$%'- ,"#.%."-
)#)%%(/// $#&&))/// )#'"$*/// +#.+).///
,"#"'$%- ,"#$$'(- ,"#$$$%- ,$#&$.*-
"#&$+&/// "#(")$/// "#)++'/// "#.$(%/// "#+&)$//
,"#"**+- ,"#$"'+- ,"#"*(+- ,"#)"()- ,"#)(&+-
A:,8*8/4)1*B,*2650:->,1 !"#+$((/// !$#&&&%/// !"#*"'+/// !)#%&."/// !&#(..&///
,"#$$'"- ,"#)&"'- ,"#$&$)- ,"#*.*&- ,$#$+))-
;>61/8*C):?D,5 !"#$*(" !"#$$*% !"#"+.) !"#$*%" "#%*"$
,"#$*"+- ,"#)&.*- ,"#$+$+- ,"#**("- ,"#'''&-
7/--,-*:0*.5/.,52E*F6)4, !"#'*$+/// !"#&('. !"#'$.(/// !$#'".$/// !"#(++"
,"#$$%.- ,"#)&+)- ,"#$&")- ,"#*'&.- ,$#"(''-
3/:-, !"#)$&"/ !"#&("&/ !"#)%*./ "#("&+// !"#$&*'
,"#$$'$- ,"#))"*- ,"#$&)+- ,"#&.$$- ,"#("*)-
G/*0/2*,H.,?2*2/*B,*6II,?2,1 "#%+$+/// "#(+"%// "#%(++/// "#&(). "#())$
,"#$)+(- ,"#&'$&- ,"#$*)%- ,"#+&+%- ,$#$(&)-
J5/.,52E*A6)4,*90-4560?, !$#*.'*/// !$#."$"/// !$#&'.'/// !)#$%($// !&#%)'(//
,"#)*%+- ,"#%$&$- ,"#)+..- ,"#.*&'- ,$#+""&-
;>61/8*C):?D,5*K:2:=62:/0 !$#&"'$/// !$#."(%/// !$#)$."/// !)#"**+// !&#&'**//
,"#)&$(- ,"#%"+"- ,"#)%*.- ,"#.$'+- ,$#%*''-
3/:-,*K:2:=62:/0 !$#"*("/// !$#%'$'/// !"#.&)'/// !$#*(.(// !)#*&'%//
,"#)"&%- ,"#*).%- ,"#))($- ,"#'*$%- ,$#"'%%-
L"MNNNOE,65 !$#&%../// !$#%.&./// !$#&".*/// !$#&*')/ !)#*))$//
,"#)"$'- ,"#*)''- ,"#))*"- ,"#'*&'- ,$#$&'(-
(=, "#"$*) "#)*'. !"#""$. "#%*".// !"#%&(*
,"#"+)"- ,"#$%%*- ,"#"+'"- ,"#)+%%- ,"#')'+-
P14?62:/0 !"#")"& !"#$()&/// !"#")&$ !"#)"&$/ !"#&".$
,"#")'+- ,"#"+%"- ,"#"&"%- ,"#$$%%- ,"#)"%&-
</@,*/80,5->:. !"#"((' !"#%)*' !"#"(*. !"#*$*" !&#")+&/
,"#$)+&- ,"#&*%%- ,"#$&'%- ,"#%'("- ,$#%())-
Q,01,5 "#$*". !"#"""& "#$%&* "#*"'* !$#*)&%//
,"#"('.- ,"#)"%*- ,"#".+*- ,"#&'&"- ,"#+'$%-
"#".** !"#%$('/ "#"+&( !"#++)( !"#&(.&
,"#$&$+- ,"#)'*+- ,"#$*(%- ,"#%+(+- ,"#'*('-
R42*" &#$'$+/// "#&))' %#'.)$/// !*#("'+/// )#)"&"
,"#&+**- ,"#+(%"- ,"#%('%- ,$#"'$.- ,)#*(.%-
R42*$ %#%(*$/// )#.""%/// '#(&$"/// !)#%&)&// (#.+$)///
,"#&'$(- ,"#'"*.- ,"#%*)&- ,$#"$**- ,)#++.+-
R42*% '#)+*"/// +#(*((/// .#$$$$/// $#."+)/ $*#&**%///
,"#&()"- ,"#'+%)- ,"#%&'%- ,$#"$%*- ,&#&'&(-
R42*& $"#).*%/// .#")$+/// $)#&$&&/// &#+$**///
,"#*$)&- ,"#((%$- ,"#%($%- ,$#".*%-
SB-,5F62:/0- )+'+ *(. )&+' $+% $**
J-,41/*+T;U465,1 "#&*'$ "#&$&( "#)*&( "#&))% "#+"%.
J5/B*V*R>:T;U465,1 "#"""" "#"""" "#"""" "#"""" "#""""
7/=*7:D,):>//1 !))%"#*")% !*)+#$%)( !$.).#&*.) !$*(#"&)& !%$#"&("
;2601651*,55/5-*:0*.65,02>,-,-
WWW*.XNYN"M*WW*.XNYN'M*W*.XNY"
* * * * *
* * * * * * * * *


















Table B.6. Individuals' Support as a Function of Others' Support  
Robustness Check - Ordered Logit Results  
Interactions - High Others' Support with Belief that a Wind Farm Could be Built 1 Mile 
From Respondent's Home 
 
!"# !$# !%# !&# !'#
())*+,-./01,02-
3,4256)*/5*7/8,5*
90:2:6)*;4../52 <:=> 3,4256) 7/8
!"#"$"% $#$&'"(( !"#$')$ $#*%+,( $#),',
-"#'$*$. -"#,),). -"#'+&). -"#)/$%. -$#%,,".
!"#""*, "#/&'/( !"#$""$ "#&%** '#*/&+((
-"#$/*,. -"#,""$. -"#$*$&. -"#*"*". -$#,,'*.
!"#"&)& !"#)*+/( !"#$$+% !"#,)/, !"#%/"&
-"#',/&. -"#%/,*. -"#'/&'. -$#"),*. -$#&&,).
!"#")', !"#)%"$(( !"#$"+, !"#%+)) !"#/,//
-"#$)&/. -"#,/&+. -"#'$+'. -"#),'%. -$#%/%/.
"#''')( "#,$)& "#'/$'( !"#')$) '#$*+'(
-"#$'&+. -"#+"%/. -"#$+)/. -"#%+"'. -$#+"&).
'#'+&*((( $#++'%((( '#/*,+((( &#'*)'(((
-"#"&$+. -"#$$&&. -"#$$$/. -$#,),*.
"#+$*$((( "#*"%&((( "#'/*+((( $#"',+((( "#/%*+((
-"#",,/. -"#$"&/. -"#",*/. -"#'"$$. -"#'),&.
?:,8*8/4)1*@,*2650:->,1 !"#/$&%((( !$#,+,)((( !"#,$"'((( !$#)*""((( !,#)"'"(((
-"#$$&+. -"#'+**. -"#$+$/. -"#,&,,. -$#'*+'.
;>61/8*A):BC,5 !"#$'** "#""), !"#"%,) "#")*% $#$,&*
-"#$,"). -"#',+$. -"#$/$). -"#,*/+. -"#*)&'.
7/--,-*:0*.5/.,52D*E6)4, !"#&+&&((( !"#,/"'( !"#&')%((( !$#&%/%((( !"#,$$%
-"#$$/$. -"#'+&%. -"#$+"+. -"#,*"$. -$#",").
3/:-, !"#$)/%( !"#+&)+( !"#',$&( "#%"'* !"#&'+/
-"#$$&'. -"#''$%. -"#$+'+. -"#,"$'. -"#)$)'.
F/*0/2*,G.,B2*2/*@,*6HH,B2,1 "#%/&$((( "#&,%,(( "#%*'"((( "#&&/* $#/,%/
-"#$'/*. -"#+/**. -"#$,'%. -"#/,%). -$#'%%%.
I5/.,52D*?6)4,*90-4560B, !$#%"'%((( !$#*)&"((( !$#+)"&((( !'#/"/'((( !'#&),'
-"#',%*. -"#%$+'. -"#'&"". -"#)'"'. -$#*,",.
;>61/8*A):BC,5*J:2:=62:/0 !$#+"&,((( !$#)"'$((( !$#'',*((( !'#+*$+((( !'#%/"$
-"#'+'$. -"#%"&'. -"#'%%". -"#*)$&. -$#&','.
3/:-,*J:2:=62:/0 !$#"%%+((( !$#%)%)((( !"#)+/"((( !$#&*"/(( !'#*,*"((
-"#'"+*. -"#,')/. -"#''*,. -"#&",/. -$#$&+%.
K"LMMMND,65 !$#+/+/((( !$#/$)+((( !$#+$"&((( !$#//&&(( !'#*+$"((
-"#'"$). -"#,'*+. -"#'',+. -"#&$,+. -$#'+/%.
(=, "#"'&, "#'++) "#"$$) "#")%' !"#")'"
-"#"/+". -"#$%%,. -"#"/*'. -"#'&+&. -"#*,%).
O14B62:/0 !"#"'$% !"#$*//((( !"#"'/) !"#"%%$ !"#'&%)
-"#"'&*. -"#"/%,. -"#"+"%. -"#$$,". -"#'$''.
90B/P, !"#",*) !"#$&'+( !"#"$)/ !"#,+%+(( !"#))""((
-"#"+%*. -"#")//. -"#"+*'. -"#$*$". -"#,+$".
</P,*/80,5->:. !"#")"% !"#++"* !"#$')/ $#'/"%( !,#"*+%((
-"#$+&,. -"#+&++. -"#$,*&. -"#&'"+. -$#**++.
Q,01,5 "#$+,% "#")$, "#$,$& "#'+%/ !"#*&)+
-"#"**'. -"#'"*+. -"#")/%. -"#+/$). -"#&%&'.
"#"&," !"#,&)'( "#"%*' !"#,%$* !"#+//%
-"#$+'$. -"#'*$". -"#$,)$. -"#%&$$. -"#*&)%.
R42*" +#$*)/((( "#"$$/ %#*&%$((( !,#&"//((( !"#'*',
-"#+&&/. -"#&$*". -"#%),). -$#$%*$. -+#'$").
R42*$ %#%*))((( '#%*&,((( &#)")$((( !'#/"+"(( &#/'$"((
-"#+*+&. -"#&++$. -"#%,)*. -$#"),,. -+#+//).
R42*% &#'/'*((( /#%"$*((( )#$*+)((( $#%/'/ $,#/*,$(((
-"#+)+$. -"#&&),. -"#%,,&. -$#$+"). -,#+$,".
R42*& $"#')$)((( *#/&//((( $'#+*&)((( +#+/*)(((
-"#,'',. -"#)""). -"#%**,. -$#'"&+.
S@-,5E62:/0- '/&/ ,*) '+/& $/% $,,
I-,41/*+T;U465,1 "#+,/* "#+$') "#',,$ "#')$* "#/'*$
I5/@*V*R>:T;U465,1 "#"""" "#"""" "#"""" "#"""" "#""""
7/=*7:C,):>//1 !''%$#,+%& !,'/#&$", !$)'*#&*$$ !$%,#&,%% !,*#$/&+
;2601651*,55/5-*:0*.65,02>,-,-
WWW*.XMYM"L*WW*.XMYM'L*W*.XMY"




* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

















Table B.7. Individuals' Support as a Function of Others' Support  
Robustness Check - Ordered Logit Results  
Interactions - High Others' Support with Respondents Who Do Not Expect to be Affected 
by the Wind Farm 
 




90:2:6)*;4../52 <:=> 3,4256) 7/8
!"#$%%& "#'(&') !"#&($&)) $#*&"+))) $#&+',
-"#$*$,. -"#++&%. -"#/"+/. -"#(&%,. -$#""+&.
!"#/+,') "#"$*/ !"#&*&"))) "#*(,,) /#+&+*)))
-"#$+'%. -"#/'$%. -"#$'/'. -"#'/&&. -"#*%"$.
"#/,"& !"#'&+, "#&*"*) !/#/%(*) !/#/+"%
-"#/+/+. -"#*'/". -"#/'/$. -$#+("/. -/#(,/&.
"#++/") !"#"/"$ "#'*&/))) !/#'&'%)) !/#,*/'
-"#$*&+. -"#(*'$. -"#$%%%. -$#$",&. -/#&$'&.
/#/&('))) $#/%'/))) /#,"+'))) ,#*(+")))
-"#",$+. -"#$$'+. -"#$$$&. -$#'%%%.
"#+$*%))) "#*$/,))) "#/('+))) "#%*/())) "#(&'())
-"#"&&(. -"#$",+. -"#"&*,. -"#$%*+. -"#/%$,.
?:,8*8/4)1*@,*2650:->,1 !"#($""))) !$#++",))) !"#&"*'))) !/#"$,&))) !&#(,",)))
-"#$$,$. -"#/+$". -"#$+$'. -"#&'('. -$#$,'$.
;>61/8*A):BC,5 !"#$+(' !"#"++" !"#"&%( "#"&'( "#(%/*
-"#$&",. -"#/&"+. -"#$($,. -"#&'++. -"#*"/+.
7/--,-*:0*.5/.,52D*E6)4, !"#,&$%))) !"#&+&*) !"#,","))) !$#'++())) "#&,/"
-"#$$'%. -"#/+'%. -"#$+"'. -"#&($/. -$#$&%$.
3/:-, !"#$%(&) !"#+($, !"#///") "#("&+ !"#,+'&
-"#$$,$. -"#//"/. -"#$+/,. -"#+%"$. -"#%$'".
F/*0/2*,G.,B2*2/*@,*6HH,B2,1 "#&/",))) "#*($,) "#++'')) /#'$"'))) /#/*"'
-"#$&%/. -"#'",/. -"#$(&%. -"#**++. -$#'$%,.
I5/.,52D*?6)4,*90-4560B, !$#'"(%))) !$#%"$())) !$#+,++))) !/#/&/&)) !+#+$(()
-"#/&'&. -"#'$//. -"#/(%(. -"#%"'%. -$#,$*'.
;>61/8*A):BC,5*J:2:=62:/0 !$#+$("))) !$#%"/'))) !$#/$%"))) !/#"+"/)) !+#$'(&)
-"#/+$,. -"#'"&(. -"#/'&,. -"#**&*. -$#('&+.
3/:-,*J:2:=62:/0 !$#"'&'))) !$#(/$"))) !"#%/"%))) !$#,*%%)) !/#((,"))
-"#/"++. -"#&/*,. -"#//,%. -"#,""+. -$#$/%,.
K"LMMMND,65 !$#+('+))) !$#(+'&))) !$#+""/))) !$#((+&)) !/#($''))
-"#/"$'. -"#&/((. -"#//+*. -"#,$"&. -$#$*"(.
(=, "#"$%" "#/+/* "#""/, "#//&& !"#**(+
-"#"(/(. -"#$''%. -"#"(,(. -"#/'"*. -"#,//&.
O14B62:/0 !"#"/*, !"#$%%*))) !"#"+*+ !"#"$$" !"#/*$(
-"#"/,,. -"#"(&,. -"#"+"&. -"#$$+%. -"#/$',.
90B/P, !"#"&+/ !"#$',* !"#"$/, !"#&*($))) !$#"(,+))
-"#"+',. -"#"%('. -"#"+*/. -"#$,%%. -"#&&/+.
</P,*/80,5->:. !"#"*/* !"#&,,/ !"#$/,$ "#%*"( !+#*&+'))
-"#$+,$. -"#+,$+. -"#$&*(. -"#(&'(. -$#,"%/.
Q,01,5 "#$/%, "#"+&$ "#$+'/ "#$*/* !$#&*&*))
-"#"**". -"#/"*%. -"#"%(+. -"#+(((. -"#,+"/.
"#"%'( !"#'+*%) "#"'%" !"#%/'() "#$$&$
-"#$+$&. -"#/,,%. -"#$&*'. -"#''+%. -"#*&(/.
R42*" /#%,&+))) !"#&,$/ '#("/,))) !&#/$(/))) !/#$+(/
-"#+(/+. -"#(,$,. -"#'*'/. -$#"*,,. -/#*&'(.
R42*$ '#+,('))) /#"*/'))) ,#(+%())) !/#$/,&)) '#/"+*)
-"#+(%,. -"#(*'". -"#'+%'. -$#"/%%. -/#(',".
R42*% ,#"'&())) '#%,$())) *#%//"))) /#$(&,)) $"#+",')))
-"#+,%,. -"#,/,&. -"#'+&+. -$#",'&. -+#/,/'.
R42*& $"#"*+%))) *#$(+'))) $/#$+$$))) &#""+()))
-"#&"%$. -"#*','. -"#',,,. -$#$&%+.
S@-,5E62:/0- /(,( &*% /+(, $(' $&&
I-,41/*+T;U465,1 "#+&(, "#+"*% "#/&'" "#+""* "#($&(
I5/@*V*R>:T;U465,1 "#"""" "#"""" "#"""" "#"""" "#""""





* * * * * * * * *
* * * * *














Table B.8. Individuals' Support as a Function of Others' Support  
Robustness Check - Ordered Probit Results 
 
!"# !$# !%# !&# !'#
())*+,-./01,02-
3,4256)*/5*7/8,5*
90:2:6)*;4../52 <:=> 3,4256) 7/8
!"#"$%" "#$&"' !"#(")" "#'**(++ "#)'),
-"#"'(%. -"#('/'. -"#"'''. -"#**)&. -"#,("%.
!"#")*( !"#"(*) !"#"&,( "#(,(/ (#"*($++
-"#",%$. -"#(*,$. -"#"/(/. -"#$%$,. -"#)$''.
(#(%'%+++ "#%('%+++ (#)(,&+++ *#/)(/+++
-"#"*/". -"#"/(/. -"#",%'. -"#,&%(.
"#(',%+++ "#)'&$+++ "#(/$*+++ "#,%$(+++ "#*)('++
-"#"$)'. -"#",&". -"#"$%". -"#(($%. -"#(,(&.
?:,8*8/4)1*@,*2650:->,1 !"#*(,'+++ !"#%(&(+++ !"#(&%*+++ !(#")/,+++ !$#(/("+++
-"#"///. -"#($'/. -"#"%)&. -"#$)**. -"#,$(/.
;>61/8*A):BC,5 !"#",)& !"#"$(" !"#""'* "#"*/& "#$$%(
-"#"%&/. -"#(*%'. -"#"&(&. -"#$,',. -"#)"%".
7/--,-*:0*.5/.,52D*E6)4, !"#*&,(+++ !"#$(%$+ !"#*'$'+++ !"#&%*(+++ "#""'(
-"#"/,&. -"#(*"%. -"#"%)(. -"#$,)*. -"#,(%*.
3/:-, !"#(*$"++ !"#$$("+ !"#(,//++ "#$,,' !"#")(*
-"#"//*. -"#($)%. -"#"%)&. -"#$()). -"#)*"$.
F/*0/2*,G.,B2*2/*@,*6HH,B2,1 "#*%$$+++ "#)%$'++ "#*%"(+++ "#,/)) "#%%()
-"#"%(/. -"#$"&/. -"#"%&/. -"#*)/,. -"#/$"&.
I5/.,52D*?6)4,*90-4560B, !"#'&$%+++ !(#"%((+++ !"#'*/&+++ !(#$(,"++ !(#'$(*++
-"#(*'$. -"#$&$*. -"#(,(/. -"#)&&(. -"#&"*,.
;>61/8*A):BC,5*J:2:=62:/0 !"#%,)/+++ !(#(()*+++ !"#%(()+++ !(#()"%++ !(#%"")++
-"#(*$*. -"#$'&%. -"#(),(. -"#)&//. -"#',&*.
3/:-,*J:2:=62:/0 !"#/$/&+++ !"#&%$"+++ !"#,%%/+++ !(#"*)%++ !(#,&,/+++
-"#(()%. -"#$))". -"#($%,. -"#)"/). -"#/"().
K"LMMMND,65 !"#')*%+++ !"#&'//+++ !"#'*/'+++ !"#&('(++ !(#,*("++
-"#((*/. -"#$)$%. -"#($,,. -"#)"'$. -"#/$*%.
(=, !"#""/, "#(((/ !"#"(// "#"%,( !"#,(*/
-"#"*,*. -"#"''$. -"#"*%%. -"#()(&. -"#*/''.
O14B62:/0 !"#"('& !"#((()+++ !"#"$(/ !"#"*($ !"#($'$
-"#"(,'. -"#"*/%. -"#"(%$. -"#"/)). -"#(("*.
90B/P, !"#"$)$ !"#"&'(+ !"#"",/ !"#$&""+++ !"#)&"/++
-"#"$"". -"#",*&. -"#"$(*. -"#"&$'. -"#$"%$.
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Table B.9. Individuals' Support as a Function of Others' Support  
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Table B.10. Individuals' Support for Wind Power In General as a Function of Others' 
Robustness Checks - Ordered Logit 
Interactions - Others' Support with Homeownership 
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Table B.11. Individuals' Support for Wind Power In General as a Function of Others' 
Support Robustness Checks - Ordered Logit 
Interactions - High Others' Support with NIMBYism 
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Table B.12. Individuals' Support for Wind Power In General as a Function of Others' 
Robustness Checks - Ordered Logit 
Interactions - High Others' Support with Income 
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Table B.13. Individuals' Support for Wind Power In General as a Function of Others' 
Support Robustness Checks - Ordered Logit 
Interactions - High Others' Support with High Income Group 
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Table B.14. Individuals' Support for Wind Power In General as a Function of Others' 
Robustness Checks - Ordered Logit 
Interactions - High Others' Support with High Income Group 
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Table B.15. Individuals' Support for Wind Power In General as a Function of Others' 
Support Robustness Checks - Ordered Logit 
Interactions - High Others' Support with High Income Group 
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Table B.16. Individuals' Support for Wind Power In General as a Function of Others' 
Support 
Robustness Checks - Ordered Logit  
Interactions - High Others' Support with Respondents Who Do Not Expect to be Affected 
by the Wind Farm 
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Table B.17. Individuals' Support for Wind Power In General as a Function of Others' 
Robustness Checks 



















































Table B.18. Individuals' Support for Wind Power In General as a Function of Others' 
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Table B.19. Individuals' Ratings for Directness as a Function of Others' Support 
Robustness Checks - Ordered Logit 
Interactions - High Others' Support*Home Ownership 
 
  
) ) ) )
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-!"%',,. -!"'*(%. -!"%$&&. -!"$#$*. -!"#+'&.
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Table B.20. Individuals' Ratings for Directness as a Function of Others' Support 
Robustness Checks - Ordered Logit  
Interactions - High Others' Support*NIMBYism 
 
  
) ) ) )
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<==)!(%>"'1('&%
?($&0@=)"0)2"A(0)
B'4&4@=)C$>>"0& D43+ ?($&0@= 2"A
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Table B.21. Individuals' Ratings for Directness as a Function of Others' Support 
Robustness Checks - Ordered Logit 
Interactions - High Others' Support*Income 
 
!"# !$# !%# !&# !'#
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Table B.22. Individuals' Ratings for Directness as a Function of Others' Support 
Robustness Checks - Ordered Logit 
Interactions - High Others' Support*High Income 
 
  
!"# !$# !%# !&# !'#
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-!"*++/. -!"+$%/. -!"*&$*. -!"%,!,. -!"%,/).
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;>61/8*E):AF,5 (!"!*/% !"+$!* !"!)+# !",/,/ !"*!%*
-!"*)$&. -!"$%*#. -!"*,)/. -!")&*&. -!")&!#.
7/--,-*:0*.5/.,52G*H6)4, (!"!#,+ (!"!+$# (!"!++! !"$/*% !"!$//
-!"*$,#. -!"$&%). -!"*&&,. -!"&,/*. -!")/*!.
3/:-, !"&#+%''' !"&!,#' !")*/,''' !")&+$ !"&//)
-!"*$//. -!"$+,&. -!"*&%/. -!"&)&$. -!")/!,.
I/*0/2*,J.,A2*2/*D,*6KK,A2,1 (!"+!%&'' (!"!$!# (!"$$!+ (!")%#) !")*$/
-!"*+%/. -!"+,$%. -!"*)+/. -!"%,%). -!"#&+,.
L5/.,52G*C6)4,*90-4560A, !"&/))''' !"$*,% !")+&*''' (!"*+/& !"%&//
-!"*)&%. -!"+)/%. -!"*%&$. -!",+,,. -!"#&$#.
;>61/8*E):AF,5*M:2:=62:/0 (!"$*$, (!"!$+, (!"$*,) (!"&**/ !"$*/&
-!"*)$*. -!"+)&$. -!"*%*!. -!",*,+. -!"#,#,.
3/:-,*M:2:=62:/0 !"*,&*' !"!!*+ !"$$,/'' (!"*),+ !"!)!$
-!"*!&/. -!"$))/. -!"***/. -!"&)$*. -!"&,,&.
N"OPPPQG,65 !"+&!%'' (!"!,/* !"+#,)'' !"*!+, !")%)#
-!"*),,. -!"+%)&. -!"*%/!. -!"%/!&. -!"%#$!.
(=, (!"*)+#'' (!"&$%$'' (!"*+)!'' (!"*#!# (*"!),&''
-!"!%&,. -!"*%#&. -!"!%#&. -!"+*%#. -!"&$&*.
R14A62:/0 !"!*,* (!"!+%/ !"!+&! (!"+&#$''' !"!$+,
-!"!$#/. -!"!%/$. -!"!+*$. -!"*$&). -!"*&&%.
</B,*/80,5->:. !"$)*/' !",#$$'' !"*)/, !"#)%$ +"#*#$'''
-!"*+!). -!"+,&,. -!"*+,#. -!"%/#+. -*"!&&*.
S,01,5 (!"!+$+ (!"***, (!"!*,# (!"!%,* !"!,%$
-!"!/!&. -!"$*%+. -!"!/%%. -!"&$!%. -!")*$!.
(!"*!/! !"&//&' (!"$!&! (*",*&+''' $"*$,,'''
-!"*+/&. -!"$///. -!"*)+#. -!"%!,&. -!"))*$.
T42*" (!"*+)& (!",,%! (*"*#+*'' (+"+)#/''' !",*)#
-!"+%%%. -!",$+$. -!")++,. -*"*#&%. -*"%/)+.
T42*$ !"&%)# (!"!)/% (!"))%% ($")%&!'' *"&/!*
-!"+%)!. -!",$*). -!")+!,. -*"*%+*. -*",!&!.
T42*% $"!)!)''' *"&%#,'' *"!%+*'' (!"+$&$ +"*#*#'
-!"+%#+. -!",$%/. -!")+!!. -*"*$#/. -*",*%+.
T42*& +")&)/''' +"*))*''' $")/*)''' *"%/,& &"*!*$''
-!"+,&%. -!",&%+. -!")+&). -*"*,#+. -*",$%+.
?D-,5H62:/0- *,#& +$% *),# **! /%
L-,41/*+U;V465,1 !"!$&! !"!)!* !"!*%! !"*&%% !"*+%#
L5/D*W*T>:U;V465,1 !"!!!! !"!!!* !"!!!! !"!!!$ !"!!$!
7/=*7:F,):>//1 ($),+"#,*, (&,*"$*)* ($$)&"$&,/ (*+&"$*%& (*$%"#!$/
XXX*.YPZP"O*XX*.YPZP'O*X*.YPZ"
+/D4-2*-2601651*,55/5-*:0*.65,02>,-,-






* * * *
* * * * *
;4../52*K/5*]:01*L/8,5*:0*S,0,56)
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Table B.23. Individuals' Ratings for Directness as a Function of Others' Support 
Robustness Checks - Ordered Logit 
Interactions - High Others' Support*Experience Living Near a Wind Farm 
 
  
!"# !$# !%# !&# !'#
())*+,-./01,02-
3,4256)*/5*7/8,5*
90:2:6)*;4../52 <:=> 3,4256) 7/8
<:=>*?2>,5-@*;4../52 !"!#$% !"$!&'( )!"!$*+ *"'%%%((( !"&++,(
-!"!,*#. -!"##'!. -!"!,+%. -!"$&!&. -!"'##+.
!"%,+* *"%#%$(( !"*%'$ *'"%%&! %"',%*(((
-!"#+&*. -!"/!/*. -!"%!&!. -+%,"$!$#. -*"#&*,.
!"$/,#((( !"%'%*((( !"#%$&(( !"#+'#
-!"!'+&. -!"*!+'. -!"*!!%. -!"$&+%.
A:,8*8/4)1*B,*2650:->,1 )!"!$&$ )!"'#,,(( !"*!%/ )*"*#!*(( )!"&##!
-!"*#,*. -!"#%&%. -!"*$'&. -!"$,&,. -!"'/$!.
;>61/8*C):DE,5 )!"!!,+ !"%+%% !"!/$/ !"+*$* !"*$+*
-!"*'#%. -!"#/%'. -!"*+'&. -!"'',+. -!"''%+.
7/--,-*:0*.5/.,52F*G6)4, )!"!,#& )!"*$+/ )!"!%,* !"#*$# )!"%%*'
-!"*#++. -!"#$+*. -!"*$$/. -!"$,&,. -!"'&*%.
3/:-, !"$+'%((( !"$+*'(( !"'!,'((( !"'+&# !"#+,+
-!"*#,&. -!"#%&%. -!"*$/+. -!"$'$+. -!"',%/.
H/*0/2*,I.,D2*2/*B,*6JJ,D2,1 )!"%!%&(( )!"!%#% )!"##$% !"*!$/ !"&&+/
-!"*%/+. -!"%+%/. -!"*'%/. -!"/+*,. -!"&$*/.
K5/.,52F*A6)4,*90-4560D, !"$,&,((( !"#*,# !"'%&*((( !"!+#* )!"'&!!
-!"*'$'. -!"%'&%. -!"*/$#. -!"+$+&. -!",%''.
;>61/8*C):DE,5*L:2:=62:/0 )!"#!,+ )!"!!%, )!"#*$# )!"*,%% )*"!'+*
-!"*'#*. -!"%'#,. -!"*/*!. -!"+*#*. -!",,/&.
3/:-,*L:2:=62:/0 !"*+,*( )!"!!&% !"#%*&(( )!"*$'+ )!"!+*!
-!"*!$,. -!"#'//. -!"***,. -!"$$%$. -!"$+$'.
M"NOOOPF,65 !"%'%/(( )!"!+$+ !"%,+%(( !"#&/+ !"%%/*
-!"*'+,. -!"%/'&. -!"*/,#. -!"/&$%. -!"+!$,.
(=, )!"*'/+(( )!"$'#/((( )!"*%%/( )!"$!*& )*"!#*#((
-!"!/'/. -!"*+*/. -!"!/,%. -!"#,+!. -!"$*%$.
Q14D62:/0 !"!!&! )!"!$/# !"!#&! )!"%$/!((( !"***%
-!"!#,!. -!"!/&+. -!"!%*#. -!"*#&,. -!"*'*'.
90D/R, )!"!%!& )!"#*+'(( )!"!#&# )!"#'&& )!"%!*%
-!"!%/$. -!"*!#+. -!"!%&'. -!"#!*$. -!"#$#'.
</R,*/80,5->:. !"#//*( !",///(( !"*+$$ *"%/+*( %"$#+'(((
-!"*$*!. -!"%,//. -!"*$,*. -!"+/*$. -*"!#'*.
S,01,5 )!"!%'% )!"!',# )!"!*,! )!"!%/! )!"*&,#
-!"!,!%. -!"#*,/. -!"!,/$. -!"$*'%. -!"'$&$.
)!"#,*& )!"!%%$ )!"#/// )*/"%/,! *"!#$,
-!"*,!+. -!"%,+$. -!"#*##. -+%,"$!%+. -!"/,'#.
T42*" )!"%*** )*"//%!(( )*"%!'/(( )%"+&,,((( )!"$//+
-!"%/$%. -!"+*/'. -!"'%!'. -*"#/%+. -*"+$#'.
T42*$ !"#,!% )!",$#, )!"/+,% )%"!$+#(( !"%*#+
-!"%/#/. -!"+*#/. -!"'#+'. -*"#$*,. -*"+%&,.
T42*% *"&+$$((( !"'&'* !",%,'( )!",#*& #"!%&*
-!"%/''. -!"+**+. -!"'#/'. -*"#!'+. -*"+%#*.
T42*& %"%/,$((( #"#+,&((( #"$/+%((( *"!'+# %"!+$#(
-!"%+*$. -!"+#'$. -!"'%!&. -*"#$$!. -*"+$/#.
?B-,5G62:/0- *+&$ %#/ *'+& **! ,/
K-,41/*+U;V465,1 !"!#%, !"!'#* !"!*'+ !"*#&' !"*/*/
K5/B*W*T>:U;V465,1 !"!!!! !"!!!! !"!!!! !"!!** !"!!!#





* * * * * * * * *
* * * * * * * * * * * ******







Table B.24. Individuals' Ratings for Directness as a Function of Others' Support 
Robustness Checks - Ordered Logit  
Interactions - High Others' Support*Believe It Is Possible a Wind Farm Could be Built 1 
Mile From Home 
 
  
!"# !$# !%# !&# !'#
())*+,-./01,02-
3,4256)*/5*7/8,5*
90:2:6)*;4../52 <:=> 3,4256) 7/8
<:=>*?2>,5-@*;4../52 !"#"$%& "#'"(()) !"#*+&& +#%,&")) +#-'*$))
."#+-%(/ ."#(,((/ ."#+,'(/ ."#&%-%/ ."#%$$(/
"#+,(, !"#$'"+ "#*%"' "#*,%$ !"#"(%&
."#+&%&/ ."#$$$,/ ."#*"+*/ .+#"+%*/ ."#'(-%/
!"#"*,- "#$%,' !"#"'(- "#&$%- "#,*'$
."#+(-"/ ."#(*(&/ ."#+$$%/ ."#,+&$/ ."#%"&'/
"#$,-,))) "#($'+))) "#**$")) !"#*((&
."#"-&"/ ."#+"'"/ ."#+""&/ ."#$%**/
A:,8*8/4)1*B,*2650:->,1 !"#"-(' !"#,+-,)) "#"'(, !+#$'*,))) !+#(**%))
."#+*'*/ ."#*$"-/ ."#+$,"/ ."#-"'-/ ."#-$(+/
;>61/8*C):DE,5 !"#""$% "#$*-' "#"%&" "#,-&& "#+$"$
."#+-*-/ ."#*,(,/ ."#+%,+/ ."#-&-,/ ."#-$-$/
7/--,-*:0*.5/.,52F*G6)4, !"#"&(* !"#",(* !"#"*&' "#%'%% "#"&($
."#+*&+/ ."#*$%&/ ."#+$$'/ ."#-++$/ ."#-%-&/
3/:-, "#$&$,))) "#$,$%) "#-+-*))) "#%&*( "#$%''
."#+(""/ ."#*$"%/ ."#+$,%/ ."#$%&'/ ."#-%(,/
H/*0/2*,I.,D2*2/*B,*6JJ,D2,1 !"#*'&$)) !"#"($% !"#*+-- "#"%', "#$',-
."#+(,'/ ."#(%(+/ ."#+-(&/ ."#,&*'/ ."#&*%+/
K5/.,52F*A6)4,*90-4560D, "#$'"-))) "#*,-% "#-*$%))) "#*-'- "#'"%(
."#+-$'/ ."#(-',/ ."#+,$-/ ."#%$%$/ ."#&&+(/
;>61/8*C):DE,5*L:2:=62:/0 !"#*+,- "#"$"& !"#**,, !"#"+&( "#$&",
."#+-*(/ ."#(-(*/ ."#+,++/ ."#%*-+/ ."#'+('/
3/:-,*L:2:=62:/0 "#+%-+) "#"("+ "#**',)) !"#+-'' "#"+*,
."#+"$'/ ."#*-%-/ ."#+++'/ ."#$$$%/ ."#$&+'/
M"NOOOPF,65 "#(('*)) !"#"+$% "#(&'()) "#+"', "#(&"$
."#+-%&/ ."#(,-+/ ."#+,'"/ ."#,%*$/ ."#%"'+/
(=, !"#+-"()) !"#$"$+)) !"#+((() !"#+&+( !"#',&*))
."#",-&/ ."#+%"$/ ."#",'%/ ."#(*-"/ ."#$"%(/
Q14D62:/0 "#""', !"#"*&& "#"*&* !"#$""())) !"#"+''
."#"*'+/ ."#",',/ ."#"(+$/ ."#+*%$/ ."#+$'$/
90D/R, !"#"(+& !"#*$$,)) !"#"*'+ !"#+,+" !"#*+$,
."#"(,$/ ."#+"*$/ ."#"(&,/ ."#+&-$/ ."#*-*%/
</R,*/80,5->:. "#*$,%) +#"""()) "#+,$- "#-,', (#$&(")))
."#+$+(/ ."#(',&/ ."#+$'*/ ."#&-&,/ .+#"(',/
S,01,5 !"#"('' !"#",%+ !"#"*-, !"#+&%- "#+$(-
."#"'"-/ ."#**"&/ ."#"',,/ ."#$+(-/ ."#-$-*/
!"#++,% "#$%+' !"#*+(& !*#+$,())) +#'+",)))
."#+$"*/ ."#(++(/ ."#+-$$/ ."#,($$/ ."#,*-"/
T42*" !"#(*** !+#++(% !+#$*%,))) !*#'*(+)) !"#+,"+
."#(%'*/ ."#%-'"/ ."#-$*%/ .+#(*,*/ .+#%',"/
T42*$ "#*%'" !"#('$' !"#&""$ !*#+&-") "#,*"(
."#(%%,/ ."#%-%-/ ."#-(',/ .+#(+('/ .+#%'(&/
T42*% +#&,*$))) +#+(*' "#&+'& "#"++' *#*'%*
."#(&"(/ ."#%,""/ ."#-(&$/ .+#*&&*/ .+#%&'%/
T42*& (#(-,,))) *#&+,"))) *#($%%))) *#"-'' (#*++()
."#(&,"/ ."#%%$%/ ."#-$*-/ .+#(*-%/ .+#&"+"/
?B-,5G62:/0- +%&$ (*, +-%& ++" ',
K-,41/*+U;V465,1 "#"*(% "#"$'- "#"+,+ "#+*%" "#+(%+
K5/B*W*T>:U;V465,1 "#"""" "#"""* "#"""" "#""*+ "#""("





* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
* * * * * * * * * * * ******









Table B.25. Individuals' Ratings for Directness as a Function of Others' Support 
Robustness Checks - Ordered Logit  
Interactions - High Others' Support*Do Not Expect to be Affected by Wind Farm 
 




90:2:6)*;4../52 <:=> 3,4256) 7/8
<:=>*?2>,5-@*;4../52 !"!#$# !"$!%%&&& '!"(!() *"+$#,&&& *"%*-!&&&
.!"*(,!/ .!"((#$/ .!"*%-,/ .!"-!$!/ .!"%)#$/
!"!--% '!"(*)- !"(,++ '!"$,+# #"#*,!&&
.!"*)(-/ .!"$#+,/ .!"*,)%/ .*"!$*(/ .*"-+(-/
!"%$++&&& !"#-*#&&& !"(#--&& '!"(#$#
.!"!-),/ .!"*!,(/ .!"*!!(/ .!"%$%$/
A:,8*8/4)1*B,*2650:->,1 '!"!%+% '!"--,-&& !"*!*- '*"#%$%&&& '*"(##,&&
.!"*(+!/ .!"(#$+/ .!"*%-,/ .!"%,%%/ .!"-%!,/
;>61/8*C):DE,5 '!"!*!# !"%!)) !"!$)* !"$*#% !"*(*%
.!"*-(%/ .!"($($/ .!"*)-)/ .!"--,%/ .!"-#))/
7/--,-*:0*.5/.,52F*G6)4, '!"!+** '!"!)(! '!"!(%) !"-%#( '!"(**!
.!"*(),/ .!"(%$#/ .!"*%-!/ .!"%,,+/ .!"-)%!/
3/:-, !"%,*!&&& !"%##-& !"-#(-&&& !"$!() !"-)*#
.!"*#!*/ .!"(#)-/ .!"*%)#/ .!"%-%)/ .!"-)-!/
H/*0/2*,I.,D2*2/*B,*6JJ,D2,1 '!"##**&& !"!)*$ '!"#-%$&& !"*$$! '!"+$,,
.!"*$!#/ .!"-#$(/ .!"*)-,/ .!",+)(/ .*"!)%,/
K5/.,52F*A6)4,*90-4560D, !"%+)-&&& !"(-%+ !"-#-,&&& !"!-(* !",()+
.!"*-%$/ .!"#-,-/ .!"*$%(/ .!")#,%/ .!",%(!/
;>61/8*C):DE,5*L:2:=62:/0 '!"(!++ !"!(-! '!"(*$, '!"(##$ !"#$+-
.!"*-((/ .!"#-##/ .!"*$*(/ .!")!,)/ .!",$!*/
3/:-,*L:2:=62:/0 !"*))-& !"!*## !"(#**&& '!"*(,$ !"!-!)
.!"*!%+/ .!"(-$#/ .!"***+/ .!"%%#*/ .!"%,%%/
M"NOOOPF,65 !"#%$$&& '!"!#,, !"#+#%&& !"*!$, !"$!*#
.!"*-)$/ .!"#$#*/ .!"*$,+/ .!"$)*%/ .!"$,#!/
(=, '!"*-*)&& '!"%(),&& '!"*()$& '!"#(#- '*"!+!(&&&
.!"!$-$/ .!"*)!(/ .!"!$+%/ .!"(+%$/ .!"%*!$/
Q14D62:/0 !"!!+- '!"!%## !"!()! '!"#$!#&&& !"!#$$
.!"!(+!/ .!"!$,+/ .!"!#*(/ .!"*(,!/ .!"*%),/
90D/R, '!"!(+) '!"((-+&& '!"!($- '!"**)( '!"*)+-
.!"!#$%/ .!"*!#!/ .!"!#,-/ .!"*,%+/ .!"(%%,/
</R,*/80,5->:. !"(-%*& !"+$##&& !"*$(* *"!-*$ %"-$,,&&&
.!"*%*!/ .!"#+$!/ .!"*%+*/ .!")%)(/ .*"*)$#/
S,01,5 '!"!#%% '!"!,($ '!"!*)! '!"*,-) !"#$!!
.!"!+!#/ .!"((!,/ .!"!+$%/ .!"%!+,/ .!"-%(%/
'!"*!-$ !"-!+,& '!"(!(( '*",-+-&&& ("%$)!&&&
.!"*#+$/ .!"#!-)/ .!"*-%*/ .!"$(!*/ .!"$!#%/
T42*" '!"(,%) '*"%+!!&& '*"#$!-&& '#"*-)!&& !"))!!
.!"#$-!/ .!")**(/ .!"-#*)/ .*"($,%/ .*",(,)/
T42*$ !"#*$* '!"))-- '!")#%! '("%%-(& *"-,#)
.!"#$#%/ .!")!,!/ .!"-(,)/ .*"(-#!/ .*",#!(/
T42*% *",++!&&& !")%($ !",,$*& '!"#(%* #"($(*&
.!"#$$#/ .!")!)+/ .!"-())/ .*"((**/ .*",#!$/
T42*& #"#+#(&&& ("%(#*&&& ("%*-,&&& *"$+)- %"*$)!&&
.!"#)((/ .!")(()/ .!"-#*,/ .*"($-(/ .*",%#%/
?B-,5G62:/0- *),% #($ *-), **! +$
K-,41/*+U;V465,1 !"!(#- !"!%)% !"!*$( !"**-* !"*%)%
K5/B*W*T>:U;V465,1 !"!!!! !"!!!( !"!!!! !"!!%# !"!!!)





* * * * * * * * * * * ******





* * * * * * * * * * * *
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Table B.26. Individuals' Ratings for Directness as a Function of Others' Support 
Robustness Checks - Ordered Probit 
 
  
) ) ) )
456 476 486 496 4:6
;<<)!(%="'1('&%
>($&0?<)"0)@"A(0)
B'3&3?<)C$=="0& D3E+ >($&0?< @"A
!"!#$! !"###%&&& '!"!($) *"!+$+&&& !")(+#&&&
,!"!%!+- ,!"*(#%- ,!"!%$*- ,!"(..%- ,!"(./$-
!"(%$(&&& !"*+*)&&& !"*(..&& '!"*#!.
,!"!##(- ,!"!.!+- ,!"!%)*- ,!"(+#!-
F3(A)A"$<1)#()&?0'3%+(1 '!"!(). '!"()*)&& !"!%(( '!"+.*/&&& '!".!)%&
,!"!+.(- ,!"*$!%- ,!"!/%/- ,!"(+(#- ,!"#*%.-
C+?1"A)G<3,-(0 '!"!!)# !"*)%( !"!#(! !"$(#$ !"!$*/
,!"!/).- ,!"*%*$- ,!"*!%!- ,!"#!**- ,!"#*%(-
@"%%(%)3')=0"=(0&H)I?<$( '!"!%$/ '!"!.#+ '!"!(%$ !"##*) !"!)!*
,!"!+%#- ,!"*$%!- ,!"!/$)- ,!"()!$- ,!"#$#*-
>"3%( !"(//)&&& !"(.$/& !"#**!&&& !"#.!# !"*)%$
,!"!+%/- ,!"*#/*- ,!"!/%+- ,!"(%.)- ,!"#(%%-
J")'"&)(K=(,&)&")#()?LL(,&(1 '!"*#%+& !"!%*( '!"!)#* '!"!*.+ !"$!.!
,!"!+)*- ,!"((/)- ,!"!//.- ,!"#)+(- ,!"%!$/-
20"=(0&H)F?<$()B'%$0?',( !"(+)*&&& !"!/)( !"#!$+&&& !"!$(! !"*.+(
,!"!)!$- ,!"(*!#- ,!"!)%/- ,!"$*/*- ,!"$))*-
C+?1"A)G<3,-(0)M3&3E?&3"' '!"*##) '!"!((( '!"*#/* '!"*/.% '!"!+$/
,!"!/).- ,!"(*!*- ,!"!)$/- ,!"$(!*- ,!"%!.+-
>"3%()M3&3E?&3"' !"*!%+& '!"!!)# !"*$#+&& '!"*(.% '!"**#*
,!"!.*%- ,!"*$)#- ,!"!.%%- ,!"(%$%- ,!"(+#%-
N5OPPPQH(?0 !"(!#)&& '!"!+#. !"($$$&& !"!!// !"!/.#
,!"!)!)- ,!"(*$$- ,!"!)+(- ,!"#)**- ,!"$!$(-
;E( '!"!).$&& '!"(/$)&&& '!"!/%%&& '!"((/% '!".$!*&&&
,!"!#+)- ,!"!)/(- ,!"!#))- ,!"*+(!- ,!"($+!-
R1$,?&3"' !"!!%( '!"!(($ !"!*%/ '!"(!+/&&& !"!(+$
,!"!*+!- ,!"!#)/- ,!"!*/(- ,!"!+(+- ,!"!/()-
B',"S( '!"!*%$ '!"*!+)& '!"!*%+ '!"!/*# '!"***+
,!"!(*$- ,!"!%)$- ,!"!((%- ,!"*!+/- ,!"*$#*-
D"S()"A'(0%+3= !"*#%/ !"%)!/&& !"!/+. !".($) ("*)+#&&&
,!"!/()- ,!"(##$- ,!"!/+$- ,!"$(()- ,!"%/$*-
T('1(0 '!"!*#/ '!"!+#( '!"!!%# '!"!$** !"!%/!
,!"!%##- ,!"*().- ,!"!%+!- ,!"($!)- ,!"#*$(-
'!"!%). !"#$!*& '!"*()) '!")+/*&&& *"(#/*&&&
,!"!/!#- ,!"*+$+- ,!"!/)$- ,!"#$(.- ,!"##((-
*$&)5 '!"($#% '!").#!&& '!"+))%&& '*")/#!&&& '!"!)$)
,!"(*#)- ,!"$(#$- ,!"#*()- ,!"+*$/- ,*"!(+*-
*$&)7 !"!/#+ '!"%$*% '!"$.+* '*"%.$!&& !"#%($
,!"(*#*- ,!"$(((- ,!"#**$- ,!"+!%+- ,*"!(%.-
*$&)8 *"!#!*&&& !"#+#* !"$)$) '!"#*!( *"#!$*
,!"(*#/- ,!"$(*/- ,!"#*!+- ,!".)!$- ,*"!(*+-
*$&)9 *")($%&&& *"#!%(&&& *"$*.+&&& !"+%#* *"+)$+&
,!"(*.#- ,!"$(%*- ,!"#*(+- ,!"+!+)- ,*"!(%%-
/#%(0I?&3"'% *+/$ #(. *%+/ **! ).
2%($1")!.CU$?0(1 !"!((( !"!$#% !"!*% !"***) !"*(*+
20"#)V)*+3.CU$?0(1 !"!!!! !"!!!% !"!!!! !"!!#+ !"!!$)
@"E)@3-(<3+""1 '(%+/"%(.# '$+$"$)%$ '((%."$$.# '*#)"..!! '*()"!*(%
WWW)=XPYP5O)WW)=XPYP:O)W)=XPY5









Table B.27. Individuals' Ratings for Directness as a Function of Others' Support 
Robustness Checks - Ordered Logit 
Demographics Dropped 
 
) ) ) )
)
9:; 9<; 9=; 9>; 9?;
@AA)!(%8"'1('&%
B($&07A)"0)2"C(0)
D'4&47A)E$88"0& F43+ B($&07A 2"C
!"!##$ !"$%&'(( )!"!&*% !"+,'!((( !"-&,+((
.!"!-$-/ .!"&!*+/ .!"!+%,/ .!"',#-/ .!"'-&-/
!"*#+%((( !"&$,,(( !"&'#'(( !"%+#*
.!"!$,%/ .!"%!&-/ .!"!++%/ .!"*%#%/
G4(C)C"$A1)#()&70'4%+(1 )!"!#&& )!"*%%%( !"!+%' )!"+!--(( )!",#-*
.!"%&-,/ .!"&'%$/ .!"%**-/ .!"*'##/ .!"*+$'/
E+71"C)HA4,-(0 )!"!%'# !"&#+& !"!,%$ !"!&!$ !"!%--
.!"%$%$/ .!"&$,*/ .!"%,**/ .!"*-%,/ .!"*-,'/
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